PHILOSOPHY OF MIND SERIES Series Editor: Owen Flanagan, Duke University
Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life Owen Flanagan
DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND Stephen P. Stich
THE CONSCIOUS MIND
In Search of a Fundamental Theory
David J. Chalmers
THE Conscious Mind
IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY
David J. Chalmers
New York Oxford
Oxford University Press
What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the sub-jective life of a conscious mind? These questions are among the most hotly debated issues in science and philoso-phy today. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this debate as he lays out a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, but is still compatible with a scien-tific view of the world.
Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly establishes that contemporary cognitive science and neuroscience do not begin to explain how subjective experience emerges from neural processes in the brain. He pro-poses that conscious experience must instead be understood in a new light-as an irre-ducible entity (like such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a funda-mental level and cannot be understood as the sum of simpler physical parts. In the second half of the book, he sets out on a quest for a "fundamental theory"- a theory of the basic laws governing the structure and character of conscious experience-and shows how this reconception of the mind could lead us to a new science of consciousness.
Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that vividly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the possibility that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by sili-con chips - as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how
the author's ideas might be applied to sub-jects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
All of us have pondered the mysteries of consciousness. Engaging and penetrating, The Conscious Mind adds a fresh new perspective that will spark debate about our understand-ing of the mind for years to come.
About the Author
David J. Chalmers is a professor of philoso-phy at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Born in Sydney, Australia, he has been a Rhodes Scholar at the University of Oxford and a McDonnell Fellow at Washington Uni-versity. His article "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience" appeared in the December 1995 issue of Scientific American.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chalmers, David John
The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory p. cm. (Philosophy of mind series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Consciousness. 3. Mind and body. 4. Dualism. I. Title. II. Series.
BD418.3.C43 1996 128'.2-dc20 95-36036
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper.
I first became excited by consciousness and the mind-body problem as an undergraduate studying mathematics at the University of Adelaide. Conversations with a number of people, especially Paul Barter, Jon Baxter, Ben Hambly, and Paul McCann, helped form my ideas. Even then, the subject seemed about as fascinating a problem as there could be. It seemed faintly unreasonable that somebody could be occupied full-time thinking about something that was so much fun.
Later, as a graduate student at Oxford, I found that the mind was always occupying my thoughts where mathematics should have been, and I decided to switch fields and eventually to switch continents. Many people were patient and supportive during this difficult time, especially Michael Atiyah, Michael Dummett, and Robin Fletcher. Thanks also to all those who were subjected to hearing about whatever my latest theory of consciousness happened to be; the ideas in this book are a distant descendant.
My decision to move to Indiana University to gain a grounding in philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence was one of the best that I have made. I owe special thanks to Doug Hofstadter; it was his writing that first introduced me to the mysteries of the mind when I was young, and it was the stimulating and comfortable environment of his research lab, the Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, that allowed these ideas to develop. Although he disagrees with many of the ideas in this book, I would like to think that at some level what I have written remains true to the intellectual spirit of his work.
I wrote the first version of this work (then known as Toward a Theory of Consciousness) in a heady six-month period in 1992 and 1993. I had useful discussions with a number of people at Indiana around this time: everybody at CRCC, especially Bob French and Liane Gabora, and many in other departments, including Mike Dunn, Rob Goldstone, Anil Gupta, Jim Hettmer, Jerry Seligman, and Tim van Gelder. Thanks also to members of the consciousness discussion group in the back room at Nick's for many enjoyable Monday afternoon conversations.
A two-year McDonnell fellowship in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology at Washington University has provided another stimulating environ-
ment, as well as a chance to experience Zeno's paradox in finishing this book. I am grateful to the James S. McDonnell Foundation for their support, to all the participants in my graduate seminar on consciousness for discussions that helped to refine the book, and to a number of people for conversation and comments, including Morten Christiansen, Andy Clark, Jason Clevenger, Peggy DesAutels, Pepa Toribio, and Tad Zawidzki.
In the last couple of years, I have had an enormous amount of helpful conversation and correspondence about the material in this book. Among many others, thanks are due to Jon Baxter, Ned Block, Alex Byrne, Francis Crick, Dan Dennett, Eric Dietrich, Avi Elitzur, Matthew Elton, Owen Flanagan, Stan Franklin, Liane Gabora, GØven GØzeldere, Chris Hill, Terry Horgan, Steve Horst, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Christof Koch, Martin Leckey, Dave Leising, Kerry Levenberg, Joe Levine, David Lewis, Barry Loewer, Bill Lycan, Paul McCann, Daryl McCullough, Brian McLaughlin, Thomas Metzinger, Robert Miller, Andrew Milne, John O'Leary-Hawthorne, Joseph O'Rourke, Calvin Ostrum, Rhett Savage, Aaron Sloman, Leopold Stubenberg, and Red Watson. I am grateful to too many others to mention for interesting conversations about consciousness in general. A special note of thanks to Norton Nelkin, who returned his copy of the manuscript covered with many helpful comments not long before he died of lymphoma. He will be missed.
My broader philosophical debts are many. I developed my initial views on consciousness largely on my own, but these have been greatly enriched by my reading on the subject. One discovers quickly that any given idea has likely been expressed already by someone else. Among recent thinkers, Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, and Joseph Levine have done much to emphasize the perplexities of consciousness; their work covers much of the same territory as my early chapters. My work also overlaps with work by Ned Block, Robert Kirk, and Michael Lockwood at a number of points. The metaphysical framework that I develop in Chapter 2 owes much to the work of Terry Horgan, Saul Kripke, and David Lewis, among others, and Frank Jackson has independently developed a similar framework, presented in his marvelous 1995 John Locke lectures. The ideas of Daniel Dennett, Colin McGinn, John Searle, and Sydney Shoemaker have provided stimulating challenges throughout.
My greatest debts are to Gregg Rosenberg, for memorable conversations and valuable feedback; to Lisa Thomas, for a book on zombies and moral support; to Sharon Wahl, for expert editing and warm friendship; and above all, to' all three of my parents, for their support and encouragement. And thanks to all my qualia, and to the environment responsible for producing them, for constant inspiration.
As I was finishing this book, I received a fortune cookie in a restaurant, saying "Your life will be full of delightful mysteries." So far it has been, and I am very grateful.
Introduction: Taking Consciousness Seriously xi
1 Two Concepts of Mind 3
1. What is consciousness? 3
2. The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind 11
3. The double life of mental terms 16
4. The two mind-body problems 24
5. Two concepts of consciousness 25
2 Supervenience and Explanation 32
1. Supervenience 32
2. Reductive explanation 42
3. Logical Supervenience and reductive explanation 47
4. Conceptual truth and necessary truth* 52
5. Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical* 71
II THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
3 Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained? 93
1. Is consciousness logically supervenient on the physical? 93
2. The failure of reductive explanation 106
3. Cognitive modeling 111
4. Neurobiological explanation 115
5. The appeal to new physics 118
6. Evolutionary explanation 120
7. Whither reductive explanation? 121
4 Naturalistic Dualism 123
1. An argument against materialism 123
2. Objections from a posteriori necessity* 131
3. Other arguments for dualism* 140
4. Is this epiphenomenalism?* 150
5. The logical geography of the issues 161
6. Reflections on naturalistic dualism 168
5 The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment 172
1. Consciousness and cognition 172
2. The paradox of phenomenal judgment 177
3. On explaining phenomenal judgments 184
4. Arguments against explanatory irrelevance 191
5. The argument from self-knowledge* 192
6. The argument from memory* 200
7. The argument from reference* 201
III TOWARD A THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
6 The Coherence Between Consciousness and Cognition 213
1. Toward a nonreductive theory 213
2. Principles of coherence 218
3. More on the notion of awareness 225
4. The explanatory role of coherence principles 233
5. Coherence as a Psychophysical law 242
7 Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia 247
1. The principle of organizational invariance 247
2. Absent qualia 251
3. Fading qualia 253
4. Inverted qualia 263
5. Dancing qualia 266
6. Nonreductive functionalism 274
8 Consciousness and Information: Some Speculation 276
1. Toward a fundamental theory 276
2. Aspects of information 277
3. Some supporting arguments 287
4. Is experience ubiquitous? 293
5. The metaphysics of information 301
6. Open questions 308
9 Strong Artificial Intelligence 309
1. Machine consciousness 309
2. On implementing a computation 315
3. In defense of strong AI 320
4. The Chinese room and other objections 322
5. External objections 328
6. Conclusion 331
10 The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 333
1. Two mysteries 333
2. The framework of quantum mechanics 334
3. Interpreting quantum mechanics 337
4. The Everett interpretation 346
5. Objections to the Everett interpretation 351
6. Conclusion 356
Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. The science of physics is not yet complete, but it is well understood; the science of biology has removed many ancient mysteries surrounding the nature of life. There are gaps in our understanding of these fields, but they do not seem intractable. We have a sense of what a solution to these problems might look like; we just need to get the details right.
Even in the science of the mind, much progress has been made. Recent work in cognitive science and neuroscience is leading us to a better understanding of human behavior and of the processes that drive it. We do not have many detailed theories of cognition, to be sure, but the details cannot be too far off. Consciousness, however, is as perplexing as it ever was. It still seems utterly mysterious that the causation of behavior should be accompanied by a subjective inner life.
We have good reason to believe that consciousness arises from physical systems such as brains, but we have little idea how it arises, or why it exists at all. How could a physical system such as a brain also be an experience? Why should there be something it is like to be such a system? Present-day scientific theories hardly touch the really difficult questions about consciousness. We do not just lack a detailed theory; we are entirely in the dark about how consciousness fits into the natural order.
Many books and articles on consciousness have appeared in the past few years, and one might think that we are making progress. But on a closer look, most of this work leaves the hardest problems about consciousness untouched. Often, such work addresses what might be called the "easy" problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimula-
Taking Consciousness Seriously xvii
without loss, and I hope the structure brings out the deep relationships between a number of different issues.
This work is perhaps unusual in largely eschewing the philosophical notion of identity (between mental and physical states, say) in favor of the notion of Supervenience. I find that discussions framed in terms of identity generally throw more confusion than light onto the key issues, and often allow the central difficulties to be evaded. By contrast, Supervenience seems to provide an ideal framework within which the key issues can be addressed. To avoid loose philosophy, however, we need to focus on the strength of the Supervenience connection: Is it underwritten by logical necessity, natural necessity, or something else? It is widely agreed that consciousness supervenes on the physical in some sense; the real question is how tight the connection is. Discussions that ignore these modal issues generally avoid the hardest questions about consciousness. Those skeptical of modal notions will be skeptical of my entire discussion, but I think there is no other satisfactory way to frame the issues.
One of the delights of working on this book, for me, has come from the way the problem of consciousness has reached out to make contact with deep issues in many other areas of science and philosophy. But the scope and depth of the problem also make it humbling. I am acutely aware that at almost every point in this book there is more that could be said, and that in many places I have only scratched the surface. But I hope, minimally, to have suggested that it is possible to make progress on the problem of consciousness without denying its existence or reducing it to something it is not. The problem is fascinating, and the future is exciting.
No. Xia stopped, twirling toward him in slow motion. Her icy mint eyes grew wide. You're in danger here. Panic whitened her face as she stared toward the house. Go home now. Before it's too late. And find me the antidote.
What kind of antidote?
Xia disappeared beyond the junipers, yet her final message burst into Joey's mind like the pop of a firecracker: The antidote for zombie poison.
Dian Curtis Regan, My Zombie Valentine
Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from lumpy gray matter? We know consciousness far more intimately than we know the rest of the world, but we understand the rest of the world far better than we understand consciousness.
Consciousness can be startlingly intense. It is the most vivid of phenomena; nothing is more real to us. But it can be frustratingly diaphanous: in talking about conscious experience, it is notoriously difficult to pin down the subject matter. The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization:
Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness-to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989)
Almost anyone who has thought hard about consciousness will have some sympathy with these sentiments. Consciousness is so intangible that even this limited attempt at a definition could be disputed: there can arguably be perception and thought that is not conscious, as witnessed by the notions of subliminal perception and unconscious thought. What is central to conscious-
Two Concepts of Mind 11
seems illusory-it is certainly harder to pin down than any specific experiences-but there is a strong intuition that unity is there.
Sad to say, we will not again be involved this closely with the rich varieties of conscious experience. In addressing the philosophical mysteries associated with conscious experience, a simple color sensation raises the problems as deeply as one's experience of a Bach chorale. The deep issues cut across these varieties in a way that renders consideration of the nature of specific experiences not especially relevant. Still, this brief look at the rich varieties of conscious experience should help focus attention on just what it is that is under discussion, and provides a stock of examples that can be kept in mind during more abstract discussion.5
Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. To see this, observe that although modern cognitive science has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, it has had much to say about mind in general. The aspects of mind with which it is concerned are different. Cognitive science deals largely in the explanation of behavior, and insofar as it is concerned with mind at all, it is with mind construed as the internal basis of behavior, and with mental states construed as those states relevant to the causation and explanation of behavior. Such states may or may not be conscious. From the point of view of cognitive science, an internal state responsible for the causation of behavior is equally mental whether it is conscious or not.
At the root of all this lie two quite distinct concepts of mind. The first is the phenomenal concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state. This is the most perplexing aspect of mind and the aspect on which I will concentrate, but it does not exhaust the mental. The second is the psychological concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. A state is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behavior, or at least plays an appropriate role in the explanation of behavior. According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not. What matters is the role it plays in a cognitive economy.
On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does. There should be no question of competition between these two notions of mind. Neither of them is the correct analysis of mind. They cover different phenomena, both of which are quite real.
It seems reasonable to say that together, the psychological and the phenomenal exhaust the mental. That is, every mental property is either a phenomenal
Two Concepts of Mind 17
property, a psychological property, or some combination of the two. Certainly, if we are concerned with those manifest properties of the mind that cry out for explanation, we find first, the varieties of conscious experience, and second, the causation of behavior. There is no third kind of manifest explanandum, and the first two sources of evidence-experience and behavior-provide no reason to believe in any third kind of nonphenomenal, nonfunctional properties (with perhaps a minor exception for relational properties, discussed shortly). There are certainly other classes of mental states of which we often speak-intentional states, emotional states, and so on-but it is plausible that these can be assimilated to the psychological, the phenomenal, or a combination of the two.
Things are complicated by the fact that many everyday mental concepts straddle the fence, having both a phenomenal and a psychological component. Pain provides a clear example. The term is often used to name a particular sort of unpleasant phenomenal quality, in which case a phenomenal notion is central. But there is also a psychological notion associated with the term: roughly, the concept of the sort of state that tends to be produced by damage to the organism, tends to lead to aversion reactions, and so on. Both of these aspects are central to the commonsense notion of pain. We might say that the notion of pain is ambiguous between the phenomenal and the psychological concept, or we might say that both of these are components of a single rich concept.
One can tie oneself into all kinds of knots by worrying about whether the phenomenal quality or the functional role is more essential to pain. For instance, would a hypothetical system in which all the functional criteria were satisfied but in which the conscious experience were not present be truly in pain? One might be tempted to say no, but what of the fact that we speak of pains that last for a day, even though there are times when they are not conscious? There is little point trying to legislate matters one way or the other. Nothing important rests on the semantic decision as to whether some phenomenal quality is really essential for something to count as pain. Instead, we can recognize the different components associated with a concept and explicitly distinguish them, speaking for example of "phenomenal pain" and "psychological pain." Our everyday concept of pain presumably combines the two in some subtle weighted combination, but for philosophical discussion things are clearer if we keep them separate.
The reason why phenomenal and psychological properties are often run together is clear: it is because the relevant properties tend to co-occur. Generally, when the processes resulting from tissue damage and leading to aversion reaction take place, some sort of phenomenal quality is instantiated. That is, when psychological pain is present, phenomenal pain is usually also present. It is not a conceptual truth that the process should be accompanied
senses. So far, I have been focusing on the phenomenal sense, which itself subsumes all the previously mentioned phenomenal aspects of mind. To be conscious in this sense is just to instantiate some phenomenal quality. This is the key sense of "consciousness," or at least the one that poses the major explanatory problems. But it is not the only sense of the term. "Consciousness" can also be used to refer to a variety of psychological properties, such as reportability or introspective accessibility of information. We can group psychological properties of this sort under the label of psychological consciousness, as opposed to the phenomenal consciousness on which I have been concentrating.
This ambiguity can lead to much confusion in the discussion of consciousness. Frequently, someone putting forward an explanation of consciousness will start by investing the problem with all the gravity of the problem of phenomenal consciousness, but will end by giving an explanation of some aspect of psychological consciousness, such as the ability to introspect. This explanation might be worthwhile in its own right, but one is left with the sense that more has been promised than has been delivered.
There are numerous psychological notions for which the term "consciousness" is sometimes used. These include the following:
Awakeness. Sometimes we say that a person is conscious as another way of saying that they are not asleep. It makes sense to suppose that we have experiences while we are asleep, so this notion clearly does not coincide with phenomenal consciousness. Awakeness can plausibly be analyzed in functional terms-perhaps, at a first approximation, in terms of an ability to process information about the world and deal with it in a rational fashion.
Introspection. This is the process by which we can become aware of the contents of our internal states. If you ask me about my mental states, it is by introspection that I determine my answer. This access to one's mental states is an important component of the everyday concept of consciousness, and it is at least partly a functional notion. One might analyze it in terms of one's rational processes being sensitive to information about one's internal states in the right sort of way, and one's being able to use this information appropriately.
Reportability. This is our ability to report the contents of our mental states. It presupposes the ability to introspect, but is more constrained than that ability, as it presupposes a capacity for language. This concept of consciousness has often been the central target of philosophers and psychologists of an operationalist bent.
Two Concepts of Mind 27
Self-consciousness. This refers to our ability to think about ourselves, our awareness of our existence as individuals and of our distinctness from others. My self-consciousness might be analyzed in terms of my access to a self-model, or my possession of a certain sort of representation that is associated in some way with myself. It may well be that self-consciousness is limited to humans and a few species of animals.
Attention. We often say that someone is conscious of something precisely when they are paying attention to it; that is, when a significant portion of their cognitive resources is devoted to dealing with the relevant information. We can be phenomenally conscious of something without attending to it, as witnessed by the fringes of a visual field.
Voluntary control. In another sense, we say that a behavioral act is conscious when that act is performed deliberately; that is, where the action is caused in the appropriate sort of way by an element of prior thought.
Knowledge. In another everyday sense, we say that someone is conscious of a fact precisely when they know the fact, and that they are conscious of a thing precisely when they know about that thing. This notion is rarely the focus of technical discussion of consciousness, but it is probably as central to the everyday usage of the term as anything else.
That these are all largely functional notions can be seen from how one would explain the phenomena in question. If one were to try to explain attention, one might devise a model of the cognitive processes that lead to resources being concentrated on one aspect of available information rather than another. If one were to try to explain introspection, one would try to explain the processes by which one is sensitive to one's internal states in the appropriate way. Similar stories apply to explanation of the other properties. In each case, a functional explanation seems to capture what is central.
Although these concepts have a psychological core, many or all of them are associated with phenomenal states. There is a certain sort of phenomenal state associated with self-consciousness, for example. The same goes for introspection, attention, and the voluntary control of behavior. As with the other dual-aspect terms that I have discussed, terms such as "introspection" and "self-consciousness" are sometimes used to refer to the phenomenal state, which can lead to confusion. Indeed, some might argue that a phenomenal aspect is required for a process to truly qualify as "introspection," "attention," or whatever. As before, however, this issue is largely verbal. It is clear that there is a phenomenal and a psychological property in the vicinity of each of these concepts. Those who do not like to dignify the psychological property with a mental term such as "attention" can use the term "pseudo-attention" instead. The substantial philosophical issues remain the same, no matter what the properties are called.
terms of arrangement of basic qualities in those worlds, say), then there will automatically be a vast class of conceptually true conditionals that result.
It has traditionally been thought that all conceptual truths are knowable a priori, as are all necessary truths, and that the classes of a priori truths, necessary truths, and conceptual truths are closely related or even coextensive. Saul Kripke's book Naming and Necessity (1972) threw a wrench into this picture by arguing that there is a large class of necessarily true statements whose truth is not knowable a priori. An example is the statement "Water is H2O." We cannot know this to be true a priori; for all we know (or for all we knew at the beginning of inquiry), water is made out of something else, perhaps XYZ. Kripke argues that nevertheless, given that water is H2O in the actual world, then water is H2O in all possible worlds. It follows that "Water is H2O" is a necessary truth despite its a posteriori nature.
This raises a few difficulties for the framework I have presented. For example, on some accounts these necessary truths are conceptual truths, implying that not all conceptual truths are knowable a priori. On alternative accounts, such statements are not conceptual truths, but then the link between conceptual truth and necessity is broken. At various points in this book, I use a priori methods to gain insight into necessity; this is the sort of thing that Kripke's account is often taken to challenge.
On analysis, I think it can be seen that these complications do not change anything fundamental to my arguments; but it worth taking the trouble to get clear about what is going on. I will spend some time setting up a systematic framework for dealing with these issues, which will recur. In particular, I will present a natural way of capturing Kripke's insights in a two-dimensional picture of meaning and necessity. This framework is a synthesis of ideas suggested by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, Stalnaker, Lewis, Evans, Davies and Humberstone, and others who have addressed these two-dimensional phenomena.
On the traditional view of reference, derived from Frege although cloaked here in modern terminology, a concept determines a function f: W -> R from possible worlds to referents. Such a function is often called an intension; together with a specification of a world w, it determines an extension f(w). In Frege's own view, every concept had a sense, which was supposed to determine the reference of the concept depending on the state of the world; so these senses correspond closely to intensions. The sense was often thought of as the meaning of the concept in question.
More recent work has recognized that no single intension can do all the work that a meaning needs to do. The picture developed by Kripke complicates things by noting that reference in the actual world and in counterfactual
Supervenience and Explanation 57
Supervenience and Explanation 89
by noting that the primary intension of the concept picks out some actual-world referent that is projected (by rigidification) invariantly across physically identical worlds. All we need here for an explanation is an a priori conceptual analysis combined with contingent facts about the actual world.51 On the other hand, a mere natural Supervenience relation will itself be a contingent law. At best it will be explainable in terms of more fundamental laws; at worst, the Supervenience law will itself be fundamental. In either case, one explains certain regularities in the world by invoking fundamental laws, just as one does in physics, and as always, fundamental laws are where explanation must stop. Mere natural Supervenience is ontologically expensive, as we have seen, so it is fortunate that logical Supervenience is the rule and natural Supervenience the exception.
Almost everything in the world can be explained in physical terms; it is natural to hope that consciousness might be explained this way, too. In this chapter, however, I will argue that consciousness escapes the net of reductive explanation. No explanation given wholly in physical terms can ever account for the emergence of conscious experience. This may seem to be a negative conclusion, but it leads to some strong positive consequences that I will bring out in later chapters.
To make the case against reductive explanation, we need to show that consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical. In principle, we need to show that it does not supervene globally-that is, that all the microphysical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness. In practice, it is easier to run the argument locally, arguing that in an individual, microphysical facts do not entail the facts about consciousness. When it comes to consciousness, local and global Supervenience plausibly stand and fall together, so it does not matter much which way we run the argument: if consciousness supervenes at all, it almost certainly supervenes locally. If this is disputed, however, all the arguments can be run at the global level with straightforward alterations.
How can we argue that consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical? There are various ways. We can think about what is conceivable, in order to argue directly for the logical possibility of a situation in which the physical facts are the same but the facts about experience are different. We can appeal to epistemology, arguing that the right sort of link between
94 The Irreducibility of Consciousness
knowledge of physical facts and knowledge of consciousness is absent. And we can appeal directly to the concept of consciousness, arguing that there is no analysis of the concept that could ground an entailment from the physical to the phenomenal. In what follows I will give arguments using all three of these strategies. The first two are essentially arguments from conceivability, the second two are arguments from epistemology, and the fifth is an argument from analysis. There is some element of redundancy among the five arguments, but together they make a strong case.
One can also do things more directly, making the case against reductive explanation without explicitly appealing to logical Supervenience. I have taken that route elsewhere, but here I will give the more detailed analysis to allow a fuller case. All the same, the case against reductive explanation and the critique of existing reductive accounts (in section 2 onward) should make sense even without this analysis. Some readers might like to proceed there directly, at least on a first reading.
(A technical note: The burden of this chapter is to argue, in effect, that there is no a priori entailment from physical facts to phenomenal facts. The sort of necessity that defines the relevant Supervenience relation is the a priori version of logical necessity, where primary intensions are central. As we saw in Chapter 2, this is the relation that is relevant to issues about explanation; matters of a posteriori necessity can be set to one side. In the next chapter, issues of ontology rather than explanation are central, and I argue separately that there is no a posteriori necessary connection between physical facts and phenomenal facts.)
The most obvious way (although not the only way) to investigate the logical Supervenience of consciousness is to consider the logical possibility of a zombie: someone or something physically identical to me (or to any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether.1 At the global level, we can consider the logical possibility of a zombie world: a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences at all. In such a world, everybody is a zombie.
So let us consider my zombie twin. This creature is molecule for molecule identical to me, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a completed physics, but he lacks conscious experience entirely. (Some might prefer to call a zombie "it," but I use the personal pronoun; I have grown quite fond of my zombie twin.) To fix ideas, we can imagine that right now I am gazing out the window, experiencing some nice green sensations from seeing the trees outside, having pleasant taste experiences through munching on a chocolate bar, and feeling a dull aching sensation in my right shoulder.
Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained? 95
Figure 3.1. Calvin and Hobbes on zombies.
Figure 3.1. Calvin and Hobbes on zombies. (Calvin and Hobbes ¿ Watterson. Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved)
Naturalistic Dualism 151
this position implies is only counterintuitive, and that ultimately a degree of epiphenomenalism can be accepted.
There are a number of ways in which one might try to preserve the failure of logical Supervenience while nevertheless avoiding epiphenomenalism. The most obvious of these is to deny the causal closure of the physical, and to embrace a strong form of interactionist dualism in which the mental fills causal gaps in physical processing. I think this strategy should be avoided, for reasons I discuss shortly. However, there are a number of more subtle options that depend on an appropriate view of metaphysics and especially of causation. I discuss four such options.
1. Regularity-based causation. The first option is to accept a strong Humean account of causation, upon which all it is for A to cause B is for there to be a uniform regularity between events of type A and events of type B. Such a view would allow a "causal" role for the phenomenal: the mere fact that pain sensations are generally followed by withdrawal reactions would imply that pain causes withdrawal reactions.
A related non-Humean option identifies a causal connection with any nomic (or lawful) connection, even if a nomic regularity is something more than a uniform regularity. The natural Supervenience view is entirely compatible with the existence of a nomic connection between experience and behavior (for example, there might be a lawful connection between experience and an underlying brain state, and a lawful connection between that brain state and behavior). One might claim that this is enough for causation. This might be supported by noting that the counterfactual "Behavior would have been the same even in the absence of experience" is false on the most natural interpretation: if the experience were absent, the brain state would have been different, and behavior would have been different. Here, the counterfactual is assessed by considering naturally possible worlds, rather than logically possible worlds.
I find both of these positions implausible. I have argued against Humean views of causation in Chapter 2, and even on the non-Humean view it is implausible that just any nomic connection suffices for causation-think of the correlation between the hair color of identical twins, for instance. Nevertheless, considerations like these at least give us an idea of why consciousness appears to play a causal role. There are all sorts of systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to infer a causal connection. Faced with such regularities, we would expect people to infer a causal relation for broadly Humean reasons. This can therefore explain away some of our intuitions that con-
152 The Irreducibility of Consciousness
sciousness is causally efficacious, thus supporting the second prong of the strategy.
2. Causal overdetermination. Perhaps we might claim that a physical state and a phenomenal state, though wholly distinct, might both qualify as causing a later physical state. If physical state P1 is associated with phenomenal state Q1, then perhaps it is true both that P1 causes a later physical state P2 and that Q1 causes P2. This is counterintuitive: P1 is already a sufficient cause of P2, so Q1 would seem to be causally redundant. But it is not obvious that Q1 could not stand in a causal relation to P1 nevertheless. This may be especially reasonable if we adopt a nonreductive view of causation (of the sort
"advocated by Tooley 1987). Perhaps there is an irreducible causal connection between the two physical states, and a separate irreducible causal connection between the phenomenal state and the physical state.
This sort of causal overdetermination of events is often regarded with suspicion, but it is hard to demonstrate conclusively that there is something wrong with it. The nature of causation is sufficiently ill understood that overdetermination cannot yet be ruled out. I will not pursue this line myself, but it nevertheless deserves to be taken seriously.
3. The nonsupervenience of causation. A third strategy rests with the very nature of causation itself. We saw in Chapter 2 that there are two classes of facts that do not supervene logically on particular physical facts: facts about consciousness and facts about causation. It is natural to speculate that these two failures might be intimately related, and that consciousness and causation have some deep metaphysical tie. Both are quite mysterious, after all, and two mysteries might be more neatly wrapped into one. Perhaps, for instance, experience itself is a kind of causal nexus; perhaps it somehow realizes Hume's "unknowable causal relation"; or perhaps the relationship is more complex. A relationship like this might suggest a role for experience in causation that is more subtle than the usual sort of causation, but nevertheless avoids the strongest form of epiphenomenalism.
A proposal like this has been developed by Rosenberg (1996), who argues that many of the problems of consciousness are precisely paralleled by problems about causation. He argues that because of these parallels, it may be that experience realizes causation, or some aspects of causation, in the actual world. On this view, causation needs to be realized by something in order to support its many properties, and experience is a natural candidate. If this is so, it may be that it is the very existence of experience that allows for causal relations to exist, so that there is a subtle sort of relevance for experience in causation.
Of course, this proposal is extremely speculative, and faces some problems. For a start, it seems to lead to a version of panpsychism, the view
Naturalistic Dualism 153
The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment 209
ogy and reference, turn out merely to be challenges. Consideration of these points raises a large number of interesting issues, but at the end of the day we have seen that there is good reason to believe that the epistemology and semantics of experience cannot be essentially causal, and should instead be understood in other terms. I have said a little here about how one might go about understanding those things on a property dualist view. A full understanding of these issues would require a lengthy separate investigation; but I hope I have said enough to make clear that the nonreductive view provides a natural framework for making sense of these issues.
Even if consciousness cannot be reductively explained, there can still be a theory of consciousness. We simply need to move to a nonreductive theory instead. We can give up on the project of trying to explain the existence of consciousness wholly in terms of something more basic, and instead admit it as fundamental, giving an account of how it relates to everything else in the world.
Such a theory will be similar in kind to the theories that physics gives us of matter, of motion, or of space and time. Physical theories do not derive the existence of these features from anything more basic, but they still give substantial, detailed accounts of these features and of how they interrelate, with the result that we have satisfying explanations of many specific phenom-ena involving mass, space, and time. They do this by giving a simple, power-ful set of laws involving the various features, from which all sorts of specific phenomena follow as a consequence.
By analogy, the cornerstone of a theory of consciousness will be a set of Psychophysical laws governing the relationship between consciousness and physical systems. We have already granted that consciousness supervenes naturally (although not logically) on the physical. This Supervenience must be underwritten by Psychophysical laws; an account of these laws will tell us just how consciousness depends on physical processes. Given the physical facts about a system, such laws will enable us to infer what sort of conscious experience will be associated with the system, if any. These laws will be on a par with the laws of physics as part of the basic furniture of the universe.
214 Toward a Theory of Consciousness
310 Toward a Theory of Consciousness
A number of new insights would be required to turn this idea into a satisfying theory. Perhaps a breakthrough could come from considering the problem of the previous section: how to square phenomenal information on the macroscopic scale with the "intrinsic property" view of information at the microscopic scale. Another might come from trying to find a constraint that yields the class of physically realized information spaces that are realized in experience. Others may come from sources I have not considered at all.
The idea may prove to be entirely misguided. That would not surprise me; in fact, I think it is more likely than not that the key to a fundamental theory will lie elsewhere. But I have put these ideas forward because we need to start thinking about these matters, and because seeing even an inadequate example in the genre may be instructive. I also hope that some of the ideas raised along the way-about how to explain phenomenal judg-ments, about the ubiquity of experience, and about the connection between experience, information, and intrinsic properties of the physical-may turn out to be useful even when translated into a different framework. Perhaps a more adequate theory of consciousness could share something of the feel of the ideas put forward here, even if its details are very different.
It is often said that the problem with theories of consciousness of this sort is that they are too speculative and untestable. But I think the real problem with the "theory" I have put forward is different: it is too unspecific in its predictions. If we had a theory of a comparable level of simplicity that could predict all the specific facts about our experiences-even only those facts familiar from the first-person case-when given the physical facts about our processing system, that would be a remarkable achievement, and would give us very good reason to accept the theory as true. Right now we have no such theory, but there is no reason to believe that such a theory is impossible.
Could a machine be conscious? Could an appropriately programmed com-puter truly possess a mind? These questions have been the subject of an enormous amount of debate over the last few decades. The field of artificial intelligence (or AI) is devoted in large part to the goal of reproducing mental-ity in computational machines. So far progress has been limited, but support-ers argue that we have every reason to believe that eventually computers will truly have minds. At the same time, opponents argue that computers are limited in a way that human beings are not, so that it is out of the question for a conscious mind to arise merely in virtue of computation.
Objections to artificial intelligence typically take one of two forms. First, there are external objections, which try to establish that computational sys-tems could never even behave like cognitive systems. According to these objections, there are certain functional capacities that humans have that no computer could ever have. For example, sometimes it is argued that because these systems follow rules, they could not exhibit the creative or flexible behavior that humans exhibit (e.g., Dreyfus 1972). Others have argued that computers could never duplicate human mathematical insight, as computa-tional systems are limited by Gödel's theorem in a way that humans are not (Lucas 1961; Penrose 1989).
External objections have been difficult to carry through, given the success of computational simulation of physical processes in general. In particular, it seems that we have good reason to believe that the laws of physics are computable, so that we at least ought to be able to simulate human behavior computationally. Sometimes this is disputed, by arguing for a noncomputable
The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 357
to collapse the wave function. On the Bohm view, Everett's uncollapsed wave function remains present as the "pilot wave" that guides the position of the various particles. All the structure that is present in other components thus remains present in the state of the world, even though most of it is irrelevant to the evolution of the particles. Given that these views, too, require an uncollapsed wave function in central roles, one might argue that the relative implausibility of the Everett view is diminished.
Of course, it is always possible that a new theory might be developed that surpasses all of these in plausibility and theoretical virtue. But it does not seem especially likely. The complete absence of experimental anomalies sug-gests that the quantum-mechanical calculus is here to stay as a predictive theory. If so, we cannot expect empirical developments to solve the problem. Perhaps conceptual developments could lead to a new and improved interpre-tation, but it may be that by now the most promising niches in conceptual space have already been exploited. If so, we may be stuck with something like the current range of options-perhaps with significant refinements, but with advantages and disadvantages of a qualitatively similar kind. Of these options, the Everett interpretation seems in many ways the most attractive, but at the same time it is the hardest to accept.
I have advocated some counterintuitive views in this work. I resisted mind-body dualism for a long time, but I have now come to the point where I accept it, not just as the only tenable view but as a satisfying view in its own right. It is always possible that I am confused, or that there is a new and radical possibility that I have overlooked; but I can comfortably say that I think dualism is very likely true. I have also raised the possibility of a kind of panpsychism. Like mind-body dualism, this is initially counterintu-itive, but the counterintuitiveness disappears with time. I am unsure whether the view is true or false, but it is at least intellectually appealing, and on reflection it is not too crazy to be acceptable.
The craziness of the Everett interpretation is of another order of magni-tude. I find it easily the most intellectually appealing of the various interpreta-tions of quantum mechanics, but I confess that I cannot wholeheartedly believe it. If God forced me to bet my life on the truth or falsity of the doctrines I have advocated, I would bet fairly confidently that experience is fundamental, and weakly that experience is ubiquitous. But on the Everett interpretation I would be torn, and perhaps I would not be brave enough to bet on it at the end of the day.9 Maybe it is simply too strange to believe. Still, it is not clear whether much weight should be put on these intui-tive doubts in the final analysis. The view is simple and elegant, and it pre-dicts that there will be observers who see the world just as I see it. Is that not enough? We may never be able to accept the view emotionally, but we should at least take seriously the possibility that it is true.
1. See Nagel 1974. The first use of this phrase in philosophical contexts is usually attributed to Farrell (1950). See also Sprigge 1971.
2. Different authors use the term "qualia" in different ways. I use the term in what I think is the standard way, to refer to those properties of mental states that type those states by what it is like to have them. In using the term, I do not mean to make any immediate commitment on further issues, such as whether qualia are incorrigibly knowable, whether they are intentional properties, and so on. Qualia can be properties of "internal" mental states as well as of sensations. It is often convenient to speak as if qualia are properties instantiated directly by a subject, rather than by that subject's mental states; this practice is harmless, and justified by the fact that qualia correspond to mental state-types in their own right.
3. I use expressions such as "red sensation," "green experience," and the like throughout this book. Of course by doing this I do not mean to imply that experiences instantiate the same sort of color properties that are instantiated by objects (apples, trees) in the external world. This sort of talk can always be rephrased as "experience of the type that I usually have (in the actual world) when looking at red objects," and so on, but the briefer locution is more natural.
4. Cook 12 cups of dried black-eyed peas in boiling water to which 4 tablespoons of salt have been added. Cook until tender, and immerse in cold water. Combine 2 diced red peppers, 5 diced green peppers, 2 diced large onions, 3 cups of raisins, and a bunch of chopped cilantro in a dressing made of 1.5 cups of corn oil, 0.75 cup of wine vinegar, 4 tablespoons of sugar, 1 tablespoon of salt, 4 tablespoons of black pepper, 5 tablespoons of curry powder, and a half-tablespoon of ground cloves. Serve chilled. Thanks to Lisa Thomas and the Encore CafÊ.
5. For a wealth of reflection on the varieties of specific experiences, see Acker man's A Natural History of the Senses (1990), which provides material for those absorbed by their conscious experience to mull over for days.
6. Interestingly, Descartes often excluded sensations from the category of the mental, instead assimilating them to the bodily, so not every phenomenal state (at least as I am understanding the notion) would count as mental, either.
7. This common interpretation of Ryle does not do justice to the subtlety of his views, but it is at least a useful fiction.
8. There are other forms of functionalism, such as that developed by Putnam (1960). I do not consider these here, as they were put forward as empirical hypotheses rather than as analyses of mental concepts.
360 Notes to pages 15-29
1. The idea of Supervenience was introduced by Moore (1922). The name was introduced in print by Hare (1952). Davidson (1970) was the first to apply to the notion to the mind-body problem. More recently, a sophisticated theory of Supervenience has been developed by Kim (1978, 1984, 1993), Horgan (1982, 1984c, 1993), Hellman and Thompson (1975), and others.
2. I use "A-fact" as shorthand for "instantiation of an A-property." The appeal to facts makes the discussion less awkward, but all talk of facts and their relations can ultimately be cashed out in terms of patterns of co-instantiation of properties; I give the details in notes, where necessary. In particular, it should be noted that the identity of the individual that instantiates an A-property is irrelevant to an A-fact as I am construing it; all that matters is the instantiation of the property. If the identity of an individual were partly constitutive of an A-fact, then any A-fact would entail facts about that individual's essential properties, in which case the definition of Supervenience would lead to counterintuitive consequences.
3. I assume, perhaps artificially, that individuals have precise spatiotemporal boundaries, so that their physical properties consist in the properties instantiated in that region of space-time. If we are to count spatially distinct objects as physically identical for the purposes of local Supervenience, any properties concerning absolute spatiotemporal position must be omitted from the Supervenience base (although one could avoid the need to appeal to spatially distinct objects by considering only merely possible objects with the same position). Also, I always talk as if the same sort of individual instantiates low-level and high-level properties, so that a table, for example, instantiates microphysical properties by virtue of being characterized by a distribution of such properties. Perhaps it would be more strictly correct to talk of microphysical properties as being instantiated only by microphysical entities, but my way of speak-ing simplifies things. In any case, the truly central issues will all involve global rather than local Supervenience.
4. There are various ways to specify precisely what it is for two worlds to be identical with respect to a set of properties; this will not matter much to the discus-
362 Notes to pages 35-38
1. Edelman (1992) similarly subtitles his (purportedly materialist) book How the Mind Originates in the Brain.
2. On my reading, Searle's view is much more naturally interpreted as property dualism than as materialism, despite Searle's own view of the matter. The claim that brain states cause phenomenal states and the use of zombie arguments support this
Notes to pages 130-137 371
reading, as does the claim that "what is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more." Searle's argument about intentional-ity in his Chapter 8 also supports this reading. Searle argues that intentionality is real (p. 156), but that intentional facts cannot be constituted by neurophysiological facts (pp. 157-58). The only solution to the puzzle, he argues, is that consciousness must be partly constitutive of intentionality, as consciousness is the only other thing in the brain's ontology. This argument seems to presuppose property dualism about consciousness.
In explaining his ontology in Chapter 5, Searle argues that consciousness is irreduc-ible, but that this has no deep consequences. He says that phenomena such as heat are reducible only because we redefine them to eliminate the phenomenal aspect (in the way I discussed in Chapter 2), but that this sort of redefinition is trivially inapplica-ble to consciousness, which consists entirely in its subjective aspect. This seems correct. As I put it in Chapter 2, phenomena such as heat are reductively explainable only modulo conscious experience. But he goes on to say that "this shows that the irreducibility of consciousness is a trivial consequence of the pragmatics of our definitional practices" (p. 122). This seems to get things backward. Rather, the practices are consequences of the irreducibility of consciousness: if we did not factor out the experience of heat, we could not reduce heat at all! Thus irreducibility is a source, not a consequence, of our practices. It is hard to see how any of this trivializes the irreducibility of consciousness.
3. Closely related arguments for why a materialist cannot appeal to a posteriori necessity have been given by Jackson (1980,1994), Lewis (1994), and White (1986).
4. Jackson (1980) makes a similar point, arguing that even if a posteriori considera-tions can establish the physicality of the property pain, a problem for materialism still arises from the property pain-presents.
5. Bealer (1994) also suggests pivoting on the physical term as a strategy here, although he does not follow the reasoning through to the natural conclusion.
6. Few have explicitly taken this position in print. Most who appeal to a posteriori necessity in defense of materialism appeal to the Kripkean considerations (e.g., Hill 1991; Lycan 1995; Tye 1995), and almost nobody has explicitly defended the stronger brand of metaphysical necessity to this end. On a natural reading, however, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Byrne (1993), Levine (1993), and Loar (1990) are implicitly committed to a position like this. Byrne, Levine, and Terry Horgan have advocated the position in personal communication.
7. One sometimes hears that mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary but not conceptually necessary. This depends on subtle issues concerning the analysis of mathematical concepts and conceptual necessity, but it is nevertheless widely agreed that mathematical truths are a priori (with the slight caveat mentioned in the next section of the text). Most crucially, there is not even a conceivable world in which mathematical truths are false. So these truths do not make the space of possible worlds any smaller than the set of conceivable worlds.
It might be suggested that moral Supervenience is an example of metaphysical Supervenience without an a priori connection, but the case for strong metaphysical necessity seems even weaker here than in the case of experience. There are options available here (antirealism, a priori connection) that are much more palatable than the corresponding alternatives for conscious experience. Further, there does not even seem to be a conceivable world that is physically and mentally identical to ours but
372 Notes to pages 138-141
Notes to pages 150-168 375
27. Horgan (1987) speaks of "metaphysical" Supervenience in this context, as does Byrne (1993). If I am right that metaphysical possibility and logical possibility (of worlds) coincide, however, then logical Supervenience follows.
28. For other versions of this point, see Blackburn 1990, Feigl 1958, Lockwood 1989, Maxwell 1978, and Robinson 1982.
29. A view of the world as pure causal flux is put forward by Shoemaker (1980), who argues that all properties are "powers," with no further properties to underlie these powers. Shoemaker's argument for this view is largely verificationist, and he does not directly confront the problems that the view faces.
Shoemaker further argues that as the powers associated with a property are essen-tial to it, the laws of nature must be necessary a posteriori. (Swoyer  argues similarly, and Kripke  flirts with the conclusion.) The two-dimensional analysis of a posteriori necessity suggests that there must be something wrong with this suggestion, or at least that it is more limited than it sounds. At best, it might be that worlds with different laws are not correctly described as containing electrons (say); these considerations cannot rule such worlds impossible. Further, it seems implausible to hold that all the powers associated with electrons are constitutive of electronhood. More plausibly, for an entity to qualify as an electron only some of these powers are required, and mildly counternomic worlds containing electrons are possible. Shoemaker argues that there is no way to distinguish constitutive powers from non-constitutive powers, but the two-dimensional analysis suggests that this distinction falls out of the concept of electronhood.
A number of issues should be distinguished. (1) Is reference to physical properties fixed relationally? (Shoemaker, Chalmers: Yes.) (2) Are physical properties identical to relational properties (in secondary intension)? (S: Yes; C: Probably, but semantic intuitions may differ.) (3) Are all the nomic relations of a physical property essential to it? (S: Yes; C: No.) (4) Are there intrinsic properties underlying these relational properties? (S: No; C: Yes).
30. This view has been advocated in recent years by Lockwood (1989) and Maxwell (1978), both of whom put the view forward as an unorthodox version of the identity theory. The view has been relentlessly pushed on me by Gregg Rosenberg.
31. Although see Lahav and Shanks 1992 for a contrary view.
32. Lewis (1990) reaches a similar conclusion in a quite different way.
33. This is the issue on which I have occasionally taken polls when giving talks on consciousness, and on other occasions. The results are consistently 2:1 or 3:1 in favor of there being something further that needs explaining. Of course philosophy is not best done by democracy, but when we come to one of these issues that argument cannot resolve, the balance of prior intuition carries a certain weight.
34. Biological materialism. A common view (Hill 1991; Searle 1992) is that con-sciousness is necessarily biological. On this view, materialism is true, but unconscious systems with the same functional organization as conscious systems are logically possible and probably even empirically possible. Once we have admitted the logical possibility of an unconscious functional isomorph of me, however, we must surely admit the logical possibility of an unconscious biological isomorph of me, as there is no more of a conceptual link from neurophysiology to conscious experience than there is from silicon. This view is therefore probably best seen as a version of property dualism, with consciousness as a further fact over and above the physical facts. If not, then at best it must be combined with an appeal to strong metaphysical necessity
376 Notes to page 168
1. Lycan 1987, for example.
2. Churchland and Churchland (1981) have objected to the "Chinese nation" arguments on the grounds that such a system would need to handle around 1030,000,000 inputs to the retina, and an even vaster number of internal states of the brain. The population simulation, requiring one person per input and one person per state, would therefore require vastly more people than a population could provide.
This objection overlooks the fact that both inputs and internal states are combina-torially structured. Instead of representing each input pattern (over 108 cells) with a single person, thus requiring 210 people, we only need 108 people to represent the input as a structured pattern. The same goes for internal states. We therefore need no more people than there are cells in the brain.
3. Bogen (1981) and Lycan (1987) make the suggestion that such "accidental" situations would not have qualia, as qualia require teleology. This would have the
Notes to pages 252-265 387
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A posteriori necessity, 38, 52, 55-65, 366n28, 367n34; irrelevance to reductive explanation, 45,57, 69, 94, 98,101, 365n22; and knowledge argument, 141-44; and Kripke's argument against materialism, 146-49, 374n25; and logical supervenience, 78-79,94,98; and materialism, 129,131-38, 162, 164, 371nn3-8; and moral properties, 83-84, 371n7; two-dimensional account of, 56-65, 365n67, 374n25, 375n29
A priori truth, 63,64,69, 88,138,366n28; link with necessary truth, 62-64, 69. See also Conceptual truth
Ability analysis, 104, 144-45, 166
Absent qualia, 249-50, 274-75; arguments against, 253-63,270; arguments for, 251-53; logical possibility of (see Chinese population; Zombie)
Abstract entities, 71, 280, 315, 367n36
Access consciousness, 29, 228-29
Accessibility, 105, 112, 185-86, 290-92, 220-33, 253, 360nl5
Ackerman, D., 8, 359
Adams, R. M., 366
Aesthetic properties, 83-84
Akins, K., 236
Albert, D., 341, 345, 347, 354, 391
Alexander, S., 49, 378
Analysis. See Conceptual analysis
Analytic truth. See Conceptual truth
Angel world, 39-40, 81, 85, 363nl6, 369n47
Animal consciousness, 8,27,28,103,105,225, 226, 228, 231, 236-38, 242, 246, 257, 294-95, 383nl0
Anomalous monism, 168, 377n37
Armstrong, D. M., 14-15, 30, 166, 360, 367, 369, 382
Artificial intelligence, 184-86, 275, 313-32; external objections to, 313-14,322,328-31, 389nn7-8; internal objections to, 314,322-28
Artificial life, 121, 129
Aspectual shape, 360nl0
Attention, 27, 29, 112, 219, 269, 272-73
Auditory experience, 7-8, 220, 234
Austin, D. F., 373
Availability, 220, 223-33, 236-42, 276 288 300-301, 377n38, 382n8
Awakeness, 6, 26, 29
Awareness: coherence with consciousness, 28-29, 220-46, 276; definition of, 28, 29, 116, 222, 225-29, 246, 361nl5; distinctness from consciousness, 105, 165, 239; explanation of, 29-31, 112, 239-42; made up of judgments/registrations, 175-76, 383-84; structure of, 223-25, 234-36, 242-43, 287-88
Baars, B. J., 112-13, 238, 241
Backup circuit, 267-68, 270, 325
Bacon, J., 88
Barwise, J., 280
Basic laws. See Fundamental laws
Bateson, G., 281
Bats, 103, 236, 294
Bauer, E., 339
Bealer, G., 371, 374
Behavioral dispositions, 14, 191, 248, 255, 268-69
Behavioral invariance, 261-62
Behaviorism, 13, 166
Belief: about consciousness (see Phenomenal judgments); content of, 19, 65, 360nl2, 366n29,368nn42-43; and fading qualia, 256, 258-59; functionalist analysis of, 13-15, 19-20, 256, 269, 376n36; inflationary/ deflationary construals of, 20,175,178,192, 199, 377n38; vs. judgment, 174-75, 191-92, 203, 207-8, 232; phenomenal aspects of, 19-20, 174, 360nl2; relational element of, 21
Bell's theorem, 119, 344, 390n6
Bell, J. S., 343-44, 351, 391
Berkeley, G., 155
Bigelow, J., 143, 371
Binding, 115-16, 238
Biological materialism, 168, 244, 375n34, 380n7
Bisiach, E., 360
Black-and-white room. See Knowledge argument
Blackburn, S., 83, 88, 375
Blindness denial, 219, 260-61
Blindsight, 190, 226-27, 253, 291, 382n5 Block, N., vi, 29, 95,97,132,228,250-53,262, 368, 375, 382, 388
Boden, M., 323
Bodily sensation, 9
Bogen, J' 386
Bohm interpretation, 343-45, 348, 349, 356-57
Bohm, D., 333, 343-45,348, 356-57, 388, 391
Bohr, N., 342-43
Boring, E., 385
Boyd, R. N., 84, 148, 374
Brain in vat, 75, 195, 202, 345
Bridging principles, 107-8,121,138,164,234, 236-42, 385-86
Brindley, G. S., 385-86
Brink, D., 84, 88
Broad, C. D., 49, 129
Brooks, D. H. M., 364
Byrne, A., 166, 371, 375
Campbell, K. K., 166, 369, 372
Carroll, J. W., 369
Carruthers, P., 382
Cartesian dualism, 124-25. See also Interactionist dualism
Causal efficacy. See Consciousness, causal efficacy of
Causal flux, 153-54, 304-5, 375n29
Causal organization, 317-21, 325, 327, 328, 332
Causal overdetermination, 152
Causal pathway, 281-83, 301, 309
Causal theory of knowledge, 193-96,200,202
Causal theory of reference, 59, 201-3, 208, 368n25
Causal-role concept, 45
Causation: active vs. passive, 298, 301; and consciousness, 86,152-53,293,297-98,301; emergent, 168, 378n41; epistemology of, 74-75, 151-52, 159; Humean views of, 86, 151-52; vs. regularity, 74-75, 86, 151-52, 159; Supervenience of, 75, 86, 152-53
Cellular automaton, 303, 316-17, 319
Centered worlds, 60-61, 72, 133, 144, 201, 203-6, 366n29, 373nnl6-17, 384
Cerebral celebrity, 229-30, 240
Chalmers, D. J., 65,85,244,248,284,387,388
Character, 60, 365n25
Cheney, D. L., 236
Chinese population, 97, 244, 250-52, 259, 386n2
Chinese room, 314, 322-26, 389nn4-6
Chisholm, R., 14
Churchland, P. M., 114, 141, 370, 373-74, 386
Churchland, P. S., 169-70, 364, 386
Circumstances of evaluation, 60, 61
Claims about consciousness, 173-75, 177-88, 198-99, 203-4. See also Phenomenal judgments
Clark, A., 235, 376
Clark, J. J., 272
Cognitive limitations, 137,149, 372nn8-9,11
Cognitive model, 31, 46, 111-14, 240-41
Cognitive science, 11, 14, 29, 46-47, 111-14, 184, 289, 320, 332, 389n3
Coherence principles: between consciousness and awareness, 219-48, 276; between consciousness and cognition, 218-29, 257-59, 269, 294-95; epistemology of, 226, 238, 241-46; explanatory coherence, 288-89, 292, 388nl; explanatory role of, 233-42; as psychophysical laws, 242-46, 276-77, 382nl; structural coherence, 222-25, 234-36, 242-43, 276, 287-88, 386nl2 Cole, D., 388
Collapse of wave function, 119, 336-37, 338-41, 343-44, 390n6; by consciousness, 120, 157, 334, 339-41, 356-57, 370nl3; criteria for, 338-41
Color concepts, 205-6, 264-65, 359n3, 380nnl0-11, 381nl2, 382nl, 387n7
Color experiences, 6-7
Color space, 100-101, 223-24, 234-35, 264, 284-85, 290-91, 308-9, 369n4
Colorblindness, 369n7, 383n7, 387n11
Combinatorial-state automaton (CSA), 316-22, 324; vs. FSA, 317, 318-19
Compact disk, 281-82, 293, 300
Complexity, 98, 294-97, 344-45, 372n8, 378n41
Computation, 315-19; and consciousness, 275, 313-32; implementation of, 315-20, 350; observer-relativity of, 316, 319-20, 389n2; symbolic, 329, 332, 390nl0; universality of, 332, 390nl0 Computer, 103-4, 177,184-86, 249, 275, 303, 313-32, 389n7
Conceivability, 35, 66-68, 369n3; a priori and a posteriori varieties of, 67-68; in establishing Supervenience claims, 70, 73, 93-101; as a guide to possibility, 66-68, 98, 109-10, 130-31, 131-40, 146-47, 367nn22-23, 371n7; and logical possibility, 35, 66-68, 367n22; and reductive explanation, 109-10; unreliability of, 98-99, 367n22; various senses of, 66-67
Conceptual analysis: critiques of, 52, 53-56, 59-60, 80-81, 88; in establishing Supervenience claims, 77-81, 139, 368n40; and a posteriori necessity, 59-60, 78-79
Conceptual truth, 52-71; and absence of definitions, 52, 53-55; and a posteriori
necessity, 56, 62, 66, 367n35; a priori and a posteriori varieties, 62, 66; and necessity, 66; Quine's critique of, 52, 55-56, 88, 366n28
Conee, E., 372, 382
Connectionism, 46, 121, 316, 329, 332, 389n7
Conscious experience. See Consciousness Consciousness: acquaintance with, 196-98, 200, 208, 230, 292; against functional analysis of, 15, 104-5, 110, 164-65, 167; causal efficacy of, 150-60, 177, 191-203, 378n41; content of, 175-76, 221, 383-85; criteria for, 217, 226-29, 236-38, 239-42; definition of, 3-4; determinacy of, 105,165, 297, 390n4; different meanings of term, 6, 25-28, 360nl5; evolution of, 120-21, 160, 171; examples of, 4, 6-11, 359n5; explanatory irrelevance of, 156, 177-84, 191-203, 208; failure of reductive explanation, 46-47, 93-122, 235, 379n42; failure to logically supervene, 37-38, 88, 93-106; as fundamental property, 126-29, 357; holism of, 299; knowledge of (see Epistemology); local Supervenience of, 34, 93, 217; natural Supervenience of, 37-38, 124-27; neural correlates of, 115-18, 234, 237, 238-42; no analysis of concept, 94, 104-6; phenomenal and psychological varieties, 25-31; reference to, 201-8; semantics of concept, 133-34, 149, 203-8; specific character of, 5, 101, 263, 276-77, 308, 373nl5, 376n35; stream of, 10; structure of, 107, 223-25, 234-36, 242-43, 256, 266, 284-85, 287-88, 308-9, 382n3; subject of, 296-97, 309,349, 352; surprising nature of, 5, 101, 186, 314; ubiquity of (see Panpsychism); unity of, 10-11, 309
Consciousness-dependent properties, 81-82
Considering a world as actual/ counterfactual, 60
Context of utterance, 60, 61, 63, 363n25
Continuity and discreteness, 255-56, 278-79, 281-82, 322, 330-31, 340, 390n9
Copenhagen interpretation, 342
Cowey, A., 228
Crane, T., 383
Creation myth, 87
Creativity, 313, 329
Crick, F., 115-16, 235-36, 238-39, 370
Cuda, T., 253, 387
Cussins, A., 383
Dancing qualia, 250-51, 253, 262, 266-75, 321-22, 324-26, 388nl5
Daneri, A., 341
Davidson, D., 361, 377
Davies, M. K., 56, 63
Decoherence, 341-42, 353
Deep necessity, 63, 64
Definitions, absence of, 52 53-55 77-78, 80, 106
Deflationary construal. See Belief
Dennett, D. C, vi, 30, 82, 113-14, 145, 166, 170,189-91,227,229-30,240,361 370 372, 382,388
Depth experience, 7
Descartes, R., 12-13,15,75,124,130-31 186, 195,359,367
Descriptive theory of reference 58-59, 368n45
Detectability principle, 219
Dewitt, B. S., 347
Diagonal proposition, 64
Difference structure, 224, 278, 281-82, 284
Difference that makes a difference, 281-83, 284, 292, 302
Direct availability. See Availability
Disembodiment, 130, 146-49, 258 367n23, 374nn23-24, 384
Don't-have-a-clue materialism, 162
Double-aspect principle, 283-87, 350, 388nl; arguments against, 293-99; arguments for, 287-92; constraints on, 293, 299-300, 310; ontology of, 286, 301-8; open questions about, 308-10
Double-aspect theory, 129, 130, 155
Doxastic/phenomenal distinction, 382n9
Dreams, 227-28, 257
Dretske, F. I., 82, 166, 232-33, 280, 369, 374, 377, 378, 379, 382, 382-83
Dreyfus, H., 313, 389
Drug-induced experiences, 10, 173-74, 176
Dthat, 59, 79, 61-62, 132, 134, 135, 141
Dualism, 245, 264, 357; arguments against, 168-71, 377n37; arguments for, 123-24, 129-49, 161-68; varieties of, 124-29
Easy problems, xii, xiii
Eccles, J. C, 157-58
Ectoplasm, 39-41, 85, 158, 363-64
Edelman, G., 116-18,370
Eliminativism, xiii, 102,161-62, 164-68,184, 186-89, 195-96
Elitzur, A., 177, 183, 379
Emergence, 49, 129-30, 168, 378n41
Emotions, 10, 19, 224, 309, 384
Entailment, 36, 54, 70, 78-81
Epiphenomenalism, 150-60, 165, 370n9, 389n7; arguments against, 158-60; strategies for avoiding, 151-58
Epistemic asymmetry, 101-3, 108, 369n6
Epistemic lever, 234, 236-38
Epistemological myth, 87
Epistemology: in establishing Supervenience claims, 70, 73-77, 93-94, 101-4; of one's own consciousness, 74, 160, 169, 182-83, 191-200, 207-8, 292, 380; of others' consciousness, 72,102,226-29,234,236-38,
239-42, 243-46. See also Knowledge; Skeptical problems
EPR paradox, 119, 390n6
Essential properties, 135, 147-49, 361n2, 362n4, 375n29
Evans, G., 56, 63-64, 383
Everett interpretation, 345-57, 390; counterintuitiveness of, 346, 356-57; different versions of, 347,351,354; personal identity in, 352-53, 354-56; preferred basis problem, 348-51; probabilities in, 353-56, 390n8; and theory of consciousness, 348-51, 354-55
Everett, H., 345-48, 356-57
Evolution, 120-21, 160, 170, 171, 231, 257, 300, 345, 372n8
Experience. See Consciousness
Experience meter, 112, 226, 239
Experimental research, 112, 115, 216-18, 226-29, 233-42, 270, 272
Explanatory coherence, 288-89, 292, 388n2
Explanatory exclusion, 178
Explanatory gap, 47, 107, 119, 234-35, 333
Explanatory irrelevance, 156, 158, 163-65, 177-84, 186, 207; arguments against, 191-203, 208-9; problems with, 158-60, 182-83
Facts, 33, 361n2, 372nl3
Fading qualia, 250-51, 253-63, 266, 270, 274-75, 321-22, 324-26, 387nn7-8
Falsifiability. See Testability
Farah, M., 238-39, 241
Farrell, B. A., 359
Fechner, G.. 382
Feigl, H., 166, 375
Feldman, F., 148
Fermat's last theorem, 99
Field, H., 365
Fine-grained organization, 248, 265, 274-75, 387nl2,388nl7
Finite-state automaton, 315-19, 389n2
First-order judgment, 175-76, 182, 219-21, 231,382nl; content of, 220,383-84; vs. first-order registration, 220, 232-33, 382n9
First-order registration, 220, 232-33, 382n9, 383nl0
Flanagan, O., 166
Fodor, J., 82, 162, 323
Forrest, P., 366
Foss, J., 379
Foster, J., 389
Fredkin, E., 302-3, 389
Frege, G., 56-57, 59
Freud, S., 13
Functional analysis, 43-46, 79-81
Functional isomorph, 97,166-67,245-75,288, 375n34, 376n35, 385nl0
Functional organization: and computation, 315,320-22; and consciousness, 97,243-46, 247-75, 288, 315; definition of, 247-48
Functional properties, 79-81, 107, 163, 375nn35-36
Functionalism (nonreductive), 227, 229-32, 243-46,249,274-75; arguments for, 243-46, 253-63, 266-75
Functionalism (reductive): appropriateness for psychological, 15-16; arguments for, 187-89, 193, 369n3; criticism of, 15, 30, 104-5, 164-65, 167, 188, 274-75; definition of, 14; first-order vs. second-order, 231-32; vs. nonreductive, 229,249,274-75; varieties of, 29-32, 359n8, 376nn35-36, 378n40
Fundamental laws, 76, 88-89, 111, 126-30, 170-71, 213-18, 243, 256, 275, 276-77, 286-88, 343-45, 378n41; simplicity of, 127, 214-16, 288
Fundamental properties, 126, 136, 143, 155, 286-87, 297, 302-4
Fundamental theory, 126-29,213-18,267-77, 287-88, 310
Further fact, 41, 83, 85, 86, 107, 245, 368n43, 373nl7
Further question, 47, 106-7, 110, 111
Gas law, 36-37
Geach, P., 14
Gell-Mann, M, 341, 352
Geometry of experience, 107, 223-24, 236, 284
Gert, B., 265
Ghirardi, G. C., 343
Ghost in the machine, 125, 128, 186
Global availability. See Availability
Global workspace, 112, 238-41
God, 45, 73, 138, 345, 357, 362n5; belief in, 183,187-88,379n2; in characterizing logical possibility, 35, 66; work to do in creation, 38-41, 87, 124, 148
Gödel's theorem, 139
Goldbach's conjecture, 67, 68, 139
Goldman, A., 382
Grain problem, 306-8, 389nn6-7
Gravity, 111, 119, 171, 330
Great Divide, xv, 167
GRW interpretation, 343-45, 348, 390n5
Gunderson, K., 369
Hallucination, 34, 75, 194, 220
Halting problem, 331
Hameroff, S. R., 119
Hard problem, xii, xiii
Hardin, C. L., 100, 224, 264, 369
Hare, R. M., 83, 361, 362
Harman, G., 377, 385
Harnad, S. R., 327
Harris, R., 84, 353
Harrison, B., 100, 264
Harrison, J., 387
Hartle, J. B., 341, 352
Haugeland, J., 39, 88, 389
Healey, R. A., 351
Heil, J., 88
Hellman, G., 88, 361
Hidden variables, 343-415, 356, 390n6
High-quality representations, 238-41
Higher-order thought, 30, 168, 230-31, 361nl6, 378n39, 382nn6, 8
Hiley, B., 391
Hill, C. S., 166, 371, 375-76, 380
History-dependence, 271, 378n40, 387n3
Hodgson, D., 120, 333, 391
Hofstadter, D. R., 30, 185-86, 329, 353, 389
Homogeneity, 217, 219, 226, 246, 306
Homunculus, 97, 170, 244, 252, 299, 324-26, 389n6
Honderich, T., 166
Horgan, T., vi, 84, 88,108, 141, 150,166,361, 362, 363, 364, 367, 369, 371, 375, 387, 388
Horst, S., 385
Hughes, R. I. G., 351
Humberstone, I. L., 56, 63
Hume, G., 74-75, 151-52, 170, 363, 369
Humean views, 86, 151-52, 363n11, 369n49
Humphrey, N., 228
Huxley, T., 150
Idealism, 75, 155, 388n4
Identity, xvii, 33, 130-31, 146-49, 361n4, 367n30, 374nn22-23
Identity theory, 146-48, 374n26, 375n30, 377n37
Illuminating explanation, 48-50
Illusion, 34, 233, 385nl2
Implementation, 315-20, 326-27, 350, 389n2
Incorrigibility, 197, 207-8, 219
Indeterminacy, 53-55, 72, 77, 80,105, 365n23
Indexicality, 60-61, 72, 205, 352, 353, 355, 382nl7; indexical fact, 85, 87, 373nnl6-17; in knowledge argument, 142-44, 373nnl6-17; primitiveness of, 84-85, 369n46
Induction, problem of, 75, 355-56
Ineffability, 22-23, 206-7, 224, 246, 291
Inference to the best explanation, 75, 76, 216, 246
Inflationary construal. See Belief
Information, 277-310, 388-89; amount of, 280-82; aspects of, 284-87 (see also Double-aspect principle); and consciousness, 283-310; direct access to, 290-92; in explaining phenomenal judgments, 288-92; microscopic vs. macroscopic, 305-8; ontology of, 286-87, 301-5; phenomenally realized, 283-84; physically realized, 280-87; and physics, 302-5, 350; pure,
302-5, 308; semantic notion of, 278 280-syntactic notion of, 278-80; transmittability of, 282-83, 285; ubiquity of 293 297, 299-301
Information space, 278-310; combinatorial and relational structure of 278-80 282, 284, 287-88, 309
Information state, 278-310; in cognitive
processing, 289-92; grounding of, 303-7
Intension, 55, 56, 66, 77-81, 201-3, 367n31. See also Primary intension; Secondary intension
Intensity, 224, 235, 301, 385nl2
Intentionality, 19, 360nl5; connection to consciousness, 19-22, 82, 174, 208, 322-23 327, 360nl0, 371n2, 384-85; functionalist analysis of, 19-20, 82; Supervenience of, 82-83, 368n43
Interactionist dualism, 124-25, 128, 162-63, 177, 183; arguments against, 156-58, 163
Intrinsic properties, 135-36,153-55,158,163, 235, 304-5, 310, 375n29, 389n7
Introspection, 26, 29, 30, 31, 189-90, 231, 381nl4
Intuition, xv, 83, 96-98, 110, 139, 147-48, 167, 375n33
Invariance principle. See Organizational invariance
Inverted Earth, 265-66, 387nnl3-14
Inverted qualia, 108,235,308,376n35,385nl0; actual cases of, 378n11; arguments against natural possibility of, 266-74, 370n9; arguments for natural possibility of, 250, 263-66, 387nn11-12; logical possibility of, 99-101,166,250,263-64,274-75,369nn4-5; and materialism, 124, 140, 372nl2; and phenomenal concepts, 205-7, 381nn11,15 Inverted spectrum. See Inverted qualia It from bit, 302-5, 308, 388nn4-5
Jackendoff, R., 25, 360, 382
Jackson, F., vi, 42, 103-4, 140, 149, 166, 363, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 379
Jacoby, H., 369
James, W., 13
Jaynes, J., 30
Joe, 256-57, 259, 261, 262
Johnson-Laird, P., 114
Judgment, 159-60, 174, 175, 183-84, 189-92, 203, 220, 232-33, 262, 383nl0
Judgments about consciousness. See Phenomenal judgments
Kaplan, D., 56, 59, 60, 64, 84, 365-66
Kim, J., 178, 361, 362, 364, 377
Kirk, R., vi, 150, 231-32, 367, 369, 372
Knowledge, 27, 182-83, 373nl8
Knowledge argument, 103-4, 140-46, 206, 369n7, 370n9, 372-74, 379n3
Knowledge of consciousness. See Epistemology
Koch, C, 115-16, 235-36, 238-39, 370
Korb, K., 389
Kripke, S. A., vi, 38,45,52,56-57,59,64,124, 131,133-34,140,146-50,164,360,365,366, 368, 374, 375
Kripke/Wittgenstein argument, 360nl2, 368n43
Kripkean argument against materialism, 140, 146-50, 374
Kripkean necessity. See A posteriori necessity
Lahav, R., 119,375
Langton, C. G., 129
Language: about consciousness (see Phenomenal concepts); and consciousness, 28, 116-17, 237-38
Laplace's demon, 35, 36
Laws of nature, 33, 36-38,71, 75-76, 87, 111, 170-71, 362n7; Humean views of, 86, 363n11, 369n49; necessity of, 375n29; supervenience of, 86, 369n48. See also Fundamental laws; Psychophysical laws Learning: as example of reductive explanation, 42-47, 51, 111; as functional concept, 12, 15, 16, 18, 51
Leckey, M., 303
Levine, J., vi, 47, 100, 107, 166, 371, 387 Lewis, D., vi, 14-15, 56, 60, 82, 104, 123, 143-45, 166, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 371, 374, 375
Libet, B., 238-39
Life, 25, 148, 296; logical Supervenience of, 79, 108-9; reductive explanation of, 79, 108-9; vagueness of concept, 53-54
Linguistic division of labor, 58
Linking proposition, 385-86
Loar, B., 142-43, 145, 166, 371, 373
Locke, J., 263
Lockwood, M., vi, 135,166,333,347,360,372, 375, 388, 389
Loewer, B., 345, 347, 354, 372, 390
Logic, 35, 52, 76, 362n6
Logical necessity (of statements), 66; a priori vs. a posteriori varieties, 65; and a priori truth, 68-69; broad vs. strict, 35, 52, 362n6; and conceivability, 66; and conceptual truth, 66
Logical possibility, 35, 47, 65-71, 362n5; arguing for, 96-97; and conceivability, 66-68; vs. natural possibility, 37-38, 250, 257, 314-15, 370n9
Logical Supervenience: and a priori entailment, 70,372n8; of almost everything, 71-89, 367-69, 372n8; definition of, 35, 40-41, 363nnl3, 16; equivalence of formulations, 70-71; and explanatory relevance, 178-79; and logical necessity, 69-71; and materialism, 41-42, 123-24,
129-31; modulo consciousness, 72, 78, 81-83, 367n37; modulo indexicality, 72, 367n37, 368n24; vs. natural Supervenience, 37-38, 362n9; primary and secondary versions, 69-70; problems and doubts, 81-86, 88; and reductive explanation, 47-51; ways to establish, 70
Logothetis, N., 237
Loinger, A., 341
London, F., 339
Look-up table, 254, 262, 325
Lucas, J. R., 313-14, 330, 389
Lycan, W. G., 141, 145, 166, 231, 252, 265, 371,374,377, 380,385,386
Machine consciousness, 275, 313-32, 370n9
Mackay, D. M., 282
Mackie, J. L., 369
Macroscopic phenomenology, 305-7, 310
Many-worlds interpretation, 347, 351. See also Everett interpretation
Marks, L. E., 386
Mary, 103-4, 133, 139, 140-46, 166-67, 206, 369n7, 373nl8, 374nnl9-20, 379n3
Materialism, 245, 264, 370-75; arguments against, 123-24, 129-49, 161-68, 369n3, 371-74; arguments for, 168-71,186-91,193, 377n37; definition of, 41-42, 124, 126, 363nl2, 364nnl7, 19
Mathematical truths, 67-69, 71, 99, 139, 367n31, 371n7, 372nn9-10
Matzke, D., 302
Maximal state, 349-50, 377n37, 387n5
Maxwell, G., 135, 166, 375
Maxwell, J. C, 127-28, 169
McCarthy, J., 388
McDowell, J., 383
McGinn, C, vi, 139, 148, 379
McLaughlin, B. P., 362, 378
McMullen, C, 141, 143
Meaning, 52, 55, 56, 62, 66, 367n31
Meaning holism, 365n24
Measure on space of observers, 354-56
Measurement postulate, 336-39,341, 343-44, 346, 348, 350, 354
Measurement problem, 338-39, 347
Measuring apparatus, 338, 342
Meehl, P. E., 378
Memory, 10, 12, 102, 115-16, 200-201, 217, 221, 326, 352, 354
Memory of consciousness, 191, 200-201
Mental causation, 14, 150-60. See also Epiphenomenalism
Mental concepts: division into phenomenal and psychological concepts, 11-22; double life of terms, 16-22
Mental imagery, 9
Metaphysical necessity, 38-39, 42, 67-68, 131-38,141,143,162,164,166,181,367n34,
371n7; strong, 136-38, 143, 149, 156, 164, 166, 181, 264, 371nn6-7, 372n8, 373nl5, 374n25, 376n35, 377n38; weak, 137, 149, 374n25. See also A posteriori necessity; Logical necessity;
Microphenomenal properties, 305-8
Mile-high unicycle, 96-97
Mind-body problem, 4, 24-25, 188
Mind-mind problem, 25
Misdescription of worlds, 67, 99, 134,146-49
Modes of presentation, 141-44, 372nl4
Module, 113-14, 241, 326
Molnar, G., 369
Monism, 129, 130, 155, 166
Moore, G. E., 83, 361
Moral properties, 83-84, 368nn23-24, 371n7
Moral realism, 83-84, 368nn23-24
MØller, G. E., 385
Multiple realizability, 43, 97-98, 364n20
Musical experience, 7-8, 10, 224, 235
Mysterianism, 168, 379n42
Mystery-removing explanation, 48-50
Nagel, T., vi, 4, 82, 103, 144, 236, 307, 359, 360, 369, 379, 382
Names, 84, 368n45
Narrow content, 65, 384
Natsoulas, T., 360
Natural necessity. See Natural possibility Natural possibility: characterization of, 36-37, 362nn7-8; vs. logical possibility, 37-38, 250, 257, 314-15, 370n9
Natural Supervenience, 88-89, 213, 299, 362nn9-10, 364nl6, 379n42; and dualism, 124-31; and epiphenomenalism, 150-60; introduction to, 34, 36-38
Naturalistic dualism, 128, 162, 168-71, 299
Necessary and sufficient conditions, 52, 53-55, 77-78, 106
Necessary truth. See Logical necessity Negative facts and properties, 40-41, 85, 369n47
Nelkin, N., 360, 382
Nemirow, L., 104, 144-45, 374
Neural correlates of consciousness, 115-18, 234, 237, 238-42
Neural replacement, 248, 253-63, 265-74, 322, 324-26
Neural rewiring, 100, 265, 273-74, 387nl2
Neural "time-on" theory, 238-40
Neuroscience, 46,103,170,289; in explaining consciousness, 115-18, 234-42
Neutral monism, 155, 388nl
New physics, 118-20, 161-63
Newell, A., 29
Newton, I., 118, 171, 245
Newton, N., 389
Nida-RØmelin, M., 381, 382, 387
Nietzsche, F., 181
Noise, 331, 390n9
Nomic possibility. See Natural possibility
Nomic Supervenience. See Natural Supervenience
Nomological danglers, 155, 160
Nonconceptual content, 220,233,383nl0, 384
Nonlinear dynamics, 121, 157, 255-56 330-31
Nonlocality, 119, 271, 340, 344, 356, 390n6
Nonreductive explanation, 107, 111 120 122, 213-18, 235, 379n42
Nonreductive materialism, 162, 164, 166
Nonseparability, 335, 343
O'Leary-Hawthorne, J., 372, 380
O'Regan, J. K., 272
Occurrent thoughts, 10,20,221-22,309,382n2
Ockham's razor, 169
Olfactory experience, 8, 9, 10
One-big-world interpretation, 347, 390n7, See also Everett interpretation
1-conceivability, 67-68, 367n23
1-necessity, 65, 67-69, 132, 367n23
Ontology, 41-42, 68, 87, 89, 94, 110, 123-71, 286-87, 301-8
Organizational invariance, 248-49, 274-75, 276-77; arguments against, 249-53,263-66, 387nl2, 388nnl3-14; arguments for, 253-63, 266-74; and artificial intelligence, 315,321,328; and information, 287-88; and quantum mechanics, 350
Organizational properties, 275, 288, 328
Orgasm, 9, 384
Oscillations, 115-16, 238-42, 370nl9
Other minds, problem of, 74,102, 246, 360n9
Pain, 9, 17, 146-49, 179, 182, 221, 224
Panpsychism, 152-53, 216, 293-301, 305, 315, 316, 340, 357
Papineau, D., 141, 143, 166
Paradox of phenomenal judgment, 177-84, 188, 191
Parfit, D., 353, 355
Pargetter, R., 143, 371
Peacocke, C, 383
Penrose, R., 119, 313-14, 330, 333, 348, 379, 389
Perception, 3, 18, 116, 184-85, 194, 220, 233, 237, 289-91
Perceptual manifold, 294
Perry, J., 143, 280
Person, 300, 352
Personal identity, 85, 272, 296-97, 352-53, 354-55
Petrie, B., 39, 88
Phenomenal concepts, 11-24, 133-34, 149, 203-8, 360nl3, 380-82, 387n7. See also Phenomenal judgments
Phenomenal judgments, 159-60, 172-209, 244, 379-82; in coherence principles, 218-33; content of, 174, 178, 180, 203-8, 380-81; definition of, 173-76; as exhausting consciousness, 189-91; explanation of, 177-78, 184-89, 288-92, 310, 370n9; first-order, 175-76,182,219-21,231-33,382nn1, 9; justification of, 183,192-200,207-8, 292, 380nn6-7, 9; paradox of, 177-84, 188, 191; reliability of, 218-19,226,257,259,260-61; second-order, 176, 182, 218-21, 230-32, 382nl; third-order, 176, 182, 291
Phenomenal manifold, 189, 294
Phenomenal properties, 11-12, 16-25, 125-28, 135-36, 153-55, 158, 163-64, 166, 304-5, 328, 376-79, 385n10
Phenomenal quality. See Qualia
Phenomenal/nonphenomenal beliefs, 381nl2, 382nl6
Phenomenal/psychological states: co-occurrence of, 17-18, 22-24; distinction between, 11-16, 18, 22, 23; as exhausting the mental, 16-22; problems posed by, 24-25, 29-30
Physical properties: definition of, 32-33, 128-29; intrinsic/extrinsic nature of, 135-36, 143, 153-55, 163, 166, 375n29
Physicalism. See Materialism
Physicalist-functionalism, 168, 376n35, 387nl0, 388nnl6-17
Physics, 33; autonomy and simplicity of, 49; causal closure of, 125,128,150,151,156-58, 161-63, 178, 183-84; definition of, 118-19, 128-29; in explaining consciousness, 118-20, 126, 161-63; as fundamental theory, 126-29, 213-15, 277; informational view of, 302-5
Place, U. T., 146, 148, 360
Plantinga, A., 366
Plausibility constraints, 216-18, 219, 226
Positive facts and properties, 40-41, 42, 123-24, 134, 363nl5, 364nl8
Possibility of statements vs. of worlds, 63, 65-68
Possible worlds: characterization of, 35, 66, 361n4, 366n30; containment between, 40, 42, 363nl5, 364nl8; identity between, 361n4, 367n30
Primary intension, 57-70,365-68; and a priori conceptual truth, 62, 66, 88; a priori determination of, 57-58, 61; in arguments against materialism, 132-37, 372-73; centrality in reductive explanation, 57, 69, 94,98; of concept of consciousness, 132-34, 202-8, 376nn35-36, 382nl7; definition of, 57, 366n29; indeterminacy of, 365nn23-24, 366n26; indexical nature of, 60-61; in logical Supervenience, 69-70, 78-79, 88-89; and reference-fixation, 57-59,81-82,201-3, 208, 365n23, 373nl5
Primary proposition, 63-65
Private language argument, 360nl2, 368n43, 381nl3
Program, 315-17, 322-27
Property dualism, 125, 130, 136, 138, 155, 164-68, 339, 370n2, 375-78
Property terms, 62, 69
Proposition, 19, 63-65, 69, 366n30, 373nl8
Propositional attitudes, 19-22. See also Belief
Prosperi, G. M., 341
Protophenomenal properties, 126-27, 135-36, 143, 154-55, 166, 168, 298-99, 305
Pseudonormal color vision, 387n11
Psychofunctionalism, 132, 168, 376n36
Psychological states. See Phenomenal/ psychological states
Psychology, 12, 13, 31, 112
Psychophysical laws, 87, 127-29,138, 155, 170-72, 213-18, 242-46, 275, 276-77, 286-87, 307-10, 316, 377n37, 385-86; epistemology of, 215-18, 226, 243-46, 310, 386nl2
Psychophysics, 236, 361nl7, 385-86
Putnam, H., 56-57, 359, 365, 367, 387, 389
Pylyshyn, Z., 253
Qualia, 4, 6, 235, 249-75, 386-88; definition of, 4, 359n2; natural history of, 235
Quantum mechanics, 247, 320, 333-57; in explaining consciousness, 119-21, 333-34, 389n7; framework of, 334-37; and interactionist dualism, 156-58; interpretation of, 157,251,333-34,337-57, 390; measurement in, 335-39, 390n2; probability in, 337, 341, 343, 344, 353-56, 390nn3, 9; and relativity, 119, 340, 344, 356
Quine, W. V., 52, 55, 60, 88, 366
Ramsey sentence, 368n38
Recognitional concept, 373nl5
Reduction, 43, 88, 364n20
Reductive explanation, 42-51, 364n20; in cognitive science, 46-47; by functional analysis, 43-46; illuminating vs. mystery-removing explanation, 48-50; link with a priori analysis, 43-45,51,57,69,94,98,110; modulo consciousness, 45-46,47,72,371n2
Reductive functionalism, 161-62, 164-68
Reductive materialism, 161-62, 164
Reference-fixation, 57-59, 61, 81-82, 84-85, 365n23, 366n25, 368n45, 373nl5, 376n36. See also Primary intension
Reference to consciousness, 191, 201-3, 208
Registration, 220, 232-33
Relational properties, 20-21, 80, 153-55, 375n29
Relative-state interpretation, 347
Relativity, 58, 118-19, 340, 344, 356, 365n24
Reliability principle, 218-19, 226
Religious belief, 183, 187-88, 379n2
Rensink, R. A., 272
Reportability, 26, 28, 30, 114, 216-29, 237, 239-40, 285, 290, 385nl2
Representationalism, 168 265, 377n38, 384-85
Revisability, 52, 55-56, 366n28
Rey, G., 166, 323, 388
Reynolds, C, 129
Rigid designation, 59, 62,79,132-36,141-42, 146-49, 365n25, 374n26, 376n34, 381nl5
Rimini, A., 343
Robinson, H., 166, 372, 375
Robinson, W. S., 166
Robot, 249, 253-55, 259
Rosenberg, G. H., 152, 375
Rosenthal, D. M., 30, 166, 230-31, 361, 378
Rule-following, 313, 329
Russell, B., 153-54, 166, 305
Russellian view, 134-36,143,153-55,166-67, 181, 302, 305-8, 310, 375n30, 389nn6-7
Ryle, G., 14-15, 22-23, 166, 359
Savage, C. W., 386
Savitt, S., 253
Sayre, K. M., 388
Sayre-McCord, G., 368
Schacter, D. L., 241
Schall, J. D., 237
Schlick, M' 224, 264
Schrödinger equation, 336-41, 343-50, 354, 356
Schrödinger's cat, 251, 340, 342
Seager, W. E., 88, 150, 362, 372, 388
Searle, J. R., vi, 19,82,130,164,258,314 316 319, 322-27, 360, 370-71, 375-76
Second-order judgment, 176, 182, 218-21 230-32, 382n1
Secondary intension, 57-70, 365-67, 372nl3; a posteriori determination of, 59, 61-62; in arguments against materialism, 132-37, 141-44, 148; of concept of consciousness, 132-34, 205-7, 381nl5; definition of, 59; in logical Supervenience, 69-70, 78-79
Secondary proposition, 63-65
Seeming, 190-91, 370n9, 379n5
Self-consciousness, 3, 10, 27, 29, 30, 116-17, 185, 246, 294-95
Sellars, W., 306, 378, 380
Semantic deference, 58
Sensation, 5-9, 12, 18, 22, 45, 176, 359n6 385-86
Sense and reference, 56, 207
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, 255-56, 330-31
Seyfarth, R. M., 236
Shallice, T., 114, 241
Shanks, N., 119, 375
Shannon, C. E., 277-78, 280 282-83
Shepard, R. N., 177
Shoemaker, S.,vi, 101,193,375 376 380 381, 382,387,388
Sidelle, A., 367
Siewert, C, 197, 365, 382, 384
Silicon isomorph, 97, 248, 253-63, 266-74
Simplicity, 49, 169, 214-16 219 244-46, 344-45
Simulation, 76, 157, 313, 327-28
Skeptical problems, 73-76 194-95 246, 269-70, 369n48, 380n7
Skyrms, B., 369
Sleep, 26, 219, 227-28, 257
Smart, J. J. C, 146, 148, 166, 360
Solipsism, 85, 216, 244, 262
Sorites arguments, 261, 387n9
Space-time, 118, 126, 303
Sperling, G., 228
Sperry, R. W., 378
Spin, 126, 334-37, 340, 390nl
Splitting-worlds interpretation, 347, 351, 390n7
Sprigge, T. L. S., 166, 359
Squires, E., 333
Stalnaker, R., 56, 64, 366
Stapp, H. P., 120, 333
State-transition, 317-20, 324, 389n2
Stevens, S. S., 385
Stoerig, P., 228
Strong artificial intelligence, 314-15,316,319; arguments against, 322-31, 389nn7-8; arguments for, 321-22
Strong metaphysical necessity, 136-38, 143, 149, 156, 164, 166, 181, 264, 371nn6-7, 372n8, 373nl5, 374n25, 376n35, 377n38
Structural coherence, 222-25,234-36,242-43, 276, 287-88, 386nl2
Structural properties, 79-81, 107, 121, 163
Subjective experience. See Consciousness
Subspaces, 279, 282, 285
Substance dualism, 124-25. See also Interactionist dualism
Substate, 317-19, 350
Suddenly disappearing qualia, 255-56, 259, 261, 262
Superbeing, 49, 68, 73, 76
Superficial necessity, 63, 64
Supermemory module, 326
Superposition, 334-44,346-57,390; observers in, 346-51,352-56; preferred basis for, 335, 347, 348
Superposition principle, 349-50
Supervenience, xvi-xvii, 32, 361nl, 363nl3, 372nl3; definition of, 32, 40-41, 361n4; explaining Supervenience relations, 88-89; local/global distinction, 33-34, 38, 40, 51,
93, 361n3, 362n4, 363n11, 364nl6; logical/ natural distinction, 34-38,39; and ontology, 41-42; strong and weak, 38,362nl0, 364nl6. See also Logical supervenience; Natural supervenience
Supervenience conditionals, 52-56, 108
Supervenience laws, 127, 128
Sutherland, N. S., 3
Swoyer, C, 375
Syntax vs. semantics, 278, 280, 326-27
Systems reply, 323-36
Tactile experience, 8
Taking consciousness seriously, xiv-xv, 110, 131, 158, 164-65, 167-68, 171
Taste experiences, 9, 10, 224, 308
Teleofunctionalism, 168, 377n38, 378n40, 383nl0
Teleology, 44, 378n40, 386n3
teller, D. Y., 385-86
teller, P., 39, 88, 141
Temporally extended activity, 238-40
Testability, 111, 157,215-18,237,310,386nl2
Thagard, P., 323
"That's all" fact, 41, 85-86, 87, 369n47
Theoretical entities, 75, 158
Theory of everything, 126
Thermodynamics, 183, 215, 341
Thermostat, 281, 293-99, 301, 388n3
Third-order judgment, 176, 182, 291
Thomas, L., 359
Thompson, E., 369
Thompson, F., 88, 361
Thought experiments, 251
Tienson, J. L., 387
Timmons, M., 84, 369
Token identity, 147-48, 377n37
Tooley, M., 152, 369
Topic-neutral analyses, 135, 360nl3
Topological structure, 279, 282, 309
Transworld identity, 367n30, 368n22
Truth-conditions, 55, 63, 203-4
Turing machine, 315-19, 331, 390nl0
Twin Earth, 59, 60, 205, 366n27
2-conceivability, 67-68, 367n23
Two-dimensional account of a posteriori necessity, 56-65; applied to semantics of thought, 65, 366n29; in arguments against materialism, 132-38, 141-44, 148; formalization of, 61-62
2-necessity, 65, 67-69, 132, 367n23
Two Tubes puzzle, 373nl7
Tye, M., 141, 166, 232, 371, 377, 382, 384-85
Type identity, 147-48
Type-A views, 165-68, 377n38, 378n40
Type-B views, 165-68, 181, 377n38, 380n7
Type-C views, 166-68
Type-C views, 166-68, 181
UFO, 183, 187
Uncomputability, 119, 260, 313-14, 322, 329-31
Unconscious mental states, 3, 13, 17, 18
Vagueness, 53, 77
Van Cleve, J., 362
Van Gulick, R., 30, 166, 235
Velmans, M., 388
Visual cortex, 115, 226, 234, 238, 240, 272, 284-85, 290, 388nl4
Visual experiences, 6-7, 220, 223-24, 229, 232-33, 289-91, 384
Vital spirit, 102, 109
Vitalism, 108-9, 370n8
Watery stuff, 57
Wave function, 119-20, 334-57, 390
Weber, T., 343
Weber-Fechner law, 385nl2
Weinberg, S., 126
Weiskrantz, L., 226, 228
"What it is like," 4-6, 145, 231, 359nl
Wheeler, J. A., 302, 388
White, S. L., 166, 371, 376, 388
Wigner interpretation, 339, 356-57
Wigner, E. P., 333, 339, 356
Wilkes, K. V., 166
Wilson, M., 364, 365
Winograd, T., 185
Wittgenstein, L., 23, 52, 206, 265, 368, 381
Worlds. See Possible worlds
Wright, R., 389
X-factor, 246-47, 249
Yablo, S., 367
Zombie: definition of, 94; and evolution, 120-21; and explanatory gap, 107-10; and explanatory irrelevance, 156, 158; and knowledge of consciousness, 192-99; logical possibility of, 94-99, 166, 228, 369nnl-2, 374n24, 376n34, 378n40; and materialism, 123-24, 130, 140, 146-48; phenomenal and psychological, 95; varieties of, 95, 190, 254, 314, 379n4
Zombie concept of consciousness, 133, 178, 180, 203-5, 380n9
Zombie judgments, 174, 178, 180-81, 203-4, 208, 289, 384
Zombie world, 94, 99, 128, 161-63; and epiphenomenalism, 150, 153, 379n41; and materialism, 123-24, 130-38
Zuboff, A., 388