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John R. Searle
Mind
A Brief Introduction
Fundamentals
of Philosophy Series
Series Editors John Martin
Fischer, University of California, Riverside
and John Perry, Stanford
University
Mind
A Brief Introduction
John R. Searle
Biomedical Ethics
Walter Glannon
Free Will
Robert Kane
Mind
A Brief
Introduction
John R. Searle
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
2004
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PUSS
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Library of Congress Catalogjng-in-Publication Data
Searle, John R.
Mind: a brief
introduction/by John R. Searle
p. cm.-(Fundamentals of
Philosophy)
ISBN 0-19-515733-8
1. Philosophy of Mind.
I.
Title.
II. Fundamentals of
philosophy (Oxford, England). B.418.3.542004
128.2-dc22 2004049546
Book design by
planettheo.com 9876543
Printed in the United
States of America on acid-free paper
INTRODUCTION.
Why I Wrote This Book
CHAPTER
1. A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
I. DESCARTES AND OTHER DISASTERS
3. The Problem of Skepticism about
the External World and 4. The Analysis of Perception
6. The Self and Personal Identity
9. The Problem of Intentionality
10. Mental Causation and
Epiphenomenalism
12. Psychological and Social
Explanation
III. DESCARTES' SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEMS
3. Skepticism about the External
World and 4. The Correct Analysis of Perception
6. The Self and Personal Identity
CHAPTER
2. The Turn to Materialism
III. THE SAGA OF MATERIALISM: FROM
BEHAVIORISM TO STRONG ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Physicalism and the Identity Theory
Objections to the Identity Theory
Computer Functionalism (= Strong
Artificial Intelligence)
IV. COMPUTATION AND MENTAL PROCESSES
V. OTHER VERSIONS OF MATERIALISM
CHAPTER
3. Arguments against Materialism
I. EIGHT (AND ONE HALF) ARGUMENTS
AGAINST MATERIALISM
3. Thomas Nagel: What Is It Like to
Be a Bat?
4. Frank Jackson: What Mary Didn't
Know
5. Ned Block: The Chinese Nation
6. Saul Kripke: Rigid Designators
7. John Searle: The Chinese Room
8. The Conceivability of Zombies
9. The Aspectual Shape of
Intentionality
II. MATERIALIST ANSWERS TO THE
FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
Answers to Kripke on Rigid
Designators
Answers to Searle's Chinese Room
Argument
Answers to the Conceivability of
Zombies
CHAPTER
4. Consciousness Part I. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
Assumption 1. The Distinction
between the Mental and the Physical
Assumption 2. The Notion of
Reduction
Assumption 3. Causation and Events
Assumption 4. The Transparency of
Identity
II. THE SOLUTION TO THE MIND-BODY
PROBLEM
III. OVERCOMING THE MISTAKEN
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumption 1. The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical
Assumption 3. Causation and Events
IV. NEITHER MATERIALISM NOR DUALISM
V. SUMMARY OF THE REFUTATION OF
MATERIALISM AND DUALISM
CHAPTER
5. Consciousness Part II: The Structure of Consciousness and Neurobiology
6. The Distinction between the
Center and the Periphery
9. Active and Passive Consciousness
II. SOME OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
III. CURRENT NEUROBIOLOGICAL
APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS
IV. CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY, AND THE
SELF
I. HOW IS INTENTIONALITY POSSIBLE AT
ALL?
II. THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONALITY
1. Propositional Content and
Psychological Mode
5. The Network of Intentionality and
the Background of Preintentional Capacities
III. INTENTIONALITY-WITH-A-T AND
INTENSIONALITY-WITH-AN-S
IV. THE DETERMINATION OF INTENTIONAL
CONTENT: TWO ARGUMENTS FOR EXTERNALISM
The First Argument for Externalism:
Hilary Putnam and Twin Earth.3
The Second Argument for Externalism:
Tyler Burge and Arthritis
V. HOW INTERNAL MENTAL CONTENT
RELATES AGENTS TO THE WORLD
I. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION
II. DO WE NEVER EXPERIENCE
CAUSATION?
III. MENTAL CAUSATION AND THE CAUSAL
CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL
IV. MENTAL CAUSATION AND THE
EXPLANATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
I. WHY DO WE HAVE A PROBLEM ABOUT
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL?
II. IS COMPATIBILISM A SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL?
III. IS PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
TRUE?
IV. IS NEUROBIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
TRUE?
The
Unconscious and the Explanation of Behavior
I. FOUR TYPES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
III. UNCONSCIOUS REASONS FOR ACTION
IV. UNCONSCIOUS RULE FOLLOWING
I. ARGUMENTS FOR THE SENSE-DATUM
THEORY
II. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SENSE-DATUM
THEORY
III. REFUTATION OF THE SENSE-DATUM
THEORY
1. What Are the Criteria of Personal
Identity?
2. What Exactly Is the Subject of
Our Attribution of Psychological Properties?
3. What Exactly Makes Me the Person
I Am?
II. WHY IS THERE A SPECIAL PROBLEM
ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY?
III. THE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL
IDENTITY
1. Spatio-temporal Continuity of
Body
2. Relative Temporal Continuity of
Structure
V. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
A NON-HUMEAN SELF
EPILOGUE.
Philosophy and the Scientific World-View
1. A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM
9. THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE
EXPLANATION OF BEHAVOIR
Suggestions
for further reading
1. A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM
9. THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE
EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR
For Dagmar
Contents
Acknowledgments viii
Introduction: Why I
Wrote This Book 1
1. A
Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind 9
2. The Turn to
Materialism 41
3. Arguments against
Materialism 83
4. Consciousness
Part I: Consciousness
and the Mind-Body Problem 107
5. Consciousness
Part II: The Structure
of Consciousness and Neurobiology 133
6. Intentionality 159
7. Mental Causation 193
8. Free Will 215
9. The Unconscious and
the Explanation of Behavior 237 10.
Perception 259
11. The Self 279
Epilogue: Philosophy and
the Scientific World-View 301
Notes 305
Suggestions for Further
Reading 313
Index 321
Mind
Acknowledgments
Most of the material in
this book has been given by me in lectures at Berkeley, and I am indebted to my
students for their combination of enthusiasm and skepticism. Two of them, Hua (Linda) Ding and Nadia Taylor, read the entire
manuscript and made helpful comments. For help in preparing the electronic text
1 am also grateful to Maria Francisca Reines, Jessica Samuels, and Jing
Fong Williams Ying. I received valuable philosophical advice from Janet
Broughton, Josef Moural, Axel Seeman,
and Marga Vega. The two readers for Oxford University
Press, David Chalm-ers and an anonymous reader, made many helpful com-ments. 1 thank my research assistant, Jennifer Hudin
for assistance throughout, from the early formulation of the ideas to the final
preparation of the index. Most of all, 1 thank my wife Dagmar
Searle for her constant advice and support, and 1 dedicate this book to her.
INTRODUCTION. Why I Wrote This Book
There are many recent
introductory books on the philoso-phy of mind. Several give a more or less
comprehensive survey of the main positions and arguments currently in the
field. Some, indeed, are written with great clarity, rigor, intelligence, and
scholarship. What then is my excuse for adding another book to this glut? Well,
of course, any philosopher who has worked hard on a subject is unlikely to be
completely satisfied with somebody else's writings on that same subject, and I
suppose that I am a typical philosopher in this respect. But in addition to the
usual desire for wanting to state my disagreements, there is an overriding
reason for my wanting to write a general intro-duction to the philosophy of
mind. Almost all of the works that I have read accept the same set of
historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially
consciousness, and with these categories a certain set of assumptions about how
consciousness and other mental phenomena relate to each other and to the rest
of the world. It is this set of categories, and the assumptions that the
2 MIND
WHY I WROTE THIS
BOOK 7
Where the mind is
concerned we also need a distinc-tion between original or intrinsic
intentionality on the one hand and derived intentionality on the other. For
example I have in my head information about how to get to San Jose. I
have a set of true beliefs about the way to San Jose. This information and these beliefs in me are
examples of original or intrinsic intentionality. The map in front of me also
contains information about how to get to San Jose, and it contains symbols and
expressions that refer to or are about or represent cities, highways, and the like. But the sense in which the map contains
intentionality in the form of information, reference, aboutness,
and representations is derived from the original intentionality of the map
makers and users. Intrinsically the map is just a sheet of cellulose fibers
with ink stains on it. Any intentionality it has is imposed on it by the
original intentionality of humans.
So there are two
distinctions to keep in mind, first between observer-independent and
observer-dependent phenomena, and second between original and derived
intentionality. They are systematically related: derived intentionality is always
observer-dependent.
8-9
CHAPTER 1. A Dozen Problems in the
Philosophy of Mind
The aim of this book is
to introduce the reader to the philosophy of mind. I have three objectives.
First, the reader should get an understanding of the most important contemporary
issues and discussions in this field, and also get some understanding of their
historical background. Second, I want to make clear what I think is the correct
way to approach these problems, and I even hope to provide answers to many of
the questions I pose. And third, most important of all, I would like the reader
to be able to think about these issues for himself or
herself after reading the book. I can state all of these aims at once by saying
that I am trying to write the book that 1 wish I had read when I first began to
think about these questions. I write out of the conviction that the philosophy
of mind is the most important subject in contemporary philosophy and that the
standard views-dualism, materialism,
10 MIND
A DOZEN PROBLEMS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13
special cases of the more
general characteristics of the human mind, How should we proceed to examine the
mind?
I.
DESCARTES AND OTHER DISASTERS
In philosophy there is
no escaping history. Ideally, I sometimes think, I would just like to tell my
students the truth about a question and send them home. But such a totally
unhistorical approach tends to produce philosoph-ical superficiality. We have
to know how it came about historically that we have the questions we do and
what sorts of answers our ancestors gave to these questions. The philosophy of
mind in the modern era effectively begins with the work of Rene Descartes
(1596-1650). Descartes was not the first person to hold views of the kind he
did, but his view of the mind was the most influential of the so-called modern
philosophers, the philosophers of the sev-enteenth century, and after. Many of
his views are routinely expounded, and uncritically accepted today by people
who cannot even pronounce his name. Descartes' most famous doctrine is dualism,
the idea that the world divides into two different kinds of substances or entities that can
exist on their own. These are mental substances and physical substances.
Descartes' form of dualism is sometimes called "substance dualism."1
Descartes thought that a
substance has to have an essence or an essential trait that makes it the kind
of substance that it is (all this jargon about substance and essence, by the
way, comes from Aristotle). The essence of mind is consciousness, or as he called
it "thinking"; and the essence of body is being extended in three
14 MIND
A DOZEN PROBLEMS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 27
it is involved in a crash.
The noise might make it look as if the carriage was suffering pain, but it is
not; and likewise with dogs and all other animals. It sounds crazy to deny that
dogs and other animals are conscious, but here is how I think Descartes thought
of the matter. In the human case, the body is not conscious. It is only the
immortal soul, which is attached to the body, that is
conscious. But in the dog's case, it seems very unlikely that there is an
immortal soul; there is just a body, and bodies cannot be conscious. Therefore,
the dog is not conscious. Ditto for all other animals.
8.
The Problem of Sleep
The eighth problem for
Descartes is the problem of sleep. If every mind is essentially conscious, if
consciousness is the essence of mind such that you could not have a mind
without being conscious, then it looks like unconscious-ness would imply
nonexistence. And indeed Descartes' theory implies: if I cease to be conscious,
then I cease to exist. But then how do we account for the fact that people,
while still alive, nonetheless are often unconscious. They go to sleep, for
example. Descartes' answer to that would be that we are never totally 100
percent unconscious. There is always some minimal level of dreaming going on
even in the soundest sleep. As long as we continue to exist we necessarily
continue to be conscious.
II.
FOUR MORE PROBLEMS
There are four other
problems arising out of the problems of fitting minds into the rest of the
universe, which, however, were either not addressed by Descartes himself
28 MIND
or have been transformed
in the contemporary era in ways that are quite different from the forms in
which Descartes and his immediate followers addressed them.
9. The Problem of Intentionality
32 MIND
the limited features of the
physical stimulus with which they are presented. The problem for both of these
notions of the unconscious is, what exactly is it
supposed to mean in real terms? What facts about brain events could make them
both mental
and at
the same time unconscious?
12.
Psychological and Social Explanation
Explanations of human
psychological and social phenomena seem to have a different logical structure from
explanations in physics and chemistry. When we explain why we voted the way we
did in the last election, or why the First World War broke out, we seem to be
using a different sort of explanation from when we explain why plants grow.
What are the appropriate forms of explanation for human psycho-logical and
social phenomena and what implications does this have for the prospects of the
social sciences?
One of the most
disappointing features of the intellec-tual history of the last hundred years
was the failure of the social sciences to achieve the rich explanatory power
characteristic of the physical and biological sciences. In sociology, or even
economics, we do not have the kind of established knowledge structures that we
have in physics and chemistry. Why not? Why have the methods of the natural
sciences not had the kind of payoff in the study of human behavior and human
social relations that they have had in the physical sciences?
III.
DESCARTES' SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
A large part of this
book will be concerned with the 12 problems that I have just outlined. If those
problems look
A DOZEN PROBLEMS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 33
interesting to you, you are likely
to find this book interesting. If you cannot for the life of you figure out why
anybody would be interested in these problems, then this is probably the wrong
book for you. The book is not a historical book, and I will not say a great
deal about the development of these problems historically. However, since I
introduced eight of them by way of Descartes as their origin, I want to tell
you, however briefly, what his answers to these eight questions were. I think
that, without exception, his answers were inadequate, and to his credit, he was
often fully aware that they were inadequate. I think you will understand
contemporary philosophy better if you see, at least briefly, how he dealt with
these problems.
1.
The Mind-Body Problem
Descartes never got an
answer to this question that he was satisfied with. He did recognize that the
mind caused events in the body and that events in the body caused events in the
mental realm. But how exactly was it supposed to work? He never felt he had
resolved that. He studied anatomy and at least once observed the dissection of
a cadaver to find out where the point of connection between the mind and the
body might be. In the end he came up with the hypothesis that it must be in the
pineal gland. This is a small pea-shaped gland at the base of the skull.
Descartes thought that this must be where the mental forces and the physical
forces come in contact with each other. This is not as crazy as it sounds; he
gave a reasonable argument for thinking this. He noticed that everything in the
brain has a twin on the opposite side of the brain. Because of the two
hemispheres,
34 MIND
40 MIND
How is such a thing
possible at all? How could the brain cause consciousness? In current discussions
this is often called the "hard problem" and the lack of an
explanation of how the brain does it is called the "explanatory gap."
But there is also, I think, an equally interesting problem: How does
consciousness function in actual organisms like our-selves?
Similarly with intentionality. There is the huge
problem: How is it possible that intentionality could exist at all? But, to me,
at least, the more interesting question is: How does it work in detail?
What I have tried to do
in this chapter is to present the framework for the discussions that will
follow. The prob-lems will not be treated as of equal weight. Not by any means.
The next three chapters will be largely devoted to the mind-body problem. I
have already said what I will have to say about animals and sleep. Several
problems receive a chapter of their own: intentionality, mental causation, free
will, the unconscious, perception, and the self. Some of the other problems,
though they are of great importance, will receive only rather brief discussion
in this book, because they go far beyond the philosophy of mind, especially
skepticism and social science explanation. These are both large questions and I
will discuss them only briefly in this book, because to give an adequate
discussion would require a separate book.
CHAPTER 2. The Turn to Materialism
I.
TROUBLES WITH DUALISM
We now skip forward in
time to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Because of the failures of
Cartesian-style dualism, especially the failure to get an adequate or even
coherent account of the relationship between the mind and the body, it is
widely assumed that substance dualism in any form is out of the question. This
is not to say that no serious professionals are substance dualists. But in my
experience most substance dualists I know are people who hold this view for
some religious reasons, or as part of a religious faith. It is a consequence of
substance dualism that when our body is destroyed our soul can continue to
survive; and this makes the view appealing to adherents of religions that
believe in an afterlife. But among most of the professionals in the field,
substance dualism is not regarded as a serious possibility. A prominent
exception is the defense of dualism offered by Karl Popper and J. C. Eccles.1 They claim that there
are two quite distinct worlds, World
42 MIND
THE TURN TO
MATERIALISM 47
cles and everything else is in some way an illusion (like colors and tastes)
or a surface feature (like solidity and liquidity) that can be reduced to the
behavior of the physical particles. At the level of molecular structure the
table is not really solid. It is, as the physicist Eddington
said, a cloud of molecules. It is just that from our point of view it seems
solid. But at bottom the physical world consists entirely of microentities, the physical particles. However there is one
exception. Consciousness is not just particles. In fact it is not particles at
all. Whatever else it is, it is something "over and above" the
particles. I believe this is the insight that drives contemporary property
dualism. David Chalmers7 puts the point by saying that it
is not logically possible that the course of the physical universe should be
different if the course of microphysical facts is the same. Once you have the
microphysics then everything else follows. But that is not true for
consciousness. You could imagine the whole physical course of the universe
exactly the same, minus consciousness. It is logically possible that the course
of the physical universe should be exactly as it is, but with no consciousness.
It is such apparent
basic differences between the mental and the physical that drives dualism. I
think dualism can be answered and refuted, but we do not yet have the tools to
do it. I will do it in chapter 4.
II.
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM
The dualists said that
there are two kinds of things or properties in the universe, and with the
failure of dualism, it is natural to suppose that maybe there is only one kind
of thing in the universe. Not surprisingly, this view is called
48 MIND
"monism"
and it comes in two flavors, mentalist monism and materialist monism. These are
called "idealism" and "materialism," respectively. Idealism
says that the universe is entirely mental or spiritual; there exists nothing
but "ideas" in the technical sense of the word, according to which
any mental phenomenon at all is an idea. On some views-for example,
Berkeley's-in addition to ideas there are minds that contain the ideas.
Idealism had a prodigious influence in philosophy, literally for centuries, but
as far as I can tell it has been dead as a doornail among nearly all of the
philosophers whose opinions I respect, for many decades, so I will not say much
about it. Some of the most famous idealists were Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley, and
Royce. The single most influential family of views in the philosophy of mind
throughout the twentieth century and leading into the twenty-first century is
one version or another of materialism. Materialism is the view that the only
reality that exists is material or physical reality, and consequently if mental
states have a real existence, they must in some sense be reducible to, they
must be nothing but, physical states of some kind. There is a sense in which
materialism is the religion of our time, at least among most of the
professional experts in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive
science, and other disciplines that study the mind. Like more traditional
religions, it is accepted without question and it provides the framework within
which other questions can be posed, addressed, and answered. The history of
materialism is fascinating, because though the materialists are convinced, with
a quasi-religious faith, that their view must be right, they never seem to be
able to formulate a version of it that they are completely satisfied with and
that can be generally
THE TURN TO
MATERIALISM 49
III.
THE SAGA OF MATERIALISM: FROM BEHAVIORISM TO STRONG ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Behaviorism
The earliest influential
form of materialism in the twentieth century was called
"behaviorism." In its crudest version, behaviorism says the mind just
is the behavior of the body. There is nothing over and above the behavior of
the body
50 MIND
that is constitutive of the
mental. Behaviorism comes in two flavors, "methodological
behaviorism" and "logical behav-iorism." I will consider each in
turn.
Methodological
Behaviorism
Methodological
behaviorism was a movement in psychol-ogy. It attempted to put psychology on a
respectable scientific footing, along with other natural sciences, by insisting
that psychology should study only objectively observable behavior. The
"laws" that such a discipline was supposed to discover were laws that
would correlate the input stimulus to the organism with the output response
behavior; and for this reason, behaviorist psychology was sometimes called
"stimulus-response" psychology. The behaviorists were so influential
that for a time they even succeeded in changing the definition of psychology.
Psychology was no longer the "science of the mind" but the
"science of human behavior." This view was called
"methodological behaviorism" because it proposed a method in
psychology rather than a substantive claim about the existence or nonexistence
of the mind. The real objection to dualism, the methodological behaviorists
claimed, was not that it postulates nonexistent entities, but rather that it is
scientifically irrelevant. Scientific claims have to be objectively testable,
and the only objectively testable claims about the human mind are claims about
human behavior.
The big names in
methodological behaviorism are John B. Watson (1878-1958) and B. F. Skinner
(1904-1990). I think that, in fact, neither of them believed in the existence
of any inner qualitative mental phenomena, but
THE TURN TO
MATERIALISM 51
66 MIND
simulations as opposed to
purporting to create a mind. On the Strong AI view, the appropriately
programmed digital computer does not just simulate having a mind; it literally
has a mind.
With the advent of the
computer model of the mind, it seemed that at long last we had the solution to
the problems that had bothered Descartes, and indeed to problems that go back
2,500 years to the early Greek philosophers. In particular, it seemed we had a
perfect solution to the traditional mind-body problem. The rela-tion of mind
and body seemed mysterious, but the relation of program to computer hardware,
the relation of the software to its physical implementation, is not the least
bit mysterious. It is a relation that is understood in every Computer Science
department in the world, and this understanding is routinely employed on a
daily basis to program computers.
IV.
COMPUTATION AND MENTAL PROCESSES
So far I have criticized
materialist views as they came up. But now I am going to set out the computer
theory of the mind and save criticisms of it and other versions of
functionalism till the next chapter. Before explaining in detail how the
computer theory of the mind is supposed to solve our problems, I want to
introduce several crucial notions. These notions are important not only for
their relevance to contemporary philosophy but, indeed, for intellectual life
in general. The notions I hope to explain briefly are those of an algorithm, a
Turing machine, Church's thesis, Turing's theorem, the Turing test, levels of
description, multiple realizability, and recursive decom-
THE TURN TO
MATERIALISM 67
THE TURN TO
MATERIALISM 81
mind think that it follows
from this that these entities do not exist? As a general formal argument, the
fact that we do not get type-type reductions of some entity into more basic
sciences does not show that the irreducible entities do not exist. Quite the contrary.
There is an interesting
irony in all of this discussion. Reductionists and eliminativists tend to think their posi-tions are quite
different. Reductionists think mental enti-ties exist
but can be reduced to physical events. Eliminativists
think mental entities do not exist at all. But these amount to very much the
same conclusion. Reduc-tionists say there is nothing
there but brain processes materialistically described. Eliminativists
say there is noth-ing there but brain processes materialistically described.
The apparent difference is a difference in vocabulary. The earlier materialists
wanted to show that mental states did not exist as such by showing that they
could undergo a type-type reduction to the entities of neurobiology. The later
eliminative materialists wanted to show that the entities of common-sense
psychology do not exist at all by showing that they cannot undergo a type-type
reduction to the entities of neurobiology. Neither argument is any good, but
what they suggest is that these people are determined to try to show that our
ordinary common-sense notions of the mental do not name anything in the real
world, and they are willing to advance any argument that they can think of for
this conclusion.
CHAPTER 3. Arguments against
Materialism
In the last chapter I
presented some of the history of recent materialism, and I considered arguments
against some versions, especially against behaviorism, type identity the-ory
and eliminative materialism. In this chapter I will present the most common
arguments against materialism, concentrating on functionalism, because it is
currently the most influential version of materialism. In general, these
attacks have the same logical structure: the materialist account leaves out
some essential feature of the mind such as consciousness or intentionality. In
the jargon of philos-ophers, the materialist analysis fails to give sufficient con-ditions for mental
phenomena, because it is possible to satisfy the materialist analysis and not
have the appropriate mental phenomena. Strictly speaking, functionalism does
not require materialism. The functionalist defines mental states in terms of
causal relations and the causal relations
84 MIND
ARGUMENTS
AGAINST MATERIALISM 95
meanings in the head of the
agent. In short, alternative and inconsistent translations will be consistent
with all the causal and behavioral facts.9
I have not seen this
argument stated before and it only occurred to me when writing this book. To
summarize it in the jargon I will explain in chapter 6, intentionality
essentially involves aspectual shape. All mental represen-tation is under
representational aspects. Causation also has aspects but they are not
representational aspects. You can't analyze mental concepts in causal terms
because the representational aspectual shape of the intentional gets lost in
the translation. This is why statements about intentionality are intensional-with-an-s, but statements about causation, of
the form A caused B, are extensional. (Don't worry if
you don't understand this paragraph. We will get there in chapter 6.)
II.
MATERIALIST ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
Not surprisingly, the
defenders of functionalism, the iden-tity theory, and Strong AI, in general,
felt that they could answer the foregoing arguments (except the last that is
published here for the first time). There is a huge literature on this subject,
and I will not attempt to review it in this book. (I know of over 100 published
attacks on the Chinese Room Argument in English alone, and I assume there must
be dozens more that I do not know about, in English and other languages.) But
some of the arguments defending materialism are quite common and have received
wide acceptance, so are worth discussing here.
96 MIND
ARGUMENTS
AGAINST MATERIALISM 103
This analogy does not
work. A suitable description of a zagnet will entail that it is a magnet, but
no third-person description of a physical system will entail that it has
conscious states because there are two different phenom-ena, the third-person
behavioral, functional, neurobiolog-ical structures and the first-person
conscious experience.
Another answer to the
zombie argument one some-times hears is that if it were right, then
consciousness would become epiphenomenal. If you could have the same behavior
without consciousness, then consciousness would not be doing any work. This
answer rests on a misunderstanding. The point of the zombie argument is to show
that consciousness, on the one hand and behavior and causal relations, on the
other, are different phenomena by showing that it is logically possible to have
one without the other. But this logical possibility does not imply that
consciousness does not do any work in the real world. Analogously: Gasoline
combustion is not the same thing as car movement, because it is conceivable to
have one without the other. But the fact that it is logically possible for cars
to move without gasoline, or indeed without any fuel at all, does not show that
gasoline and other fuels are epiphenomenal.
III.
CONCLUSION
What should we say about
these arguments? It is important in philosophy always to step back and look at
the issues from a broader intellectual and historical perspective. Why are so
many philosophers driven to deny certain common-sense claims, such as, that we
really do have conscious thoughts and feelings; that we do have real intentional
104 MIND
106 MIND
are presented to us as the
only possibilities. Furthermore we know independently that both what dualism is
trying to say and what materialism is trying to say are true. Materialism is
trying to say that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields
of force. Dualism is trying to say that there are irreducible and ineliminable mental features to the world, consciousness
and intentionality, in particular. But if both views are true, there must be a
way of stating them that renders them consistent. Given the traditional
categories, it is not easy to see how they could be consistent; for materialism
so stated seems to imply that there cannot be any irreducible nonphysical
phenomena; and dualism so stated seems to imply that there must, in addition to
material phenomena, be irreducible nonphysi-cal mental phenomena. We will
explore these issues in more detail in the next chapter and see that in order
to render these views consistent, we have to abandon the assumptions behind the
traditional vocabulary.
CHAPTER 4. Consciousness Part I. Consciousness
and the Mind-Body Problem
We ended the last
chapter with an apparent contradiction of the sort that is typical in
philosophy. On the one hand we accept a view that seems overwhelmingly
convincing-the universe is material-but that seems inconsistent with another
view that we cannot give up-minds exist. This pattern occurs over and over in
philosophy. We will see in chapter 7 that the free-will problem exhibits the
same sort of conflict or contradiction: we think all events must be causally
determined, but we experience freedom. In other branches of philosophy, similar
inconsistencies arise. In ethics we feel there must be an objective moral truth
but at the same time we feel there cannot be that kind of objectivity in
morals. Some people find these contradictions in philosophy exas-perating.
Others, like me, find them fun and challenging.
In this chapter I am
going to attempt to resolve the contradiction about mind and matter.
108 MIND
132 MIND
refute it formally you would
have to prove a universal negative. Rather than give a formal
"refutation," I will give what I take to be conclusive arguments
against dualism.
1. No one has ever
succeeded in giving an intelligible account of the relationships between these
two realms.
2. The postulation is
unnecessary. It is possible to account for all of the first-person facts and
all the third-person facts without the postulation of separate realms.
3. The postulation creates
intolerable difficulties. It becomes impossible on this view to explain how
mental states and events can cause physical states and events. In short, it is
impossible to avoid epiphenomenalism.
Notice that these
arguments still leave dualism as a logical possibility. It is a logical
possibility, though I think extremely unlikely, that when our bodies are
destroyed, our souls will go marching on. I have not tried to show that this is
an impossibility (indeed, I wish it were true), but rather that it is inconsistent
with just about everything else we know about how the universe works and
therefore it is irrational to believe in it.
CHAPTER 5. Consciousness Part II: The
Structure of Consciousness and Neurobiology
In the last chapter I described a certain basic ontology. We need to keep
this ontology in mind, with all its simplicity and even crudity, while we now
explore the remarkable complexity and uniqueness of consciousness. Though the
basic ontology is simple, the resulting phenomena are complicated and the
details of their neurobiological rela-tions to the brain are difficult to
understand and at present largely unknown. Once we have solved the relatively
easy philosophical problem, we have very difficult neurobiolog-ical problems
left over.
In this chapter I will
first describe the structure of consciousness, then state accounts that
disagree with the account I have proposed, and finally I will conclude with a
discussion of some of the neurobiological problems of consciousness.
134 MIND
CONSCIOUSNESS
PART II 145
conscious experiences. In what
follows we will find reasons to emphasize the essential feature of
consciousness, namely, qualitative unified subjectivity, and we will have to
explore its relation to intentionality.
II.
SOME OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In the course of this
book I have already discussed a number of approaches to the philosophy of mind,
ranging all the way from eliminative materialism to substance dualism. These
approaches are implicitly or explicitly theories of consciousness. For example,
the computation-alist theory of the mind simply says
that consciousness is a computational process in the brain. It is important to
emphasize that such a theory, along with other forms of reductionism are not
saying, for example, that if you had the right computer program, the machine
would, in
addi-tion, be conscious. But rather, they are saying that is all there is to
consciousness. There is nothing in addition to the right computer program with
the right inputs and outputs.4 However, despite the many
philosophies I have covered there are still a number of influential views of
consciousness that I have not yet mentioned. So, in the interest of
thoroughness, I am going to discuss some views that we have not so far considered.
1.
Mysterians
Mysterians think that
consciousness is a mystery that cannot be solved by our existing scientific
methods; and some mysterians think we will never be
able to understand
146 MIND
192 MIND
passing the car on my right.
There is a red light ahead.) Think also of the constant accessing of
unconscious inten-tionality. (For example, I will be late for my 9:00 a.m.
appointment. Where shall I have lunch? I wonder how the meetings will go.) All
of these are intentionalistic represen-tations of the
world, and we cope with the world by way of these representations.
VI.
CONCLUSION
I said at the beginning
of this book that the worst thing we can do is give the reader the impression
that she under-stands something she does not really understand. I do not wish
you to get the impression from reading this chapter that now you understand
intentionality. I have only scratched the surface of a very large subject. But
I do want you to have a certain overall conception of intentionality as
representation and I do want you to be able to avoid mistakes that are common
in contemporary philosophy. Specifically, you should see the distinction
between inten-tionality-with-a-t and intensionality-with-an-s. You should see
the difficulties in the currently orthodox externalist accounts of intentional
content, and you should begin to see the connection between intentionality and
conscious-ness, a connection I will explain in detail in chapter 9. Most of
all, you should begin to get an idea of how intentionality works as a real
feature of the real world, and this under-standing will, I hope, enable you to
avoid being intimidated into thinking there is some deep mystery about
intrinsic or original intentionality that defies any natural explanation.
CHAPTER 7. Mental Causation
One of the residual
problems left to us from dualism is the problem of mental causation. Our first
mind-body problem was, How can physical processes ever
cause mental pro-cesses? But to many philosophers the other half of the
question is even more pressing, How can anything as
ethereal and insubstantial as mental processes ever have any physical effects
in the real world? Surely the real physical world is "causally
closed" in the sense that nothing from outside the physical world can ever
have any causal effects inside the physical world.
By now, the reader will
know that I do not think these are impossibly difficult questions, and that our
acceptance of the Cartesian categories is what makes them seem difficult.
However, there are a lot of fascinating problems that arise in the study of
mental causation. Even if you accept my general account of mind-body relations,
I think you will find some interesting issues about mental causa-tion discussed
in this chapter.
194 MIND
214 MIND
entire system. I cannot exaggerate
the importance of this phenomenon for understanding the differences between the
naturalistic explanations we get in the natural sciences and the intentionalistic explanations we get in the social
sciences. In the surface structure of the sentences the following explanations
look very much alike:
1. I made a mark on the
ballot paper because I wanted to vote for Bush.
2. I got a stomachache
because I wanted to vote for Bush.
Though the surface
structure is similar, the actual logical form is quite different. Number 2 just
states that an event, my stomachache, was caused by an intentional state, my
desire. But number 1 does not state a causally sufficient condition, and makes
sense only within the context of a presupposed teleology.
Such explanations raise
a host of philosophical prob-lems. The most important of these is the problem
of free will, and I turn to that in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 8. Free Will
Philosophical problems
tend to hang together. In order to solve, or even address, one problem, you
typically have to address a series of others. The problem of free will is an
especially striking example of this general phenome-non. In order to address
the problem of free will, we have to address the nature of consciousness, of
causation, of scientific explanation, and of rationality. Worse yet, after we
have examined all of these other issues and how they relate to the problem of
free will, we will have clarified our problem but we still will not have a
solution; or at least I am unable to see my way to a solution. All I can really
hope to do in this chapter is explain what the issues are and what the possible
solutions might be. The general conclusion that I reach is that we will need to
know a great deal more about brain operations before we have a solution to the
problem of free will that we can be at all confident is right.
216 MIND
CHAPTER 9. The Unconscious and the Explanation of
Behavior
One of my main aims in
this book is to explain how mental phenomena-consciousness, intentionality,
mental causa-tion, and all of the other features of our mental life-fit into
the rest of the universe. How, for example, does conscious-ness exist in a
universe that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force? How
can mental states function causally in such a universe? So far, most of our
investiga-tion has been about conscious mental phenomena. In this chapter we
will begin a serious exploration of the nature and mode of existence of unconscious mental states.
I.
FOUR TYPES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
Let us begin by asking,
naively, Do unconscious mental states really exist?
How can there be a state that is literally
238 MIND
THE UNCONSCIOUS
AND THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR 257
agent that he has
such-and-such an unconscious inten-tional state, and that that state is
functioning actively in causing his behavior, is to say that he has a brain
state that is capable of causing that state in a conscious form, even though in
a particular instance it may be incapable of causing it in a conscious form
because of brain damage, repression, etc. I am not entirely satisfied with this
conclu-sion, but I cannot think of an alternative conclusion that is superior
to it.
CHAPTER 10. Perception
One of the chief
functions of the mind, both in our day-to-day living and over the long
evolutionary haul, is to relate us to the rest of the world, especially by way
of perception and action. To put the point in the simplest possible terms, by
perception we take in information about the world, we then coordinate this
information both consciously and unconsciously, and make decisions or otherwise
form intentions, which result in actions by way of which we cope with the
world. In this chapter we will consider the relations between perception and
the world that exists apart from our perceptions, what philosophers like to
call, misleadingly, the "external world."
Why is there supposed to
be a problem? If I extend my arm forward, I see my hand in front of my face.
What could be easier than that? There is a tripartite distinction between me,
the hand, and the actual conscious experience of per-ceiving by way of which I
perceive the hand. There is, of course, a complex neurobiological story to be
told about how the reflection of light off of the hand attacks the visual
system
260 MIND
PERCEPTION 277
precisely the naïve realism that I have been defending. We
do not prove the truth of naive realism; rather, we prove the unintelligibility
of its denial in a public language.
CHAPTER 11. The Self
In Descartes' famous
slogan, "I think therefore I am," what does the "I" refer
to? For Descartes it definitely does not refer to my body; rather, it refers to
my mind, the mental substance that constitutes the essential me. We have now
seen good reason to suppose that Cartesian dualism is not a philosophically acceptable
account of the nature of the mind. But for those of us who reject dualism there
is still a serious question left over: What exactly is the self? What fact
about me makes me me? Many contemporary philos-ophers,
including myself until fairly recently, think that Hume had more or less the
last word on this issue. In addition to the sequence of experiences, and the
body in which these experiences occur, there is no such thing as the self. Hume
says, when I turn my attention inward and try to discover some entity that
constitutes the essential me, all I discover are particular experiences; there
is no such thing as the self in addition to these experiences.
280 MIND
THE SELF 299
definitely something that it feels
like to be me. And one way to get yourself to see that there is something that
it feels like to be you is to try to imagine what it must feel like to be
someone totally different. Imagine what it felt like to have been Adolf Hitler or Napoleon or George Washington. And it is
important when you do this imagi-native exercise that you not cheat and imagine
yourself in the situation of Adolf Hitler, etc.;
rather, you have to imagine not yourself playing the role of Adolf Hitler, but what it is like to be Adolf
Hitler. If you do that I think you see that you imagine an experience that is
quite different from the experience where you normally have a sense of your
self as this self and not some other self. But of course the existence of the
sense of self does not solve the problem of personal identity. Granted that
there is something that it feels like to be me, that is not sufficient to
guarantee that anybody who has that experience must be identical with me,
because it is quite possible that any number of other people might have this
same type-identical experience that I call the "sense of what it is to be
me." My sense of self definitely exists, but it does not solve the problem
of personal identity, and it does not yet so far flesh out the purely formal
requirement that I said was necessary to supplement Hume's account in order to
account for the possibility of free rational action. So, though this chapter is
a beginning of a discussion of the self, it is not more than a beginning.
EPILOGUE. Philosophy and the
Scientific World-View
I have now completed the
task I have set for myself in the first chapter. I have tried to give an
account of the mind that will situate mental phenomena as part of the natural
world. Our account of the mind in all of its aspects- consciousness,
intentionality, free will, mental causation, perception, intentional action,
etc.-is naturalistic in this sense: first, it treats mental phenomena as just a
part of nature. We should think of consciousness and intentional-ity as just as
much a part of the natural world as photosyn-thesis or digestion. Second, the
explanatory apparatus that we use to give a causal account of mental phenomena
is an apparatus that we need to account for nature generally. The level at
which we attempt to account for mental phenom-ena is biological rather than, say,
at the level of subatomic physics. The reason for this is that consciousness
and other mental phenomena are biological phenomena; they are created by
biological processes and are specific to certain
302 MIND
NOTES
WHY
I WROTE THIS BOOK
1. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the
Mind (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1992).
1.
A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
1. I do not wish to
suggest that mine is the only reasonable interpretation of Descartes. My claim
is rather that the inter-pretation presented here has been the most influential
in the history of the subject.
2. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson,
1949).
2.
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM
1. K. Popper and J. C.
Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin: Springer,
1977).
2. J.
C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), 5.
3. Eccles, How the Self Controls
Its Brain, 69.
4. H. Stapp, The Mindful Universe, forthcoming.
5. The classical
statement of idealism is in George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. J. Dancy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
6. H. Feigl, "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell,
eds., Minnesota
Studies in the Philoso-phy of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1958).
7. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In
Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
306 NOTES
NOTES 307
223-231; D. Lewis,
"Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifica-tions," in Block, Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, and D. Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in Block, Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, 207-222; D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Roudedge, 1993).
18. P Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1988), and Mental Models, Toward a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and
Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
19. Eliminativism
was originally stated by R. Rorty and P. Feyera-bend. A recent advocate is Paul Churchland.
See P. Feyerabend, "Mental Events and the
Brain," Journal of Philosophy (1963): 295-296; R. Rorty,
"Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Catego-ries" in D. Rosenthal, ed., Materialism, and the
Mind-Body Problem (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 174-199; P. M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Proposi-tional
Attitudes," in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind.
20. D. Davidson,
"Mental Events," reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and
Events (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-227.
21. P. M. Churchland.," Eliminative Materialism and the Proposi-tional
Attitudes," in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind, 603.
3.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM
1. T. Nagel "What
Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435-450, reprinted
in David Chalmers, ed., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2. F. Jackson,
"What Mary Didn't Know," Journal of Philosophy, vol: 83 (1982): 291-295,
reprinted in T. O'Connor and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind (New York: Routledge 2003); F. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127-136, reprinted
in Chalmers, The Philosophy of the Mind.
3. N. Block,
"Troubles with Functionalism," Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: Minnesota Uni-versity Press,
1978) 261-325, reprinted in N. Block (ed.),
308 NOTES
NOTES 311
10.
PERCEPTION
1. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940), 15.
2. For a statement of
several different versions of the argument from illusion, cf. A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan,
1953).
3. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 210-211.
4. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1924), 67.
5. M. Bauerlein, Literary Criticism: An Autopsy (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
6. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
Suggestions for further reading
1.
A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. J. Col-lingham, R. Stoothoff, and D.
Murdoch, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. II,
especially Medita-tions on First Philosophy, Second Meditation, 16-23, and Sixth
Meditation, 50-62, Objections and Replies, especially Author's Replies to the Fourth Set of
Objections, 154-162.
There are a number of
general introductions to the philosophy of mind, among them:
Armstrong, D. M., The Mind-Body Problem, An
Opinionated Introduc-tion, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1999.
Churchland, P. M., Matter and
Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
Heil, J., Philosophy of Mind, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
Jacquette, D., Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1994.
Kim, J., The Philosophy of Mind, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
Lyons, W., Matters of the Mind, New York: Routledge, 2001.
There are also several
general collections of articles on the philosophy of mind, among them:
Block, N., ed., Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, vol.1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Chalmers, D., ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical
and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Heil, J., ed., Philosophy of Mind, A
Guide and Anthology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
314 SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER READING
Lycan, W., ed., Mind and Cognition: A
Reader, Cambridge,
MA:
Blackwell 1990.
O'Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds. Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge, 2003. Rosenthal, D. M., ed., The
Nature
of Mind, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
2.
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM
The following selections
give most of the basic arguments discussed in this chapter:
Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory
of the Mind, London: Rout-ledge, 1993.
Block, N.,
"Troubles with Functionalism," in Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, vol. IX, ed. C. Wade Savage, Minneap-olis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261-325, reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Borst, C, ed., The Mind/Brain Identity
Theory, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.
Churchland, P. M.,
"Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," in
Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991, 601-612.
Crane, T., The Mechanical Mind, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2003.
Davidson, D.,
"Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1980, 207-227.
Feigl, H., "The 'Mental'
and the 'Physical,'" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G.
Maxwell, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
Haugeland, J., ed., Mind Design:
Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book,
MIT Press, 1982.
Hempel, C, "The Logical
Analysis of Psychology" in Block ed., Readings in Philosophy of
Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Lewis, D.,
"Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" and "Mad Pain
and Martian Pain" both in Block, ed., Readings in
SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 315
Philosophy of
Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
McDermott, D. V., Mind and Mechanism, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001.
Nagel,
T., "Armstrong on the Mind," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Place, U. T., "Is
Consciousness a Brain Process?" British Journal of Psychology, vol. 47, pt. 1 (1956)
44-50.
Putnam, P., "The
Nature of Mental States" in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard
University
Press, 1980.
Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson,
1949.
Smart, J. J. C,
"Sensations and Brain Processes," in Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991,
169-176.
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
Turing, A., "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind, vol. 59 (1950): 433-460.
3.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM
Block, N., "Troubles with Functionalism," in Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, vol. 9
(1978): 261-325. Reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 268-305.
Jackson, F., "What
Mary Didn't Know," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83 (1986): 291-295; also
"Epiphenomenal Qualia," in Philo-sophical
Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127-136.
Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge MA: Harvard Uni-versity
Press, 1980, excerpts in Chalmers, D. ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 329-332.
McGinn, C,
"Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian
Intuitions," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1980, 156-158.
316 SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER READING
Nagel, T.,
"Armstrong on the Mind," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of
Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 200-206.
Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
Nagel, T., "What Is
It Like to be a Bat?," in Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435-450,
reprinted in Chalmers, ed., The Philos-ophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Searle, J. R.,
"Minds, Brains and Programs," in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 417-424,
reprinted in O'Connor, T. and D. Robb, Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary
Readings, Lon-don: Routledge,
2003, 332-352.
Searle, J. R., Minds, Brains and
Science, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the
Mind, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1992.
4.
CONSCIOUSNESS PART I
There is a flood of
recent work on consciousness, including some by the present author. I will list
a representative sample.
Chalmers, D., The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Dennett, D., Consciousness
Explained, Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
McGinn, C, The Problem of
Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolu-tion, Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
O'Shaughnessy, B., Consciousness and the
World, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000
Searle, J. R., The Mystery of
Consciousness, New York: New York
Review
of Books, 1997. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the
Mind, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1992.
Siewert, C, The Significance of
Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 317
Tye, M., Ten Problems of
Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
There is also a huge
(over 800 pages) collection of articles on consciousness:
Block, N., O. Flanagan,
and G. Guzeldere, eds., The Nature of
Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
More neurobiologically
oriented readings will be listed at the end of Consciousness Part II.
5.
CONSCIOUSNESS PART II
There are a number of
neurobiological approaches to consciousness. Among them:
Crick, F., The Astonishing
Hypothesis, New York: Scribner's, 1994
Damasio, A. R., The Feeling of What
Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace
& Co., 1999.
Edelman, G., The Remembered Present, New York: Basic Books,
1989.
Llinas, R., I of the Vortex: From
Neurons to Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Searle, J. R.,
"Consciousness," in Annual Review of Neuroscience, vol. 23, 2000, reprinted in Searle,
J. R., Consciousness
and Lan-guage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
(This article contains an extensive bibliography of current neuro-biological
research on consciousness.)
Koch, C, The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, Englewood, CO: Roberts
and Co., 2004.
6.
INTENTIONALITY
Burge,
T., "Individualism and the Mental," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 1979.
Fodor, J., "Meaning
and the World Order," in Psychosemantics, Cam-bridge, MA: MIT
Press, chap. 4, 1988, reprinted in O'Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind,
Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge,
2003.
Putnam, H., "The
Meaning of Meaning," in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Gunderson, K., ed., Minnesota Readings in
the
318 SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER READING
Philosophy of Science,
vol. 9,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, 131-193.
Searle, J. R., Intentionality, An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
7. MENTAL CAUSATION
Davidson, D., "Actions, Reasons and Causes," in Essays on Actions
and Events, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980. Heil, J., and A. Mele, eds., Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Kim, J., Mind in a Physical World:
An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Causation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An
Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
8.
FREE WILL
A collection of articles
on free will is contained in Watson, G., ed., Free Will, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Some recent books are:
Kane, R., The Significance of Free
Will, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Slimansky, S., Free Will and
Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Wolf, S., Freedom within Reason,
Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994.
Wegner, D. N., The Illusion of Conscious
Will, Cambridge,
MA: MIT
Press,
2003.
Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
9.
THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR
Freud, S., 1912 "A
Note on The Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 22-29. Freud,
S., 1915, "The Unconscious," in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 98-136.
SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 319
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the
Mind, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press,
1992,
chap.7. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
10.
PERCEPTION
The classic attack on
realist theories of perception is in
Berkeley's Principles of Human
Knowledge, Dancy, J., ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
See also,
Berkeley, G., Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous,
Turbayne, C, ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Educational Publishing, 1985.
For a modern statement
of the sense-datum theories, see
Ayer, A. J., The Foundations of
Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1953.
For a criticism of the
sense-datum theories, see
Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibilia, Warnock, G.J., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
For an account of the
intentionality of perception, see
Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An
Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, chap. 2.
11.
THE SELF
The classic statement of
skepticism about the self is in
Hume's Treatise of Human
Nature, Selby-Bigge, L. A., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951, Book I,
Part IV, section VI, of personal identity, 251-263, as well as the Appendix,
623-939.
Locke's conception is to
be found in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London: Routledge,
1894, especially chap. 27, "Of Identity and Diversity."
Other works about issues
raised in this chapter are:
Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action,
Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2001, especially chap. 3.
The following is a
collection of essays:
Perry, J., ed., Personal Identity, Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.
Index
algorithm, 67
animals:
and Descartes, 38
the problem of, 26-27
anomalous monism, 76-77
appearance/reality distinction, 123
argument:
from analogy, 19, 35
from illusion, 261-262, 265-266,271-273
from science, 261, 270-273 181-182, 187
arthritis and tharthritis,
181-182, 187
aspectual shape, 246-248
Background, 72-174
behaviorism, 49-53
logical, 51-55
methodological, 50-51
biological naturalism, 113-115
Cartesian dualism,
14-18, 22, 24-28, 31-37
and free will, 36-37
and personal identity, 37
and sleep, 38-39
causation, 110. 123-124
and experience, 202-205
and explanation of human behavior, 211-214
principle of, 106
problem of, 206-207, 209
causality, principle of, 106
Chinese Room Argument,
88-91, 100, 105
System's
Reply, 100
Church-Turing Thesis, 68
computational theory of the mind, 66-67,
145
computation:
as observer-relative, 91
and syntax, 91
consciousness, ch.5
active and passive, 142
as a biological feature, 115-116
and center and periphery dis-tinction, 140-141
gestalt structure of, 143-144
and intentionality, 138-139
and irreducibility, 121-122
and memory, 157
and mood, 139-140
and pleasure-unpleasure, 141
and qualitativeness, 134
and sense of self, 144
and situatedness, 141
and subjectivity, 134-136
and unity, 136-138
conscious states, and intrinsic
intentionality, 138
determinism, 216-223, 233
322 INDEX
determinism (continued)
and the experience of the gap, 233
hard and soft, 220
neurobiological, 226-228
psychological, 223-226
and randomness, 232
dualism, 13
Cartesian, 14-18, 22,
24-28, 31-37
property, 44-47
refutation of, 129-132
substance, 13, 41-43
eliminative materialism, 75-76
epiphenomenalism, 30, 45-46
explanatory gap, 40
extensionality, 178
externalism, 12, 179-189
facts, observer-dependent, 6
fallacy of composition, 231
folk psychology, 76, 77-80
free will, ch.8
and Cartesian dualism, 36-37
and Descartes, 36
the problem of, 23-25
and quantum mechanics, 230-232
and randomness, 24
functionalism, 62-65
black box, 64
computer, 65
genetic fallacy, 279-271
ghost in the machine, 15
hypothetico-deductive method, 201
idealism, 44-48
identity conditions, and correla-tions,
100
identity theory, 54
identity thesis, 55
and neuronal chauvinism, 59
and objections to, 55-61
and topic-neutral vocabulary, 58
indexicality, 179-180, 187
induction, problem of, 196
information, 162
internalism, 179-189
intensionality, 174-178
intentionality, ch.6 as-if, 29
and aspectual shape, 94-95
and the Background, 172-174
and conditions of satisfaction, 169
as causally self-referential, 170-172
and content, 166
and direction of fit, 168-169
and explanation of human action, 250-251
and interpretativism, 163
and the Network, 172-174
and observer-independent fea-tures, 6
and observer-dependent fea-tures, 6
and observer-relative features, 6
original or intrinsic, 7, 29
possibility of, 162-166
the problem of, 4, 27-30
as a representation, 165
knowledge argument, 97
law of conservation, 42
INDEX 323
Leibniz's Law, 55,
175-176
levels of description, 70-71
libertarianism, 223
materialism, 48, ch.2
arguments against, ch.3
eliminative, 75-76
refutation of, 126-132
mental causation, 30-31, ch.7
the problem of, 4
mental states, unconscious, 237-238
mental and physical features, 116-119
mind-body problem, 4, 17-18
solution, 111-115
monism, 48
anomalous, 76-77
as idealism, 48
as materialism, 48
multiple realizability,
66, 71-72
mysterians, 145
neuronal chauvinism, 59
Network, 172-174
nomological danglers, 46
neurobiology:
and the building block approach, 151-155
and the unified-field approach, 151-154
neuronal correlates of conscious-ness,
151
objective, 3, 136
ontology:
first-person, 98
third-person, 98
other minds, the problem of, 18-21,
35
pan-psychism, 149-150
perception, ch.
10
the representation theory of, 22, 267-273
and the sense-datum theory, 260
physicalism, 54
property dualism, 44-47
realism:
direct or naive, 260
transcendental argument for, 273-275
reduction, 119-123
causal, 119
eliminative, 122
ontological, 119
qualia, 84, 134
quantum mechanics, 43-44
Ramsey sentence, 62
recursive decomposition, 66,72-73
rigid designator, 88
self, ch.
11
and Descartes, 37
and personal identity, 25-26, 282-291
sense data, 262-264
and primary and secondary qualities, 267
skepticism, 21
and the external world, 21-23, 35
sleep, the problem of, 27
solipsism, 20-21
epistemic, 20
extreme, 20
spectrum inversion, 85
Strong Artificial
Intelligence, 65
subjective, 3, 136
324 INDEX
subjectivity, ontological, 135-136
epistemic, 135
substances, 13-16
substance dualism,13, 41-43
supervenience, 148
constitutive,
148-149
syntax/semantics distinction, 101- 102
Turing machine, 69
universal, 69, 73
Turing test, 70, 74
Twin Earth, 180-181, 187
Unconscious, 31-32, ch.9
and aspectual shape, 246-248
deep, 242, 246
dispositional analysis of, 248-249
as dynamic, 245
as nonconscious, 242
as preconscious, 240
as repressed, 241
as rule-described, 252-256
and rule following, 252-256
as rule-governed, 252-256
Weak Artificial
Intelligence, 65
zombies, 92-92, 128
and zagnets, 102-103
Name Index
Aristotle, 76
Austin, J. L., 271
Ayer, A. J., 221
Berkeley, G., 48, 260, 268, 269
Block, N., 87
Bradley, F., 48
Burge, Т., 181,
184
Chalmers, D., 47, 149
Chomsky, N.. 52
Church, A., 68
Churchland, P., 80
Davidson, D., 76-77
Dennett, D., 102, 163
Descartes, R., 13-18, 22,
24-28,33-37,42,51,54,66,93, 117, 158,238-239,245,260,269. 279,291
Ding, H., viii
Eccles, J. C, 34,41-42
Eddington, 47
Freud, S., 238, 240
Gazzaniga, M.,
138
Hegel, G., 48
Hobbes, Т., 221.
287
Hudin, J.,
viii
Hume, D., 37, 147, 194-196, 198,
200-204,260,265,268-269, 279,282,291,292,294-295, 298-299
Jackson, F., 86-87
James, W., 220
Kant, I., 260, 274
Kim,J., 125, 148
Kripke, S.,
88, 99, 125
Leibniz, G, 55, 175, 289
Lichtenburg, 37
Locke, J., 260, 267, 269, 287, 289, 291
Maxwell, G., 58
McGinn, C, 146
Mill, J. S.,221
Moural, J.,
viii
Nagel, Т., 85-86,
93, 97, 146-147, 149
Penfield, W., 142, 203
Popper, K., 41
Putnam, H., 180, 182-183, 186
Ramsey, F., 62
Reines, M. F., viii
Richards, I. A., 54
326 NAME INDEX
Royce, J.,48
Russell, В., 261
Ryle, G., 15
Samuels, J., viii
Searle, D., viii
Searle, J. R., 89, 100
Seeman, A.,
viii
Skinner, B. F., 50, 51
Sperry, R., 138
Stevenson, C, 221
Taylor, N., viii
Turing, A., 67, 69-70
Vega, M., viii
Watson, J. В., 50
Ying J. F. W.,viii
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update 22.07.05 АНОНС книги
Described as a "dragonslayer by tempera-ment," John Searle offers here
a refreshingly direct and open discussion of philosophy, one that skewers
accepted wisdom even as it offers striking new insights into the nature of con-sciousness
and the mind.
JOHN R. SEARLE is Mills Professor in
the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley.
He is the author of many books, including The Rediscovery of the Mind, The Mystery of Consciousness, Mind, Language and Society,
Philosophy in the Real World, and Consciousness and Language.
OXPORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS www.oup.com
"The philosophy of
mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John
Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are
false." In Mind, Searle dismantles these famous and influential theories as he presents a
vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind.
Here readers will find
one of the world's most eminent thinkers shedding light on the central concern
of modern philosophy. Searle begins with a look at the twelve prob-lems of
philosophy of mind--which
he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"-problems which he returns to
throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as the freedom of the
will, the actual operation of mental causation, the nature and functioning of
the unconscious, the analysis of perception, and the concept of the self. One
of the key chapters is on the mind-body problem, which Searle analyzes
brilliantly. He argues that all forms of con-sciousness-from feeling thirsty to wondering
how to translate Mallarmé-are caused by the behavior of
neurons and are realized in the brain system, which is itself composed of neu-rons.
But this does not mean that consciousness is nothing but neuronal behavior. The
main point of having the concept of consciousness, Searle points out, is to
capture the first-person subjective features of the phenomenon and this point
is lost if we redefine consciousness in third-person objective terms.
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The leading authority on the mind offers a highly
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'The philosophy of mind
is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects, in that all of the most
famous and influential theories are false.... One of my aims fin writing this
book] is to try to rescue the truth from the overwhelming urge to falsehood. I
have attempted some of this task in other works, especially The Rediscovery of the
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this is my only attempt at a comprehensive introduction to
the entire subject of the
philosophy of mind."
- from the Introduction
'Searle has written a
forceful, clear, accessible and fascinating intro-ductory book that explains
much more convincingly than anything else his iconoclastic view that both
materialism and dualism are false. Searle vigorously explores the big issues in
philosophy of mind, always
keeping the deepest intuitions
about the mind in focus."
-
Ned Block, New York
University
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update 22.07.05