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John R. Searle
A Brief Introduction
Fundamentals of Philosophy Series
Series Editors John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
and John Perry, Stanford University
A Brief Introduction John R. Searle
A Brief Introduction
John R. Searle
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Searle, John R.
Mind: a brief introduction/by John R. Searle
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1. Philosophy of Mind.
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Introduction: Why I Wrote This Book 1
1. A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind 9
2. The Turn to Materialism 41
3. Arguments against Materialism 83
Part I: Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 107
Part II: The Structure of Consciousness and Neurobiology 133
6. Intentionality 159
7. Mental Causation 193
8. Free Will 215
9. The Unconscious and the Explanation of Behavior 237 10.
11. The Self 279
Epilogue: Philosophy and the Scientific World-View 301
Suggestions for Further Reading 313
Most of the material in this book has been given by me in lectures at Berkeley, and I am indebted to my students for their combination of enthusiasm and skepticism. Two of them, Hua (Linda) Ding and Nadia Taylor, read the entire manuscript and made helpful comments. For help in preparing the electronic text 1 am also grateful to Maria Francisca Reines, Jessica Samuels, and Jing Fong Williams Ying. I received valuable philosophical advice from Janet Broughton, Josef Moural, Axel Seeman, and Marga Vega. The two readers for Oxford University Press, David Chalm-ers and an anonymous reader, made many helpful com-ments. 1 thank my research assistant, Jennifer Hudin for assistance throughout, from the early formulation of the ideas to the final preparation of the index. Most of all, 1 thank my wife Dagmar Searle for her constant advice and support, and 1 dedicate this book to her.
There are many recent introductory books on the philoso-phy of mind. Several give a more or less comprehensive survey of the main positions and arguments currently in the field. Some, indeed, are written with great clarity, rigor, intelligence, and scholarship. What then is my excuse for adding another book to this glut? Well, of course, any philosopher who has worked hard on a subject is unlikely to be completely satisfied with somebody else's writings on that same subject, and I suppose that I am a typical philosopher in this respect. But in addition to the usual desire for wanting to state my disagreements, there is an overriding reason for my wanting to write a general intro-duction to the philosophy of mind. Almost all of the works that I have read accept the same set of historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially consciousness, and with these categories a certain set of assumptions about how consciousness and other mental phenomena relate to each other and to the rest of the world. It is this set of categories, and the assumptions that the
WHY I WROTE THIS BOOK 7
Where the mind is concerned we also need a distinc-tion between original or intrinsic intentionality on the one hand and derived intentionality on the other. For example I have in my head information about how to get to San Jose. I have a set of true beliefs about the way to San Jose. This information and these beliefs in me are examples of original or intrinsic intentionality. The map in front of me also contains information about how to get to San Jose, and it contains symbols and expressions that refer to or are about or represent cities, highways, and the like. But the sense in which the map contains intentionality in the form of information, reference, aboutness, and representations is derived from the original intentionality of the map makers and users. Intrinsically the map is just a sheet of cellulose fibers with ink stains on it. Any intentionality it has is imposed on it by the original intentionality of humans.
So there are two distinctions to keep in mind, first between observer-independent and observer-dependent phenomena, and second between original and derived intentionality. They are systematically related: derived intentionality is always observer-dependent.
The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to the philosophy of mind. I have three objectives. First, the reader should get an understanding of the most important contemporary issues and discussions in this field, and also get some understanding of their historical background. Second, I want to make clear what I think is the correct way to approach these problems, and I even hope to provide answers to many of the questions I pose. And third, most important of all, I would like the reader to be able to think about these issues for himself or herself after reading the book. I can state all of these aims at once by saying that I am trying to write the book that 1 wish I had read when I first began to think about these questions. I write out of the conviction that the philosophy of mind is the most important subject in contemporary philosophy and that the standard views-dualism, materialism,
A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13
special cases of the more general characteristics of the human mind, How should we proceed to examine the mind?
In philosophy there is no escaping history. Ideally, I sometimes think, I would just like to tell my students the truth about a question and send them home. But such a totally unhistorical approach tends to produce philosoph-ical superficiality. We have to know how it came about historically that we have the questions we do and what sorts of answers our ancestors gave to these questions. The philosophy of mind in the modern era effectively begins with the work of Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes was not the first person to hold views of the kind he did, but his view of the mind was the most influential of the so-called modern philosophers, the philosophers of the sev-enteenth century, and after. Many of his views are routinely expounded, and uncritically accepted today by people who cannot even pronounce his name. Descartes' most famous doctrine is dualism, the idea that the world divides into two different kinds of substances or entities that can exist on their own. These are mental substances and physical substances. Descartes' form of dualism is sometimes called "substance dualism."1
Descartes thought that a substance has to have an essence or an essential trait that makes it the kind of substance that it is (all this jargon about substance and essence, by the way, comes from Aristotle). The essence of mind is consciousness, or as he called it "thinking"; and the essence of body is being extended in three
A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 27
it is involved in a crash. The noise might make it look as if the carriage was suffering pain, but it is not; and likewise with dogs and all other animals. It sounds crazy to deny that dogs and other animals are conscious, but here is how I think Descartes thought of the matter. In the human case, the body is not conscious. It is only the immortal soul, which is attached to the body, that is conscious. But in the dog's case, it seems very unlikely that there is an immortal soul; there is just a body, and bodies cannot be conscious. Therefore, the dog is not conscious. Ditto for all other animals.
The eighth problem for Descartes is the problem of sleep. If every mind is essentially conscious, if consciousness is the essence of mind such that you could not have a mind without being conscious, then it looks like unconscious-ness would imply nonexistence. And indeed Descartes' theory implies: if I cease to be conscious, then I cease to exist. But then how do we account for the fact that people, while still alive, nonetheless are often unconscious. They go to sleep, for example. Descartes' answer to that would be that we are never totally 100 percent unconscious. There is always some minimal level of dreaming going on even in the soundest sleep. As long as we continue to exist we necessarily continue to be conscious.
There are four other problems arising out of the problems of fitting minds into the rest of the universe, which, however, were either not addressed by Descartes himself
or have been transformed in the contemporary era in ways that are quite different from the forms in which Descartes and his immediate followers addressed them.
the limited features of the physical stimulus with which they are presented. The problem for both of these notions of the unconscious is, what exactly is it supposed to mean in real terms? What facts about brain events could make them both mental and at the same time unconscious?
Explanations of human psychological and social phenomena seem to have a different logical structure from explanations in physics and chemistry. When we explain why we voted the way we did in the last election, or why the First World War broke out, we seem to be using a different sort of explanation from when we explain why plants grow. What are the appropriate forms of explanation for human psycho-logical and social phenomena and what implications does this have for the prospects of the social sciences?
One of the most disappointing features of the intellec-tual history of the last hundred years was the failure of the social sciences to achieve the rich explanatory power characteristic of the physical and biological sciences. In sociology, or even economics, we do not have the kind of established knowledge structures that we have in physics and chemistry. Why not? Why have the methods of the natural sciences not had the kind of payoff in the study of human behavior and human social relations that they have had in the physical sciences?
A large part of this book will be concerned with the 12 problems that I have just outlined. If those problems look
A DOZEN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 33
interesting to you, you are likely to find this book interesting. If you cannot for the life of you figure out why anybody would be interested in these problems, then this is probably the wrong book for you. The book is not a historical book, and I will not say a great deal about the development of these problems historically. However, since I introduced eight of them by way of Descartes as their origin, I want to tell you, however briefly, what his answers to these eight questions were. I think that, without exception, his answers were inadequate, and to his credit, he was often fully aware that they were inadequate. I think you will understand contemporary philosophy better if you see, at least briefly, how he dealt with these problems.
Descartes never got an answer to this question that he was satisfied with. He did recognize that the mind caused events in the body and that events in the body caused events in the mental realm. But how exactly was it supposed to work? He never felt he had resolved that. He studied anatomy and at least once observed the dissection of a cadaver to find out where the point of connection between the mind and the body might be. In the end he came up with the hypothesis that it must be in the pineal gland. This is a small pea-shaped gland at the base of the skull. Descartes thought that this must be where the mental forces and the physical forces come in contact with each other. This is not as crazy as it sounds; he gave a reasonable argument for thinking this. He noticed that everything in the brain has a twin on the opposite side of the brain. Because of the two hemispheres,
How is such a thing possible at all? How could the brain cause consciousness? In current discussions this is often called the "hard problem" and the lack of an explanation of how the brain does it is called the "explanatory gap." But there is also, I think, an equally interesting problem: How does consciousness function in actual organisms like our-selves? Similarly with intentionality. There is the huge problem: How is it possible that intentionality could exist at all? But, to me, at least, the more interesting question is: How does it work in detail?
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to present the framework for the discussions that will follow. The prob-lems will not be treated as of equal weight. Not by any means. The next three chapters will be largely devoted to the mind-body problem. I have already said what I will have to say about animals and sleep. Several problems receive a chapter of their own: intentionality, mental causation, free will, the unconscious, perception, and the self. Some of the other problems, though they are of great importance, will receive only rather brief discussion in this book, because they go far beyond the philosophy of mind, especially skepticism and social science explanation. These are both large questions and I will discuss them only briefly in this book, because to give an adequate discussion would require a separate book.
We now skip forward in time to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Because of the failures of Cartesian-style dualism, especially the failure to get an adequate or even coherent account of the relationship between the mind and the body, it is widely assumed that substance dualism in any form is out of the question. This is not to say that no serious professionals are substance dualists. But in my experience most substance dualists I know are people who hold this view for some religious reasons, or as part of a religious faith. It is a consequence of substance dualism that when our body is destroyed our soul can continue to survive; and this makes the view appealing to adherents of religions that believe in an afterlife. But among most of the professionals in the field, substance dualism is not regarded as a serious possibility. A prominent exception is the defense of dualism offered by Karl Popper and J. C. Eccles.1 They claim that there are two quite distinct worlds, World
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM 47
cles and everything else is in some way an illusion (like colors and tastes) or a surface feature (like solidity and liquidity) that can be reduced to the behavior of the physical particles. At the level of molecular structure the table is not really solid. It is, as the physicist Eddington said, a cloud of molecules. It is just that from our point of view it seems solid. But at bottom the physical world consists entirely of microentities, the physical particles. However there is one exception. Consciousness is not just particles. In fact it is not particles at all. Whatever else it is, it is something "over and above" the particles. I believe this is the insight that drives contemporary property dualism. David Chalmers7 puts the point by saying that it is not logically possible that the course of the physical universe should be different if the course of microphysical facts is the same. Once you have the microphysics then everything else follows. But that is not true for consciousness. You could imagine the whole physical course of the universe exactly the same, minus consciousness. It is logically possible that the course of the physical universe should be exactly as it is, but with no consciousness.
It is such apparent basic differences between the mental and the physical that drives dualism. I think dualism can be answered and refuted, but we do not yet have the tools to do it. I will do it in chapter 4.
The dualists said that there are two kinds of things or properties in the universe, and with the failure of dualism, it is natural to suppose that maybe there is only one kind of thing in the universe. Not surprisingly, this view is called
"monism" and it comes in two flavors, mentalist monism and materialist monism. These are called "idealism" and "materialism," respectively. Idealism says that the universe is entirely mental or spiritual; there exists nothing but "ideas" in the technical sense of the word, according to which any mental phenomenon at all is an idea. On some views-for example, Berkeley's-in addition to ideas there are minds that contain the ideas. Idealism had a prodigious influence in philosophy, literally for centuries, but as far as I can tell it has been dead as a doornail among nearly all of the philosophers whose opinions I respect, for many decades, so I will not say much about it. Some of the most famous idealists were Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley, and Royce. The single most influential family of views in the philosophy of mind throughout the twentieth century and leading into the twenty-first century is one version or another of materialism. Materialism is the view that the only reality that exists is material or physical reality, and consequently if mental states have a real existence, they must in some sense be reducible to, they must be nothing but, physical states of some kind. There is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time, at least among most of the professional experts in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and other disciplines that study the mind. Like more traditional religions, it is accepted without question and it provides the framework within which other questions can be posed, addressed, and answered. The history of materialism is fascinating, because though the materialists are convinced, with a quasi-religious faith, that their view must be right, they never seem to be able to formulate a version of it that they are completely satisfied with and that can be generally
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM 49
The earliest influential form of materialism in the twentieth century was called "behaviorism." In its crudest version, behaviorism says the mind just is the behavior of the body. There is nothing over and above the behavior of the body
that is constitutive of the mental. Behaviorism comes in two flavors, "methodological behaviorism" and "logical behav-iorism." I will consider each in turn.
Methodological behaviorism was a movement in psychol-ogy. It attempted to put psychology on a respectable scientific footing, along with other natural sciences, by insisting that psychology should study only objectively observable behavior. The "laws" that such a discipline was supposed to discover were laws that would correlate the input stimulus to the organism with the output response behavior; and for this reason, behaviorist psychology was sometimes called "stimulus-response" psychology. The behaviorists were so influential that for a time they even succeeded in changing the definition of psychology. Psychology was no longer the "science of the mind" but the "science of human behavior." This view was called "methodological behaviorism" because it proposed a method in psychology rather than a substantive claim about the existence or nonexistence of the mind. The real objection to dualism, the methodological behaviorists claimed, was not that it postulates nonexistent entities, but rather that it is scientifically irrelevant. Scientific claims have to be objectively testable, and the only objectively testable claims about the human mind are claims about human behavior.
The big names in methodological behaviorism are John B. Watson (1878-1958) and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). I think that, in fact, neither of them believed in the existence of any inner qualitative mental phenomena, but
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM 51
simulations as opposed to purporting to create a mind. On the Strong AI view, the appropriately programmed digital computer does not just simulate having a mind; it literally has a mind.
With the advent of the computer model of the mind, it seemed that at long last we had the solution to the problems that had bothered Descartes, and indeed to problems that go back 2,500 years to the early Greek philosophers. In particular, it seemed we had a perfect solution to the traditional mind-body problem. The rela-tion of mind and body seemed mysterious, but the relation of program to computer hardware, the relation of the software to its physical implementation, is not the least bit mysterious. It is a relation that is understood in every Computer Science department in the world, and this understanding is routinely employed on a daily basis to program computers.
So far I have criticized materialist views as they came up. But now I am going to set out the computer theory of the mind and save criticisms of it and other versions of functionalism till the next chapter. Before explaining in detail how the computer theory of the mind is supposed to solve our problems, I want to introduce several crucial notions. These notions are important not only for their relevance to contemporary philosophy but, indeed, for intellectual life in general. The notions I hope to explain briefly are those of an algorithm, a Turing machine, Church's thesis, Turing's theorem, the Turing test, levels of description, multiple realizability, and recursive decom-
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM 67
THE TURN TO MATERIALISM 81
mind think that it follows from this that these entities do not exist? As a general formal argument, the fact that we do not get type-type reductions of some entity into more basic sciences does not show that the irreducible entities do not exist. Quite the contrary.
There is an interesting irony in all of this discussion. Reductionists and eliminativists tend to think their posi-tions are quite different. Reductionists think mental enti-ties exist but can be reduced to physical events. Eliminativists think mental entities do not exist at all. But these amount to very much the same conclusion. Reduc-tionists say there is nothing there but brain processes materialistically described. Eliminativists say there is noth-ing there but brain processes materialistically described. The apparent difference is a difference in vocabulary. The earlier materialists wanted to show that mental states did not exist as such by showing that they could undergo a type-type reduction to the entities of neurobiology. The later eliminative materialists wanted to show that the entities of common-sense psychology do not exist at all by showing that they cannot undergo a type-type reduction to the entities of neurobiology. Neither argument is any good, but what they suggest is that these people are determined to try to show that our ordinary common-sense notions of the mental do not name anything in the real world, and they are willing to advance any argument that they can think of for this conclusion.
In the last chapter I presented some of the history of recent materialism, and I considered arguments against some versions, especially against behaviorism, type identity the-ory and eliminative materialism. In this chapter I will present the most common arguments against materialism, concentrating on functionalism, because it is currently the most influential version of materialism. In general, these attacks have the same logical structure: the materialist account leaves out some essential feature of the mind such as consciousness or intentionality. In the jargon of philos-ophers, the materialist analysis fails to give sufficient con-ditions for mental phenomena, because it is possible to satisfy the materialist analysis and not have the appropriate mental phenomena. Strictly speaking, functionalism does not require materialism. The functionalist defines mental states in terms of causal relations and the causal relations
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM 95
meanings in the head of the agent. In short, alternative and inconsistent translations will be consistent with all the causal and behavioral facts.9
I have not seen this argument stated before and it only occurred to me when writing this book. To summarize it in the jargon I will explain in chapter 6, intentionality essentially involves aspectual shape. All mental represen-tation is under representational aspects. Causation also has aspects but they are not representational aspects. You can't analyze mental concepts in causal terms because the representational aspectual shape of the intentional gets lost in the translation. This is why statements about intentionality are intensional-with-an-s, but statements about causation, of the form A caused B, are extensional. (Don't worry if you don't understand this paragraph. We will get there in chapter 6.)
Not surprisingly, the defenders of functionalism, the iden-tity theory, and Strong AI, in general, felt that they could answer the foregoing arguments (except the last that is published here for the first time). There is a huge literature on this subject, and I will not attempt to review it in this book. (I know of over 100 published attacks on the Chinese Room Argument in English alone, and I assume there must be dozens more that I do not know about, in English and other languages.) But some of the arguments defending materialism are quite common and have received wide acceptance, so are worth discussing here.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM 103
This analogy does not work. A suitable description of a zagnet will entail that it is a magnet, but no third-person description of a physical system will entail that it has conscious states because there are two different phenom-ena, the third-person behavioral, functional, neurobiolog-ical structures and the first-person conscious experience.
Another answer to the zombie argument one some-times hears is that if it were right, then consciousness would become epiphenomenal. If you could have the same behavior without consciousness, then consciousness would not be doing any work. This answer rests on a misunderstanding. The point of the zombie argument is to show that consciousness, on the one hand and behavior and causal relations, on the other, are different phenomena by showing that it is logically possible to have one without the other. But this logical possibility does not imply that consciousness does not do any work in the real world. Analogously: Gasoline combustion is not the same thing as car movement, because it is conceivable to have one without the other. But the fact that it is logically possible for cars to move without gasoline, or indeed without any fuel at all, does not show that gasoline and other fuels are epiphenomenal.
What should we say about these arguments? It is important in philosophy always to step back and look at the issues from a broader intellectual and historical perspective. Why are so many philosophers driven to deny certain common-sense claims, such as, that we really do have conscious thoughts and feelings; that we do have real intentional
are presented to us as the only possibilities. Furthermore we know independently that both what dualism is trying to say and what materialism is trying to say are true. Materialism is trying to say that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Dualism is trying to say that there are irreducible and ineliminable mental features to the world, consciousness and intentionality, in particular. But if both views are true, there must be a way of stating them that renders them consistent. Given the traditional categories, it is not easy to see how they could be consistent; for materialism so stated seems to imply that there cannot be any irreducible nonphysical phenomena; and dualism so stated seems to imply that there must, in addition to material phenomena, be irreducible nonphysi-cal mental phenomena. We will explore these issues in more detail in the next chapter and see that in order to render these views consistent, we have to abandon the assumptions behind the traditional vocabulary.
We ended the last chapter with an apparent contradiction of the sort that is typical in philosophy. On the one hand we accept a view that seems overwhelmingly convincing-the universe is material-but that seems inconsistent with another view that we cannot give up-minds exist. This pattern occurs over and over in philosophy. We will see in chapter 7 that the free-will problem exhibits the same sort of conflict or contradiction: we think all events must be causally determined, but we experience freedom. In other branches of philosophy, similar inconsistencies arise. In ethics we feel there must be an objective moral truth but at the same time we feel there cannot be that kind of objectivity in morals. Some people find these contradictions in philosophy exas-perating. Others, like me, find them fun and challenging.
In this chapter I am going to attempt to resolve the contradiction about mind and matter.
refute it formally you would have to prove a universal negative. Rather than give a formal "refutation," I will give what I take to be conclusive arguments against dualism.
1. No one has ever succeeded in giving an intelligible account of the relationships between these two realms.
2. The postulation is unnecessary. It is possible to account for all of the first-person facts and all the third-person facts without the postulation of separate realms.
3. The postulation creates intolerable difficulties. It becomes impossible on this view to explain how mental states and events can cause physical states and events. In short, it is impossible to avoid epiphenomenalism.
Notice that these arguments still leave dualism as a logical possibility. It is a logical possibility, though I think extremely unlikely, that when our bodies are destroyed, our souls will go marching on. I have not tried to show that this is an impossibility (indeed, I wish it were true), but rather that it is inconsistent with just about everything else we know about how the universe works and therefore it is irrational to believe in it.
In the last chapter I described a certain basic ontology. We need to keep this ontology in mind, with all its simplicity and even crudity, while we now explore the remarkable complexity and uniqueness of consciousness. Though the basic ontology is simple, the resulting phenomena are complicated and the details of their neurobiological rela-tions to the brain are difficult to understand and at present largely unknown. Once we have solved the relatively easy philosophical problem, we have very difficult neurobiolog-ical problems left over.
In this chapter I will first describe the structure of consciousness, then state accounts that disagree with the account I have proposed, and finally I will conclude with a discussion of some of the neurobiological problems of consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS PART II 145
conscious experiences. In what follows we will find reasons to emphasize the essential feature of consciousness, namely, qualitative unified subjectivity, and we will have to explore its relation to intentionality.
In the course of this book I have already discussed a number of approaches to the philosophy of mind, ranging all the way from eliminative materialism to substance dualism. These approaches are implicitly or explicitly theories of consciousness. For example, the computation-alist theory of the mind simply says that consciousness is a computational process in the brain. It is important to emphasize that such a theory, along with other forms of reductionism are not saying, for example, that if you had the right computer program, the machine would, in addi-tion, be conscious. But rather, they are saying that is all there is to consciousness. There is nothing in addition to the right computer program with the right inputs and outputs.4 However, despite the many philosophies I have covered there are still a number of influential views of consciousness that I have not yet mentioned. So, in the interest of thoroughness, I am going to discuss some views that we have not so far considered.
Mysterians think that consciousness is a mystery that cannot be solved by our existing scientific methods; and some mysterians think we will never be able to understand
passing the car on my right. There is a red light ahead.) Think also of the constant accessing of unconscious inten-tionality. (For example, I will be late for my 9:00 a.m. appointment. Where shall I have lunch? I wonder how the meetings will go.) All of these are intentionalistic represen-tations of the world, and we cope with the world by way of these representations.
I said at the beginning of this book that the worst thing we can do is give the reader the impression that she under-stands something she does not really understand. I do not wish you to get the impression from reading this chapter that now you understand intentionality. I have only scratched the surface of a very large subject. But I do want you to have a certain overall conception of intentionality as representation and I do want you to be able to avoid mistakes that are common in contemporary philosophy. Specifically, you should see the distinction between inten-tionality-with-a-t and intensionality-with-an-s. You should see the difficulties in the currently orthodox externalist accounts of intentional content, and you should begin to see the connection between intentionality and conscious-ness, a connection I will explain in detail in chapter 9. Most of all, you should begin to get an idea of how intentionality works as a real feature of the real world, and this under-standing will, I hope, enable you to avoid being intimidated into thinking there is some deep mystery about intrinsic or original intentionality that defies any natural explanation.
One of the residual problems left to us from dualism is the problem of mental causation. Our first mind-body problem was, How can physical processes ever cause mental pro-cesses? But to many philosophers the other half of the question is even more pressing, How can anything as ethereal and insubstantial as mental processes ever have any physical effects in the real world? Surely the real physical world is "causally closed" in the sense that nothing from outside the physical world can ever have any causal effects inside the physical world.
By now, the reader will know that I do not think these are impossibly difficult questions, and that our acceptance of the Cartesian categories is what makes them seem difficult. However, there are a lot of fascinating problems that arise in the study of mental causation. Even if you accept my general account of mind-body relations, I think you will find some interesting issues about mental causa-tion discussed in this chapter.
entire system. I cannot exaggerate the importance of this phenomenon for understanding the differences between the naturalistic explanations we get in the natural sciences and the intentionalistic explanations we get in the social sciences. In the surface structure of the sentences the following explanations look very much alike:
1. I made a mark on the ballot paper because I wanted to vote for Bush.
2. I got a stomachache because I wanted to vote for Bush.
Though the surface structure is similar, the actual logical form is quite different. Number 2 just states that an event, my stomachache, was caused by an intentional state, my desire. But number 1 does not state a causally sufficient condition, and makes sense only within the context of a presupposed teleology.
Such explanations raise a host of philosophical prob-lems. The most important of these is the problem of free will, and I turn to that in the next chapter.
Philosophical problems tend to hang together. In order to solve, or even address, one problem, you typically have to address a series of others. The problem of free will is an especially striking example of this general phenome-non. In order to address the problem of free will, we have to address the nature of consciousness, of causation, of scientific explanation, and of rationality. Worse yet, after we have examined all of these other issues and how they relate to the problem of free will, we will have clarified our problem but we still will not have a solution; or at least I am unable to see my way to a solution. All I can really hope to do in this chapter is explain what the issues are and what the possible solutions might be. The general conclusion that I reach is that we will need to know a great deal more about brain operations before we have a solution to the problem of free will that we can be at all confident is right.
One of my main aims in this book is to explain how mental phenomena-consciousness, intentionality, mental causa-tion, and all of the other features of our mental life-fit into the rest of the universe. How, for example, does conscious-ness exist in a universe that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force? How can mental states function causally in such a universe? So far, most of our investiga-tion has been about conscious mental phenomena. In this chapter we will begin a serious exploration of the nature and mode of existence of unconscious mental states.
Let us begin by asking, naively, Do unconscious mental states really exist? How can there be a state that is literally
THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR 257
agent that he has such-and-such an unconscious inten-tional state, and that that state is functioning actively in causing his behavior, is to say that he has a brain state that is capable of causing that state in a conscious form, even though in a particular instance it may be incapable of causing it in a conscious form because of brain damage, repression, etc. I am not entirely satisfied with this conclu-sion, but I cannot think of an alternative conclusion that is superior to it.
One of the chief functions of the mind, both in our day-to-day living and over the long evolutionary haul, is to relate us to the rest of the world, especially by way of perception and action. To put the point in the simplest possible terms, by perception we take in information about the world, we then coordinate this information both consciously and unconsciously, and make decisions or otherwise form intentions, which result in actions by way of which we cope with the world. In this chapter we will consider the relations between perception and the world that exists apart from our perceptions, what philosophers like to call, misleadingly, the "external world."
Why is there supposed to be a problem? If I extend my arm forward, I see my hand in front of my face. What could be easier than that? There is a tripartite distinction between me, the hand, and the actual conscious experience of per-ceiving by way of which I perceive the hand. There is, of course, a complex neurobiological story to be told about how the reflection of light off of the hand attacks the visual system
precisely the naïve realism that I have been defending. We do not prove the truth of naive realism; rather, we prove the unintelligibility of its denial in a public language.
In Descartes' famous slogan, "I think therefore I am," what does the "I" refer to? For Descartes it definitely does not refer to my body; rather, it refers to my mind, the mental substance that constitutes the essential me. We have now seen good reason to suppose that Cartesian dualism is not a philosophically acceptable account of the nature of the mind. But for those of us who reject dualism there is still a serious question left over: What exactly is the self? What fact about me makes me me? Many contemporary philos-ophers, including myself until fairly recently, think that Hume had more or less the last word on this issue. In addition to the sequence of experiences, and the body in which these experiences occur, there is no such thing as the self. Hume says, when I turn my attention inward and try to discover some entity that constitutes the essential me, all I discover are particular experiences; there is no such thing as the self in addition to these experiences.
THE SELF 299
definitely something that it feels like to be me. And one way to get yourself to see that there is something that it feels like to be you is to try to imagine what it must feel like to be someone totally different. Imagine what it felt like to have been Adolf Hitler or Napoleon or George Washington. And it is important when you do this imagi-native exercise that you not cheat and imagine yourself in the situation of Adolf Hitler, etc.; rather, you have to imagine not yourself playing the role of Adolf Hitler, but what it is like to be Adolf Hitler. If you do that I think you see that you imagine an experience that is quite different from the experience where you normally have a sense of your self as this self and not some other self. But of course the existence of the sense of self does not solve the problem of personal identity. Granted that there is something that it feels like to be me, that is not sufficient to guarantee that anybody who has that experience must be identical with me, because it is quite possible that any number of other people might have this same type-identical experience that I call the "sense of what it is to be me." My sense of self definitely exists, but it does not solve the problem of personal identity, and it does not yet so far flesh out the purely formal requirement that I said was necessary to supplement Hume's account in order to account for the possibility of free rational action. So, though this chapter is a beginning of a discussion of the self, it is not more than a beginning.
I have now completed the task I have set for myself in the first chapter. I have tried to give an account of the mind that will situate mental phenomena as part of the natural world. Our account of the mind in all of its aspects- consciousness, intentionality, free will, mental causation, perception, intentional action, etc.-is naturalistic in this sense: first, it treats mental phenomena as just a part of nature. We should think of consciousness and intentional-ity as just as much a part of the natural world as photosyn-thesis or digestion. Second, the explanatory apparatus that we use to give a causal account of mental phenomena is an apparatus that we need to account for nature generally. The level at which we attempt to account for mental phenom-ena is biological rather than, say, at the level of subatomic physics. The reason for this is that consciousness and other mental phenomena are biological phenomena; they are created by biological processes and are specific to certain
1. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
1. I do not wish to suggest that mine is the only reasonable interpretation of Descartes. My claim is rather that the inter-pretation presented here has been the most influential in the history of the subject.
2. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949).
1. K. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin: Springer, 1977).
2. J. C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), 5.
3. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain, 69.
4. H. Stapp, The Mindful Universe, forthcoming.
5. The classical statement of idealism is in George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. J. Dancy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
6. H. Feigl, "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philoso-phy of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
7. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
223-231; D. Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifica-tions," in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, and D. Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 207-222; D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Roudedge, 1993).
18. P Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), and Mental Models, Toward a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
19. Eliminativism was originally stated by R. Rorty and P. Feyera-bend. A recent advocate is Paul Churchland. See P. Feyerabend, "Mental Events and the Brain," Journal of Philosophy (1963): 295-296; R. Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Catego-ries" in D. Rosenthal, ed., Materialism, and the Mind-Body Problem (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 174-199; P. M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Proposi-tional Attitudes," in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind.
20. D. Davidson, "Mental Events," reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-227.
21. P. M. Churchland.," Eliminative Materialism and the Proposi-tional Attitudes," in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind, 603.
1. T. Nagel "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435-450, reprinted in David Chalmers, ed., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2. F. Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," Journal of Philosophy, vol: 83 (1982): 291-295, reprinted in T. O'Connor and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind (New York: Routledge 2003); F. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127-136, reprinted in Chalmers, The Philosophy of the Mind.
3. N. Block, "Troubles with Functionalism," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: Minnesota Uni-versity Press, 1978) 261-325, reprinted in N. Block (ed.),
1. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940), 15.
2. For a statement of several different versions of the argument from illusion, cf. A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1953).
3. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 210-211.
4. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 67.
5. M. Bauerlein, Literary Criticism: An Autopsy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
6. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. J. Col-lingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. II, especially Medita-tions on First Philosophy, Second Meditation, 16-23, and Sixth Meditation, 50-62, Objections and Replies, especially Author's Replies to the Fourth Set of Objections, 154-162.
There are a number of general introductions to the philosophy of mind, among them:
Armstrong, D. M., The Mind-Body Problem, An Opinionated Introduc-tion, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
Churchland, P. M., Matter and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
Heil, J., Philosophy of Mind, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
Jacquette, D., Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
Kim, J., The Philosophy of Mind, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
Lyons, W., Matters of the Mind, New York: Routledge, 2001.
There are also several general collections of articles on the philosophy of mind, among them:
Block, N., ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol.1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Chalmers, D., ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Heil, J., ed., Philosophy of Mind, A Guide and Anthology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
314 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Lycan, W., ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell 1990. O'Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds. Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge, 2003. Rosenthal, D. M., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
The following selections give most of the basic arguments discussed in this chapter:
Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Rout-ledge, 1993.
Block, N., "Troubles with Functionalism," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IX, ed. C. Wade Savage, Minneap-olis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261-325, reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Borst, C, ed., The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.
Churchland, P. M., "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," in Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 601-612.
Crane, T., The Mechanical Mind, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2003.
Davidson, D., "Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, 207-227.
Feigl, H., "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical,'" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
Haugeland, J., ed., Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press, 1982.
Hempel, C, "The Logical Analysis of Psychology" in Block ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Lewis, D., "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" and "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" both in Block, ed., Readings in
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 315
Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
McDermott, D. V., Mind and Mechanism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Nagel, T., "Armstrong on the Mind," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Place, U. T., "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" British Journal of Psychology, vol. 47, pt. 1 (1956) 44-50.
Putnam, P., "The Nature of Mental States" in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980.
Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949.
Smart, J. J. C, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in Rosenthal, D., ed., The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 169-176.
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. Turing, A., "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind, vol. 59 (1950): 433-460.
Block, N., "Troubles with Functionalism," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, vol. 9 (1978): 261-325. Reprinted in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 268-305.
Jackson, F., "What Mary Didn't Know," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83 (1986): 291-295; also "Epiphenomenal Qualia," in Philo-sophical Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127-136.
Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge MA: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1980, excerpts in Chalmers, D. ed., Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 329-332.
McGinn, C, "Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 156-158.
316 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Nagel, T., "Armstrong on the Mind," in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 200-206.
Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Nagel, T., "What Is It Like to be a Bat?," in Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435-450, reprinted in Chalmers, ed., The Philos-ophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Searle, J. R., "Minds, Brains and Programs," in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 417-424, reprinted in O'Connor, T. and D. Robb, Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, Lon-don: Routledge, 2003, 332-352.
Searle, J. R., Minds, Brains and Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
There is a flood of recent work on consciousness, including some by the present author. I will list a representative sample.
Chalmers, D., The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Dennett, D., Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
McGinn, C, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolu-tion, Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
O'Shaughnessy, B., Consciousness and the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000
Searle, J. R., The Mystery of Consciousness, New York: New York
Review of Books, 1997. Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
Siewert, C, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 317
Tye, M., Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
There is also a huge (over 800 pages) collection of articles on consciousness:
Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
More neurobiologically oriented readings will be listed at the end of Consciousness Part II.
There are a number of neurobiological approaches to consciousness. Among them:
Crick, F., The Astonishing Hypothesis, New York: Scribner's, 1994
Damasio, A. R., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999.
Edelman, G., The Remembered Present, New York: Basic Books, 1989.
Llinas, R., I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Searle, J. R., "Consciousness," in Annual Review of Neuroscience, vol. 23, 2000, reprinted in Searle, J. R., Consciousness and Lan-guage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. (This article contains an extensive bibliography of current neuro-biological research on consciousness.)
Koch, C, The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, Englewood, CO: Roberts and Co., 2004.
Burge, T., "Individualism and the Mental," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 1979.
Fodor, J., "Meaning and the World Order," in Psychosemantics, Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press, chap. 4, 1988, reprinted in O'Connor, T., and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
Putnam, H., "The Meaning of Meaning," in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Gunderson, K., ed., Minnesota Readings in the
318 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, 131-193.
Searle, J. R., Intentionality, An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
7. MENTAL CAUSATION Davidson, D., "Actions, Reasons and Causes," in Essays on Actions
and Events, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Heil, J., and A. Mele, eds., Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Kim, J., Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Causation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
A collection of articles on free will is contained in Watson, G., ed., Free Will, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Some recent books are:
Kane, R., The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Slimansky, S., Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Wolf, S., Freedom within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Wegner, D. N., The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Freud, S., 1912 "A Note on The Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 22-29. Freud, S., 1915, "The Unconscious," in Collected Papers, vol. 4, J. Riviere, trans., New York: Basic Books, 1959, 98-136.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 319
Searle, J. R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992, chap.7. Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
The classic attack on realist theories of perception is in
Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, Dancy, J., ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Berkeley, G., Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Turbayne, C, ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1985.
For a modern statement of the sense-datum theories, see
Ayer, A. J., The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1953.
For a criticism of the sense-datum theories, see
Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibilia, Warnock, G.J., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
For an account of the intentionality of perception, see
Searle, J. R., Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, chap. 2.
The classic statement of skepticism about the self is in
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L. A., ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951, Book I, Part IV, section VI, of personal identity, 251-263, as well as the Appendix, 623-939.
Locke's conception is to be found in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London: Routledge, 1894, especially chap. 27, "Of Identity and Diversity."
Other works about issues raised in this chapter are:
Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Searle, J. R., Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, especially chap. 3.
The following is a collection of essays:
Perry, J., ed., Personal Identity, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.
and Descartes, 38
the problem of, 26-27
anomalous monism, 76-77
appearance/reality distinction, 123
from analogy, 19, 35
from illusion, 261-262, 265-266,271-273
from science, 261, 270-273 181-182, 187
arthritis and tharthritis, 181-182, 187
aspectual shape, 246-248
biological naturalism, 113-115
Cartesian dualism, 14-18, 22, 24-28, 31-37
and free will, 36-37
and personal identity, 37
and sleep, 38-39
causation, 110. 123-124
and experience, 202-205
and explanation of human behavior, 211-214
principle of, 106
problem of, 206-207, 209
causality, principle of, 106
Chinese Room Argument, 88-91, 100, 105
System's Reply, 100
Church-Turing Thesis, 68
computational theory of the mind, 66-67, 145
as observer-relative, 91
and syntax, 91
active and passive, 142
as a biological feature, 115-116
and center and periphery dis-tinction, 140-141
gestalt structure of, 143-144
and intentionality, 138-139
and irreducibility, 121-122
and memory, 157
and mood, 139-140
and pleasure-unpleasure, 141
and qualitativeness, 134
and sense of self, 144
and situatedness, 141
and subjectivity, 134-136
and unity, 136-138
conscious states, and intrinsic intentionality, 138
determinism, 216-223, 233
and the experience of the gap, 233
hard and soft, 220
and randomness, 232
Cartesian, 14-18, 22, 24-28, 31-37
refutation of, 129-132
substance, 13, 41-43
eliminative materialism, 75-76
epiphenomenalism, 30, 45-46
explanatory gap, 40
externalism, 12, 179-189
facts, observer-dependent, 6
fallacy of composition, 231
folk psychology, 76, 77-80
free will, ch.8
and Cartesian dualism, 36-37
and Descartes, 36
the problem of, 23-25
and quantum mechanics, 230-232
and randomness, 24
black box, 64
genetic fallacy, 279-271
ghost in the machine, 15
hypothetico-deductive method, 201
identity conditions, and correla-tions, 100
identity theory, 54
identity thesis, 55
and neuronal chauvinism, 59
and objections to, 55-61
and topic-neutral vocabulary, 58
indexicality, 179-180, 187
induction, problem of, 196
intentionality, ch.6 as-if, 29
and aspectual shape, 94-95
and the Background, 172-174
and conditions of satisfaction, 169
as causally self-referential, 170-172
and content, 166
and direction of fit, 168-169
and explanation of human action, 250-251
and interpretativism, 163
and the Network, 172-174
and observer-independent fea-tures, 6
and observer-dependent fea-tures, 6
and observer-relative features, 6
original or intrinsic, 7, 29
possibility of, 162-166
the problem of, 4, 27-30
as a representation, 165
knowledge argument, 97
law of conservation, 42
Leibniz's Law, 55, 175-176
levels of description, 70-71
materialism, 48, ch.2
arguments against, ch.3
refutation of, 126-132
mental causation, 30-31, ch.7
the problem of, 4
mental states, unconscious, 237-238
mental and physical features, 116-119
mind-body problem, 4, 17-18
as idealism, 48
as materialism, 48
multiple realizability, 66, 71-72
neuronal chauvinism, 59
nomological danglers, 46
and the building block approach, 151-155
and the unified-field approach, 151-154
neuronal correlates of conscious-ness, 151
objective, 3, 136
other minds, the problem of, 18-21, 35
perception, ch. 10
the representation theory of, 22, 267-273
and the sense-datum theory, 260
property dualism, 44-47
direct or naive, 260
transcendental argument for, 273-275
qualia, 84, 134
quantum mechanics, 43-44
Ramsey sentence, 62
recursive decomposition, 66,72-73
rigid designator, 88
self, ch. 11
and Descartes, 37
and personal identity, 25-26, 282-291
sense data, 262-264
and primary and secondary qualities, 267
and the external world, 21-23, 35
sleep, the problem of, 27
spectrum inversion, 85
Strong Artificial Intelligence, 65
subjective, 3, 136
subjectivity, ontological, 135-136
substance dualism,13, 41-43
syntax/semantics distinction, 101- 102
Turing machine, 69
universal, 69, 73
Turing test, 70, 74
Twin Earth, 180-181, 187
Unconscious, 31-32, ch.9
and aspectual shape, 246-248
deep, 242, 246
dispositional analysis of, 248-249
as dynamic, 245
as nonconscious, 242
as preconscious, 240
as repressed, 241
as rule-described, 252-256
and rule following, 252-256
as rule-governed, 252-256
Weak Artificial Intelligence, 65
zombies, 92-92, 128
and zagnets, 102-103
Austin, J. L., 271
Ayer, A. J., 221
Berkeley, G., 48, 260, 268, 269
Block, N., 87
Bradley, F., 48
Burge, Т., 181, 184
Chalmers, D., 47, 149
Chomsky, N.. 52
Church, A., 68
Churchland, P., 80
Davidson, D., 76-77
Dennett, D., 102, 163
Descartes, R., 13-18, 22, 24-28,33-37,42,51,54,66,93, 117, 158,238-239,245,260,269. 279,291
Ding, H., viii
Eccles, J. C, 34,41-42
Freud, S., 238, 240
Gazzaniga, M., 138
Hegel, G., 48
Hobbes, Т., 221. 287
Hudin, J., viii
Hume, D., 37, 147, 194-196, 198, 200-204,260,265,268-269, 279,282,291,292,294-295, 298-299
Jackson, F., 86-87
James, W., 220
Kant, I., 260, 274
Kim,J., 125, 148
Kripke, S., 88, 99, 125
Leibniz, G, 55, 175, 289
Locke, J., 260, 267, 269, 287, 289, 291
Maxwell, G., 58
McGinn, C, 146
Mill, J. S.,221
Moural, J., viii
Nagel, Т., 85-86, 93, 97, 146-147, 149
Penfield, W., 142, 203
Popper, K., 41
Putnam, H., 180, 182-183, 186
Ramsey, F., 62
Reines, M. F., viii
Richards, I. A., 54
326 NAME INDEX
Russell, В., 261
Ryle, G., 15
Samuels, J., viii
Searle, D., viii
Searle, J. R., 89, 100
Seeman, A., viii
Skinner, B. F., 50, 51
Sperry, R., 138
Stevenson, C, 221
Taylor, N., viii
Turing, A., 67, 69-70
Vega, M., viii
Watson, J. В., 50
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Described as a "dragonslayer by tempera-ment," John Searle offers here a refreshingly direct and open discussion of philosophy, one that skewers accepted wisdom even as it offers striking new insights into the nature of con-sciousness and the mind.
JOHN R. SEARLE is Mills Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of many books, including The Rediscovery of the Mind, The Mystery of Consciousness, Mind, Language and Society, Philosophy in the Real World, and Consciousness and Language.
UNIVERSITY PRESS www.oup.com
"The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." In Mind, Searle dismantles these famous and influential theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind.
Here readers will find one of the world's most eminent thinkers shedding light on the central concern of modern philosophy. Searle begins with a look at the twelve prob-lems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"-problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as the freedom of the will, the actual operation of mental causation, the nature and functioning of the unconscious, the analysis of perception, and the concept of the self. One of the key chapters is on the mind-body problem, which Searle analyzes brilliantly. He argues that all forms of con-sciousness-from feeling thirsty to wondering how to translate Mallarmé-are caused by the behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system, which is itself composed of neu-rons. But this does not mean that consciousness is nothing but neuronal behavior. The main point of having the concept of consciousness, Searle points out, is to capture the first-person subjective features of the phenomenon and this point is lost if we redefine consciousness in third-person objective terms.
The leading authority on the mind offers a highly engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy
'The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects, in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false.... One of my aims fin writing this book] is to try to rescue the truth from the overwhelming urge to falsehood. I have attempted some of this task in other works, especially The Rediscovery of the Mind, but this is my only attempt at a comprehensive introduction to
the entire subject of the philosophy of mind."
- from the Introduction
'Searle has written a forceful, clear, accessible and fascinating intro-ductory book that explains much more convincingly than anything else his iconoclastic view that both materialism and dualism are false. Searle vigorously explores the big issues in philosophy of mind, always
keeping the deepest intuitions about the mind in focus."
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