John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind
Representation and Mind
Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, editors
Representation and Reality Hilary Putnam
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes Fred Dretske
The Metaphysics of Meaning Jerrold J. Katz
A Theory of Content and Other Essays Jerry A. Fodor
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind Cora Diamond
The Unity of the Self Stephen L. White
The Imagery Debate Michael Tye
A Study of Concepts Christopher Peacocke
The Rediscovery of the Mind John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind
John R. Searle
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
© 1992 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Palatino by Chiron, Inc. and printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Searle, John R.
The rediscovery of the mind / John R. Searle. p. cm. - (Representation and mind)
"A Bradford book."
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-19321-3 (hard). - ISBN 0-262-69154-X (pbk.)
1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Consciousness. 3. Intentionality (Philosophy) 4. Mind-brain identity theory-Controversial literature. I. Title. II. Series. BD418.3.S43 1992
What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind 1
The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake
Over and Over 27
Appendix: Is There a Problem about Folk Psychology? 58
Breaking the Hold: Silicon Brains, Conscious Robots, and Other Minds 65
Consciousness and Its Place in Nature 83
Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness 111
The Structure of Consciousness: An Introduction 127
The Unconscious and Its Relation to Consciousness 151
Consciousness, Intentionality, and the Background 175
The Critique of Cognitive Reason 197
The Proper Study 227
Subject Index 263
Name Index 269
I have benefited over a period of several years from discus-sions and conversations with friends, students, and colleagues about the issues considered in this book. I do not suppose I can thank all of them, but I want to offer special expressions of gratitude to the following: M. E. Aubert, John Batali, Catharine Carlin, Anthony Dardis, Hubert Dreyfus, Hana Filip, Jerry Fodor, Vinod Goel, Stevan Harnad, Jennifer Hudin, Paul Kube, Ernest Lepore, Elisabeth Lloyd, Kirk Ludwig, Thomas Nagel, Randal Parker, Joëlle Proust, Irving Rock, Charles Siewart, Melissa Vaughn, and Kayley Vernallis.
These, however, are only a few of the many who helped me so much. I have presented these ideas in lectures that I have given not only in Berkeley but as a visiting professor at the universities of Frankfurt, Venice, Florence, Berlin, and Rutgers. Among my best and severest critics have been my students, and I am grateful for their relentless skepticism. Among my institutional benefactors, I want to thank the Committee on Research of the Academic Senate and the Office of the Chan-cellor of the University of California, Berkeley, and especially the Rockefeller Foundation Center at Bellagio, Italy.
Some of the material in this book has appeared elsewhere in a preliminary form. Specifically, portions of chapters 7 and 10 were developed from my article "Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science" (Behavioral and Brain Sci-ences, 1990), and chapter 9 is based on my Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association for 1990.
I am especially grateful to Ned Block, who read the entire manuscript in draft form and made many helpful comments. Most of all I thank my wife, Dagmar Searle, for her constant
help and advice. As always, she has been my greatest intellec-tual influence and my strongest source of encouragement and inspiration. It is to her that this book is dedicated.
This book has several objectives, some of which do not admit of quick summary but will only emerge as the reader progresses. Its most easily statable objectives are these: I want to criticize and overcome the dominant traditions in the study of mind, both "materialist" and "dualist." Because I think con-sciousness is the central mental phenomenon, I want to begin a serious examination of consciousness on its own terms. I want to put the final nail in the coffin of the theory that the mind is a computer program. And I want to make some proposals for reforming our study of mental phenomena in a way that would justify the hope of rediscovering the mind.
Nearly two decades ago I began working on problems in the philosophy of mind. I needed an account of intentionality, both to provide a foundation for my theory of speech acts and to complete the theory. On my view, the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind; therefore no theory of language is complete without an account of the rela-tions between mind and language and of how meaning-the derived intentionality of linguistic elements-is grounded in the more biologically basic intrinsic intentionality of the mind/brain.
When I read the standard authors and tried to explain their views to my students, I was appalled to discover that with few exceptions these authors routinely denied what I thought were simple and obvious truths about the mind. It was then, and still is, quite common to deny, implicitly or explicitly, such claims as the following: We all have inner subjective qualita-tive states of consciousness, and we have intrinsically inten-tional mental states such as beliefs and desires, intentions and
perceptions. Both consciousness and intentionality are biologi-cal processes caused by lower-level neuronal processes in the brain, and neither is reducible to something else. Furthermore, consciousness and intentionality are essentially connected in that we understand the notion of an unconscious intentional state only in terms of its accessibility to consciousness.
Then and now, all this and more was denied by the prevail-ing views. Mainstream orthodoxy consists of various versions of "materialism." Just as bad, the opponents of materialism usually embrace some doctrine of "property dualism," thus accepting the Cartesian apparatus that I had thought long discredited. What I argued for then (Searle 1984b) and repeat here is that one can accept the obvious facts of physics-that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force-without denying that among the physical features of the world are biological phenomena such as inner qualitative states of consciousness and intrinsic intentionality.
About the same time as my interest in problems of the mind began, the new discipline of cognitive science was born. Cog-nitive science promised a break with the behaviorist tradition in psychology because it claimed to enter the black box of the mind and examine its inner workings. But unfortunately most mainstream cognitive scientists simply repeated the worst mis-take of the behaviorists: They insisted on studying only objec-tively observable phenomena, thus ignoring the essential features of the mind. Therefore, when they opened up the big black box, they found only a lot of little black boxes inside.
So I got little help from either mainstream philosophy of mind or cognitive science in my investigations, and I went ahead to try to develop my own account of intentionality and its relation to language (Searle 1983). However, just develop-ing a theory of intentionality left many major problems undis-cussed, and worse yet, left what seemed to me the major prevailing mistakes unanswered. This book is an attempt to fill at least some of those gaps.
One of the hardest-and most important-tasks of philoso-phy is to make clear the distinction between those features of
the world that are intrinsic, in the sense that they exist indepen-dent of any observer, and those features that are observer rela-tive, in the sense that they only exist relative to some outside observer or user. For example, that an object has a certain mass is an intrinsic feature of the object. If we all died, it would still have that mass. But that the same object is a bath-tub is not an intrinsic feature; it exists only relative to users and observers who assign the function of a bathtub to it. Hav-ing mass is intrinsic, but being a bathtub is observer relative, even though the object both has mass and is a bathtub. That is why there is a natural science that includes mass in its domain, but there is no natural science of bathtubs.
One of the themes that runs throughout this book is the attempt to get clear about which of the predicates in the philos-ophy of mind name features that are intrinsic and which observer relative. A dominant strain in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been to suppose that computa-tion is an intrinsic feature of the world and that consciousness and intentionality are somehow eliminable, either in favor of something else or because they are observer relative, or reduci-ble to something more basic, such as computation. In this book I argue that these suppositions are exactly backward: Consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and inelimin-able, and computation-except for the few cases in which the computation is actually being performed by a conscious mind-is observer relative.
Here is a brief map to help the reader find his or her way about the book. The first three chapters contain criticisms of the dominant views in the philosophy of mind. They are an attempt to overcome both dualism and materialism, with more attention devoted in these chapters to materialism. At one time I thought of calling the whole book What's Wrong with the Phi-losophy of Mind, but in the end that idea emerges as the theme of the first three chapters and is the title of the first. The next five chapters, 4 to 8, are a series of attempts to give a character-ization of consciousness. Once we have gone beyond both materialism and dualism, how do we locate consciousness in
relation to the rest of the world (chapter 4)? How do we account for its apparent irreducibility according to the stan-dard patterns of scientific reduction (chapter 5)? Most impor-tant, what are the structural features of consciousness (chapter 6)? How do we account for the unconscious and its relation to consciousness (chapter 7)1 And what are the relations between consciousness, intentionality, and the Background capacities that enable us to function as conscious beings in the world (chapter 8)? In the course of these discussions I try to over-come various Cartesian shibboleths such as property dualism, introspectionism, and incorrigibility, but the main effort in these chapters is not critical. I am trying to locate conscious-ness within our general conception of the world and the rest of our mental life. Chapter 9 extends my earlier (Searle 1980 a and b) criticisms of the dominant paradigm in cognitive sci-ence, and the final chapter makes some suggestions as to how we might study the mind without making so many obvious mistakes.
In this book I have more to say about the opinions of other writers than in any of my other books-maybe more than all of them put together. This makes me extremely nervous, because it is always possible that I might be misunderstanding them as badly as they misunderstand me. Chapter 2 gave me the most headaches in this regard, and I can only say that I tried as hard as I could to make a fair summary of a whole family of views that I find uncongenial. As for references: The books I read in my philosophical childhood-books by Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Ryle, Hare, etc.-contain few or no references to other authors. I think unconsciously I have come to believe that philosophical quality varies inversely with the number of bibliographical references, and that no great work of philoso-phy ever contained a lot of footnotes. (Whatever its other faults, Ryle's Concept of Mind is a model in this regard: it has none.) In the present instance, however, there is no escaping bibliographical references, and I am likely to be faulted more for what I have left out than for what I have put in.
The title is an obvious homage to Bruno Snell's classic, The Discovery of the Mind. May we in rediscovering conscious-
ness-the real thing, not the Cartesian ersatz nor the behavior-
ist doppelgänger-also rediscover the mind.
The famous mind-body problem, the source of so much con-troversy over the past two millennia, has a simple solution. This solution has been available to any educated person since serious work began on the brain nearly a century ago, and, in a sense, we all know it to be true. Here it is: Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view from the many others in the field, I call it "biological natural-ism." Mental events and processes are as much part of our biological natural history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme secretion.
Biological naturalism raises a thousand questions of its own. What exactly is the character of the neurophysiological processes and how exactly do the elements of the neuro-anatomy - neurons, synapses, synaptic clefts, receptors, mito-chondria, glial cells, transmitter fluids, etc. - produce mental phenomena? And what about the great variety of our mental life-pains, desires, tickles, thoughts, visual experiences, beliefs, tastes, smells, anxiety, fear, love, hate, depression, and elation? How does neurophysiology account for the range of our mental phenomena, both conscious and unconscious? Such questions form the subject matter of the neurosciences, and as I write this, there are literally thousands of people investigating these questions.1 But not all the questions are neurobiological. Some are philosophical or psychological or part of cognitive science generally. Some of the philosophical
248 Chapter 10
corresponds to the facts, because "corresponds to the facts" does mean corresponds to the facts, and any discipline that aims to describe how the world is aims for this correspon-dence. If you keep asking yourself this question in the light of the knowledge that the brain is the only thing in there, and the brain causes consciousness, I believe you will come up with the results I have reached in this chapter, and indeed many of the results I have come up with in this book.
But that is only to take a first step on the road back to the mind. A fourth and final guideline is that we need to redis-cover the social character of the mind.
1. Or at least they are investigating the preliminaries of such questions. It is surprising how little of contemporary neuroscience is devoted to investigat-ing, e.g., the neurophysiology of consciousness.
2. The best-known proponent of this view is Thomas Nagel (1986), but see also Colin McGinn (1991).
3. See, for example, P. S. Churchland 1987.
4. I will confine my discussion to analytic philosophers, but apparently the same sort of implausibility affects so-called Continental philosophy. Accord-ing to Dreyfus (1991), Heidegger and his followers also doubt the importance of consciousness and intentionality.
5. The best-known exponent of this view is Daniel Dennett (1987).
6. But for an explicit statement, see Georges Rey (1983).
7. In different ways, I believe this is done by Armstrong (1968, 1980), and Den-nett (1991).
8. Another form of incredibility, but from a different philosophical motivation, is the claim that each of us has at birth all of the concepts expressible in any words of any possible human language, so that, for example, Cro-Magnon people had the concepts expressed by the word "carburetor" or by the expres-sion "cathode ray oscillograph." This view is held most famously by Fodor (1975).
9. Howard Gardner, in his comprehensive summary of cognitive science (1985), does not include a single chapter-indeed not a single index entry-on consciousness. Clearly the mind's new science can do without consciousness.
10. On my view, an inner process such as feeling a pain, for example, does not"stand in need" of anything. Why should it?
11. Oddly enough, my views have been confidently characterized by some commentators as "materialist," by some others, with equal confidence, as "dualist." Thus, for example, U. T. Place writes, Searle "presents the material-ist position" (1988, p. 208), while Stephen P. Stich writes, "Searle is a property dualist" (1987, p. 133).
12. A closely related point is made by Noam Chomsky (1975).
250 Notes to pages 29-39
1. A good example is Richard Rorty (1979), who asks us to imagine a tribe that does not say "I am in pain," but rather "My C-fibers are being stimulated." Well, let us imagine such a case. Imagine a tribe that refuses to use our men-talistic vocabulary. What follows? Either they have pains as we do or they do not. If they do, then the fact that they refuse to call them pains is of no interest. The facts remain the same regardless of how we or they choose to describe them. If, on the other hand, they really do not have any pains, then they are quite different from us and their situation is of no relevance to the reality of our mental phenomena.
2. It is an interesting fact that in three recent books all of which contain the word "consciousness" in their titles-Paul Churchland's Matter and Conscious-ness (1984), Ray Jackendoff's Consciousness and the Computational Mind (1987), and William Lycan's Consciousness (1987)-there is little or no effort to give any account of or theory of consciousness. Consciousness is not a subject that is treated as a worthy topic in its own right, but rather simply as an annoying problem for the materialist philosophy of mind.
3. In his review of Marvin Minsky's book Society of Mind, Bernard Williams (1987) writes: "What is at issue in this [A.I.] research, in part, is precisely whether intelligent systems can be compounded of unintelligent matter."
4. I do not know the origin of this phrase, but it is probably derived from Ogden and Richards's characterization of Watson as "affecting general anaesthesia" (1926, p. 23 of 1949 edition).
5. I mention this talk of "C-fibers" with some embarrassment because the entire discussion is misinformed. Regardless of the merits or demerits of materialism, it is out of the question for purely neurophysiological reasons that C-fibers should be the locus of pain sensations. C-fibers are a type of axon that transmits certain sorts of pain signals from peripheral nerve endings to the central nervous system. Other pain signals are transmitted by A-Delta fibers. The C-fibers function as pathways for taking the stimuli to the brain, where the real action takes place. As far as we know, the neurophysiological events responsible for sensations of pain occur in the thalamus, the limbic sys-tem, the somato-sensory cortex, and possibly other regions as well. (See any standard textbook on this question.)
6. In this chapter I am not concerned to defend my solution to the mind-body problem, but it is worth pointing out that it is not subject to this objection. Kripke and his opponents both accept the dualistic vocabulary with its opposi-tion between "mental " and "physical," which I reject. Once you reject that opposition, then, on my view, my present state of pain is a higher-level feature of my brain. It is therefore necessarily identical with a certain feature of my brain, namely itself. Equally necessary, it is not identical with any other features of my brain, though it is caused by certain lower-level events in my brain. It is possible that such features might be caused by other sorts of events and might be features of other sorts of systems. So there is no necessary con-
Notes to pages 40-90 251
nection between pains and brains. Everything is what it is and not another thing.
7. For example, McGinn (1977). McGinn defends Davidson s argument for "anomalous monism," which both he and Davidson take to be a version of token identity theory.
8. After the British philosopher F. P. Ramsey, (1903-1930).
9. The terminology of "chauvinism" and "liberalism" was introduced by Ned Block (1978).
10. The argument is found in the work of several philosophers, for example, Steven Schiffer (1987) and Paul Churchland. Churchland gives a succinct state-ment of the premise: "If we do give up hope of a reduction, then elimination emerges as the only coherent alternative" (1988).
11. I will have more to say about these issues in chapter 7.
1. In the style of Thomas Nagel's article, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974).
2. For example, "As one might expect, cells whose receptive fields are specifically color-coded have been noted in various animals, including the monkey, the ground squirrel, and some fishes. These animals, in contradistinc-tion to the cat, possess excellent color vision and an intricate neural mechanism for processing color" (Kuffler and Nicholls 1976, p. 25, my italics).
3. For an example of this misunderstanding, see P. M. and P. S. Churchland 1983.
4. I am indebted to Dan Rudermann for calling my attention to this article. 5. See, for example, Dennett 1987.
1. There is one qualification to this point. The sense of body location does have intentionality, because it refers to a portion of the body. This aspect of pains is intentional, because it has conditions of satisfaction. In the case of a phantom limb, for example, one can be mistaken, and the possibility of a mis-take is at least a good clue that the phenomenon is intentional.
2. The metaphor of "left-right" derives, of course, from the arbitrary conven-tion of European languages of writing from left to right.
3. The term "functional" is somewhat misleading because the functional level is also causal, but it is common in biology to speak of the two types of causal explanation as "functional" and "causal." However we describe it, the distinc-tion is important and I make further use of it in chapter 10.
4. Sometimes people resist my views because of a mistaken conception of the relations between causation and identity. U. T. Place (1988), for example, writes: "According to Searle mental states are both identical with and causally dependent on the corresponding states of the brain. I say you can't have your
252 Notes to pages 95-155
cake and eat it. Either mental states are identical with brain states or one is causally dependent on the other. They can't be both" (p. 209).
Place is thinking of cases such as "These footprints can be causally depen-dent on the shoes of the burglar, but they can't also be identical with those shoes." But how about: "The liquid state of this water can be causally depen-dent on the behavior of the molecules, and can also be a feature of the system made up of the molecules"? It seems to me just obvious that my present state of consciousness is caused by neuronal behavior in my brain and that very state just is a higher level feature of the brain. If that amounts to having your cake and eating it too, let's eat.
5. This is not an argument for "privileged access" because there is no privilege and no access. I will have more to say about this topic later in this chapter.
6. "Logically, "consciousness" is a stuff term, as "matter" is; and I see nothing wrong, metaphysically, with recognizing that consciousness is a kind of stuff (p. 60)."
7. The alternative explanation is that we have other more general biological urges that are satisfied by these various activities. Compare Elliot Sober's dis-tinction between what is selected and what is selected for (1984, ch. 4).
1. For further discussion of this point, see chapter 2.
1. Even such obvious points as that when one is bored, "time passes more slowly" seem to me to require explanation. Why should time pass more slowly when one is bored?
2. This expression is due to Edelman (1991).
3. Hume, by the way, thought that there couldn't be any such feeling, because if there were, it would have to do a lot of epistemic and metaphysical work that no mere feeling could do. I think in fact we all have a characteristic sense of our own personhood, but it is of little epistemic or metaphysical interest. It does not guarantee "personal identity," "the unity of the self," or any such thing. It is just how, for example, it feels like to me to be me.
4. E.g., by David Woodruff Smith (1986).
1. Lashley 1956. I don't think Lashley means this literally. I think he means that the processes by which the various features of conscious states are pro-duced are never conscious. But even that is an overstatement, and the fact that he resorts to this sort of hyperbole is revealing of the theme I am trying to identify.
Notes to pages 158-213 253
2. See also Searle 1980b, 1984b, and especially 1984a.
3. For these purposes I am contrasting "neurophysiological" and "mental," but of course on the view of mind-body relations that I have been expounding throughout this book, the mental is neurophysiological at a higher level. I con-trast mental and neurophysiological as one might contrast humans and animals without thereby implying that the first class is not included in the second. There is no dualism implicit in my use of this contrast.
4. Specifically David Armstrong, Alison Gopnik, and Pat Hayes.
5. For this discussion I am ignoring Freud's distinction between preconscious and unconscious. For present purposes I call both "unconscious."
1. Especially On Certainty (1969), which I believe is one of the best books on the subject.
2. In discussion.
3. The correct answer to this style of skepticism, I believe, is to explain the role of the Background in meaning and understanding (Searle, unpublished).
4. This is a change from the view I held in Searle 1991. I was convinced of this point by William Hirstein.
1. SOAR is a system developed by Alan Newell and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon University. The name is an acronym for "State, Operator, And Result." For an account see Waldrop 1988.
2. This view is announced and defended in a large number of books and arti-cles many of which appear to have more or less the same title, e.g., Computers and Thought (Feigenbaum and Feldman, eds., 1963), Computers and Thought (Sharpies et al. 1988), The Computer and the Mind (Johnson-Laird 1988), Compu-tation and Cognition (Pylyshyn 1984), "The Computer Model of the Mind" (Block 1990), and of course, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (Turing 1950).
3. This whole research program has been neatly summarized by Gabriel Segal (1991) as follows: "Cognitive science views cognitive processes as computa-tions in the brain. And computation consists in the manipulation of pieces of syntax. The content of the syntactic objects, if any, is irrelevant to the way they get processed. So, it seems, content can figure in cognitive explanations only insofar as differences in content are reflected in differences in the brain's syntax" (p. 463).
4. Pylyshyn comes very close to conceding precisely this point when he writes, "The answer to the question what computation is being performed requires discussion of semantically interpreted computational states" (1984, p. 58) Indeed. And who is doing the interpreting?
254 Notes to pages 218-238
5. People sometimes say that it would have to add six to itself eight times. But that is bad arithmetic. Six added to itself eight times is fifty-four, because six added to itself zero times is still six. It is amazing how often this mistake is made.
6. The example was suggested by John Batali.
1. The brain has, of course, many other features as well that have nothing to do with consciousness. For example, the medulla regulates breathing even when the system is totally unconscious.
2. Lisberger 1988, Lisberger and Pavelko 1988.
3. See Searle 1983, especially chapter 5, for an extended discussion.
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and mental abilities, 202
and semantics, 203
brain processes, 232
plant behavior, 229
antireductionist arguments Jackson, F., Kripke, S., Nagel,T., 116-118
appearance-reality distinction, 121-122
artificial intelligence, 44
as-if intentionality and rules, 245-246
aspect of familiarity, 133-136
aspectual shape, 155,159,164
and perception, 157
undetermined by third-person characterization, 158
associationist psychology, 239
atomic theory of matter, 86
attention, center/periphery of, 137-139
Background, 22, 58, 77, 175-196
argument for, 178
capacities, as manifested by inten-tional behavior, 185
"deep" vs. "local practices," 194
as feature of representations, 190-192
and habitus, 177
hypothesis restated, 189
and interpretation, 192
laws of operation, 195
and literal meaning, 179, 180-181, 183-184
and model of explicitness, 193
and Network, distinction between, 176, 187,186-191
presupposition and collective intentionality, 128
as requirement for interpretation of intentional states, 189-190
and taxonomy of components, 184
behavior, intelligent, 56, 235-236
in terms of linguistic competence, 243
importance of, 69
belief, unconscious, 188
biological naturalism, 1
bodily sensations, 128
as digital computer, 197-226
pre-Darwinian conception of, 229
as universal Turing machine, 202
as computational operations over innate syntax, 201
and causal necessity, 100-104
264 Subject Index
causal explanations (continued)
of cognition, 217, 220
and computational simulation, 218
causal relationships, 68
causal phenomena and rule follow-ing, 238
micro-macro forms, 125
Chinese room argument, 45, 200, 210
Church's thesis, 200
Church-Turing thesis, 202
cognition, causal explanations of, 215-216
cognitive science, 44, 197-226
assumptions of mainstream, 197
cognitivism, 202, 246
compositionality, principle of, 179-180
definition of, 205
as observer-relative characteriza-tion, 211, 212
irrelevant to hardware, 206
and multiple realizability, 207, 209
and universal realizability, 207, 209
computational interpretations, 219
of the brain, 225
and intentionality of homunculus, 219
and brain processes, 218
and causal explanations, 218, 219
computers and syntactical character-ization, 210
conditions of satisfaction, 175
as normative phenomena, 238
connection principle, 155-162
and cause-and-effect relations, 234
and implications, 227-248
as inconsistent with deep uncon-scious rules, 242
objections to, 162-164
violation of, 246-247
connectionism, defense of, 246-247
consciousness, 14, 84-109
and behavior, the principle of the independence of, 69
boundary of, 139
as a causally emergent property, 112
categorization of, 136
conscious states and intentionality, 84
development of a theory of, 247
irreducibility of, 116
and perception, analogy between, 170-172
structure of conscious experience, 127-149
constitutive principles, 62-63
digital computers and simulation of brain operations, 200-218
disjunction problem, 50
dispositional capacity of neurophy-siology, 188
eliminative materialist, 6
emergent properties, 111-112
Emmert's law, 232
empirical, ambiguity of sense, 72
evolutionary biology, 88
explanatory inversion, 228-237
consequences for cognitive science, 234-237
Subject Index 265
mathematic or logic, 72
folk psychology, 5, 6, 46, 58
formal symbol manipulation, 199
of brain processes, 234
as a causal level with respect to observer's interest, 237
logic of, 237
black box, 40-43,49
computer, 7, 40-43
functions and causal relations, 238
Gestalt psychology, 132
and figure ground, 133
and perception, 133
Guillain-Barré syndrome, 68
habitus, Bourdieu's notion of, 177
homunculus fallacy, 212-214, 226
identity theorists, Australian, 37
identity theory, 35
incorrigibility and inattention, 148
and misinterpretation, 148
and Network and Background, 148
indeterminacy of translation, 163
information processing, 223-225
relation to computation, 202
intentional content, attempts to naturalize, 49
intentional level of description, 238
intentional stance, 7
intentional states with wide content, 80
intentionality, 49, 51, 78,130
and aspectual shape, 131
and the function of the non-representational, 189
intrinsic vs. as-if, 156
interpretation, and understanding, 192
intrinsic features, 210-211
doctrine of, 149
intuition, Cartesian, 5
knowledge, practical and theoretical, 194
Korsakov's syndrome, 130 Kripke's modal argument, 3
language acquisition device, (LAD), 242, 244
language of thought, 198, 201, 247
latency and manifestation, 172
Leibniz's law, 38
levels of description of behavior
functional, 229, 230, 234
hardware, 229, 230, 235
intentional, 229, 230, 238
levels of description of the brain mental, 233
linguistic competence, causal expla-nations of, 243
materialism, eliminative, 45-48
memory, iconic, 130
mental states, 6
dispositional account of, 160-161
distinction between representa-tional and nonrepresentational, 189
266 Subject Index
mental states (continued)
ontology of, 16, 154
mental processes as computations, 201
unconscious and conscious, 239
mentalism, naive, 54
as a biological system, 227-228
mind-body problem, 100
other minds problem, 77
as part of the Background, 186
and causal capacity, 188
and conscious intentionality, 188
nonconscious vs. unconscious, 154-155
normative importance of functions, 238
normative phenomena, 238
observer-relative, notion of, 211
pain and C-fiber firings, 250n5
pain, unconscious, 164
causal function of, 240
and counterfactuals, 222
and inference, 232
as intelligent behavior, 231
privileged access, 98
as associative patterns, 240
with and without mental content, 239
notions of, 239
and principle of relating mental contents, 240
Ramsey sentence, 41, 42
recursive decomposition, 213
logical or definitional, 114
property ontological, 113
externalist causal theories of, 49
naturalistic accounts of, 50
deep unconscious mental, 241
and nonrepresentational capacities, 175
relation to Background, 193
as constitutive of states, 244
deep unconscious, 241, 242
and intentional content, 241
as principle or constraint, 243
requirement of causal efficacy, 242, 243
universal grammar, 242
doctrine of, 149
non-intrinsic to syntax, 210
and proof theory, 203
sensory modalities, 128
and intentionality, 129
spectrum inversion, 42, 76
stream of consciousness, 127
stream of thought, 128
Strong AI, 201
Subject Index 267
strong artificial intelligence, 7, 8, 42-45
ontology of, 99-100
superactor/superspartan objection, 35
causal and constitutive notions, 125
lack of causal power, 215
as nonphysical feature, 209
as observer-relative notion, 209
and its relation to problem of semantics, 201
problem of, 201
system features, 112
theoretical entities, 61
Turing test, 44,57
Turing machine, 205
universal machine, 202
Turing's human computer, 216
and Freud, 167
features of, 169
unconscious intentionality vs. nonin-tentional capacities, 189
unconscious rules, 235
unconscious states, 151-173
and accessibility to consciousness, 152
aspectual shape, 156-159
deep and shallow, 162
and generation of consciousness, 188
intentional and intrinsic, 156
ontology of, 159,160
unified sequence, 129
unity of conscious states
binding problem, 130
horizontal and vertical dimen-sions, 130
transcendental unity of appercep-tion, 130
Chomsky's rules of, 197
linguistic and visual, 245
vestibular ocular reflex, (VOR), 236-237
vision, Marr's rules of, 197
Weak AI, 202
Austin, J., 17
Armstrong, D. M., 100, 249n7, 253n4
Batali, J., 209, 254n6
Block, N., 38, 42, 43,84,162,206,207, 213,251n9
Bloom, F. E., 199
Boolos, G. S., 199
Bourdieu, P., 177,193
Carston, R., 181
Changeux, J. P., 100
Chisholm, R., 34
Chomsky, N., 220, 221,249nl2,232, 243
Churchland, P. M., 6, 45, 58, 60, 62, 250n2
Churchland, P. S., 48, 249n3
Churchland, P. M., and P. S., 251n3
Davidson, D., 251n7
Davis, S., 181
Dennett, D. C, 44, 55,149,212, 249n5, 249n7, 251n5
Descartes, 15, 44, 55
Dreyfus, H., 44,138,204, 249n4
Edelmann, G. M., 252n2
Feigenbaum, E. A., 253n2
Feldman, J., 253n2
Feyerband, P., 6, 45
Fodor, J.,38, 42,50,51,58,198,201, 249n8
Foucault, M., 193
Freud, S., 151, 152
Galileo, 5, 85
Gardiner, H., 249n9
Gazzaniga, M. S.,130
Geach, P., 34 Goel, V., 209
Gopnik, A., 253n4
Grice, P., 41
Griffin, D. R., 89
Hampshire, S., 34
Hare, R. M., 125
Haugeland, J., 124, 213
Hayes, P., 253n4
Heidegger, M., 138
Hempel, C, 33
Hirstein, W., 253n4
Hogg, D., 253n2
Horgan, T., 58
Hume, D., 252n3
Hutchinson, C, 253n2
Jackendoff, R., 250n2
Jackson, F., 116-118
James, W., 135,139
Jeffrey, R. C, 199
Johnson-Laird, P. N., 44, 206, 253n2
Kant, E., 17, 127
Kim, J., 125
Kripke, S., 38, 39, 116-118,184, 250n6
Kuffler, S. W., 251n2
Lashley, K., 151, 252n1
Lazerson, A., 199
Lewis, D., 35.41
Lisberger, S. G., 254n2
Lycan, W. G., 39, 55, 250n2
Marr, D., 212, 220, 221
Maturana, H. R., 217
McGinn, C, 249n2, 251n7
Minsky, M., 250n3
Moore, G. E., 125
Nagel, T., 100, 116-118, 249n2, 251nl
Newell, A., 215, 220, 253nl
Nicholls, J. G., 251n2
Nietzsche, F., 177
Ogden, C. K., 35, 250n4
Otterson, M. F., 81
Pavelko, T. A., 254n2
Penfield, W., 107
Penrose, R., 204
Pitts, W. H., 217
Place, U. T., 35, 249nll, 251n4
Postman, L., 136
Putnam, H., 35, 38, 49
Pylyshyn, Z. W., 199, 206, 253n2, 253n4
Quine, W. V. O., 8,164
Ramsey, F. P., 251n8
Récanati, F., 181, 182, 184
Rey, G., 249n6
Richards, I. A., 35, 250n4
Rock, I., 231
Rorty, R., 6, 45, 145, 250nl
Rudermann, D., 251n4
Ryle, G., 33
Sarna, S. K., 81
Searle, J. R., 8, 45, 65, 80, 122, 175, 178,194,200,249n11, 251n4, 252n2,253n3,253n4,254n3
Segal, G., 253n3
Shaffer, J., 36. 38
Sharpies, M., 253n2
Shepherd, G. M., 199
Sher, G., 39
Shiffer, S., 251n10
Smith, B., 209
Smith, W. S., 252n4
Sober, E., 252n7
Stevenson, J. T., 36
Stich, S. P., 58
Torrence, S., 253n2 Turing, A., 202, 205, 253n2
Waldrop, M. M., 253nl
Walk, R., 136
Watson, J. B., 33
Weiskrantz et al., 186
Williams, B., 250n3
Wittgenstein, L., 11, 90, 105, 126, 184, 177 Woodward, J., 5